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ABSTRACT 
 
Forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world. The cause 
of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but there is a growing 
realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is insecure rights to 
ownership and use of forest resources. This realization coupled with a call for pro-
poor forestry policy has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward 
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from 
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and 
extract forest resources. However, a big puzzle remains unsolved—such reforms on 
property rights have not consistently led to the intended sustainable resource use and 
management, particularly in developing countries.  
The overall goal of this dissertation research is to offer insight into why forest 
tenure reforms may not always lead to their intended effects by focusing on how an 
individual’s preferences over time and risk affect individual responses to forest tenure 
reforms. Since forest management involves dynamic decision making with uncertainty 
in future returns, individuals’ forest management decisions, as well as their responses 
to forest tenure reforms, will depend on: 1) how an individual perceives preference for 
income today versus the future (time preference), and 2) an individual’s attitude 
towards risk (risk preference). For example, even if individuals are given secure 
property rights, those with strong preference for current benefits (most commonly 
observed among the poor) may have the incentive to use forest resources faster. 
Failure to recognize the impacts of time and risk preferences of individuals may result 
in outcomes that policy maker sought to prevent. Furthermore, forest tenure reforms 
  
 
are often implemented in areas where the poverty rate is high. Those living in poverty 
are often assumed to have both high discount rates (i.e., impatient) and high levels of 
risk aversion, which make them less likely to make investments. Such characteristics 
may also hinder the intended effects of forest tenure reforms. 
This study examines these issues in the context of rural China, where a large-scale 
reform of forest property rights is being implemented in areas where the poverty rate 
is still high. To examine these issues, this dissertation research has three objectives: 1) 
identify the impact of forest property rights reforms on forest management decisions 
and how individual risk and time preferences may augment those impacts; 2) examine 
the correlation between time and risk preferences and poverty; and 3) identify the 
effect of the forest tenure reform on household wealth. 
This dissertation research contributes to the literature on the effect of property 
rights reforms on natural resource management in developing countries in several 
ways. This study is the first to use a large-scale property rights reform to examine the 
heterogeneity of its impact on forest management due to risk and time preferences. 
Moreover, it integrates experimental economics methods into natural resource 
management, which is an innovative approach to test the behavioral reactions to policy 
alternatives. This study is unique because it tests the theory by integrating field 
experiments to capture risk and time preferences and panel survey data to capture 
poverty and forest management decisions. 
To achieve the research objectives, I first designed experiments to capture 
individual time and risk preferences and then ran them in the field with farmers in 
China. Then I integrated data the field experiment data with a household panel data in 
  
 
an econometric framework. In manuscript 1, I use this integrated data set to examine 
how preferences over time (present vs. future) and risk can affect households’ forest 
management responses to strengthened forest property rights. I find that risk and time 
preferences impact households’ forest management responses to forest plot 
certification. Specifically, in response to forest certification, more risk averse 
households used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying inputs, while 
more loss averse households used more labor for harvesting. Households with higher 
discount rates (i.e., impatient) used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on 
forest inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds) in response to receiving a 
forest certificate.  
Manuscript 2 investigates the correlation between poverty and individual 
preferences for time and risk. The classic assumption is that the poor have both high 
levels of risk aversion and high discount rates. Contrary to this assumption, my 
research demonstrates that wealth does not have a significant effect on risk aversion or 
loss aversion (with the one exception that households with more forestland per capita 
are less loss averse). However, consistent with this assumption I find statistically weak 
evidence that households with lower wealth have higher discount rates (i.e., more 
impatient).  
In manuscript 3, I examine the effect of forest tenure reform on household wealth. 
I find statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has had a positive effect 
on household wealth, specifically, increased tenure security in the form of a forest 
certificate increased net worth per capita by 42% between 2000 and 2008. To further 
examine the source of increased wealth, I also examine the effect of the reform on 
  
 
household forest use. Results suggest that forest certification increased bamboo 
revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a forest certificate) increased non-timber 
forest product revenue, although these results are statistically weak. Overall 
manuscript 3 provides weak evidence that forest tenure reform garners potential for 
improving poor rural households’ livelihoods in China.  
Overall this dissertation research demonstrates that time and risk preferences 
matter for forest management and responses to forest tenure reforms. This suggests 
that policymakers designing and implementing tenure reforms should consider the 
particular context of the reform and consider coupling the reform with appropriate 
programs and instruments to alleviate poverty and to help households’ to deal with 
risks and make long-term investments to further stimulate the intended effects of the 
reform—increased investment in forest resources and improved livelihoods. 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
doctor of philosophy in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics is in the 
manuscript style format. The dissertation is composed of three manuscripts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Forests perform a multitude of ecosystem services and contribute directly to the 
livelihoods of more than one billion people living in extreme poverty (World Bank 
2004). Despite the national and international efforts devoted to global problems of 
deforestation, forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world 
(White et al. 2002).  
The cause of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but there is a 
growing realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is insecure 
rights to ownership and use of forest resources (White et al. 2002; Sunderlin et al. 
2005; FAO 2007; Sunderlin et al. 2008). Property rights to ownership and use of forest 
resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced. This insecurity undermines 
sound forest management, for without secure rights forest holders have few incentives 
to invest in managing and protecting their forest resources. This realization coupled 
with a call for pro-poor forestry policy from international institutions, NGOs, and 
community organizations has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward 
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from 
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and 
extract forest resources (Wunder 2001; Edmonds 2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth et al. 
2004; Sunderlin et al. 2005; Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). In the most forested 
developing countries, this trend has resulted in a doubling of the percent of forest 
owned or controlled by indigenous and rural communities between 1985 and 2000 
(White et al. 2002). By 2050, 40% of the world’s forest is expected to be managed or 
owned by communities and individuals (FAO 2003).  
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However, research to date presents conflicting conclusions regarding the impacts 
of tenure insecurity on forest management. For example, some empirical studies found 
that stronger land tenure facilitated investment in trees (e.g., Ghana (Besley 1995) and 
Ethiopia (Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru 2009)). At the same time, other examples 
illustrate that these reforms have not led to their intended consequence of sustainable 
resource management (Ecuador (Wunder 2000), Indonesia (Barr 2001), Russia (White 
and Martin 2001) and newly independent states of Eastern Europe (INDUFOR 
OY/ECO for the World Bank and World Wildlife Fund Alliance 2001) and others 
(Bromley 1989; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999). 
This dissertation research attempts to offer insight into why forest tenure reforms 
may not always lead to their intended effects by focusing on how an individual’s 
preferences over time and risk affect individual responses to forest tenure reforms 
(Figure 0.1). Forest management involves decisions about investments with long time 
horizons and those decisions involve uncertainties (e.g., price uncertainty; uncertainty 
about future growth and quality of retained stands; uncertainty about property rights 
and expropriation; uncertainty associated with outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest 
fire and the occurrence of extreme weather events) (Newman 2002; Alvarez and 
Koskela 2004; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). Since forest 
management involves dynamic decision making with uncertainty in future returns, 
individuals’ forest management decisions, as well as their responses to forest tenure 
reforms, will depend on: 1) how an individual perceives preference for income today 
versus in the future (time preference), and 2) an individual’s attitude towards risk (risk 
preference). By taking individual preferences into account, we may find that forest 
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tenure reform has the intended effects on individuals with some characteristics, while 
it does not have the intended effects on others. This heterogeneity in policy effect may 
be masked in studies that find negligible effect of the reforms. 
In a developing country context, the potential correlation between individual 
preferences and the effect of forest tenure reforms is also associated with poverty. The 
intended effect of forest tenure reforms is to increase tenure security. Economic theory 
predicts that increased tenure security will give households greater incentives to invest 
without fear of expropriation. This increased investment should raise productivity and 
cash flows, which in turn should stimulate incomes as well as land values and general 
levels of economic activity, helping the rural poor escape from poverty (Demsetz 
1997; Besley 1995; World Bank 2003; Feder 1999; Conning and Deb 2007). This 
often-assumed premise is examined specifically in this dissertation. Moreover, 
households living in poverty are often assumed to be highly risk averse (Bardhan and 
Udry 1999; Stiglitz) and have high rates of discount rates (impatient), which keep 
them from making investments. This assertion is also tested in this dissertation. In sum, 
I examine four main hypotheses (Figure 0.1): H1) Forest property right reforms affect 
how individuals manage their forest resources; H2) Time and risk preferences affect 
forest management and therefore also augment individual forest management 
responses to forest property rights reforms; H3) Time and risk preferences are 
negatively correlated with wealth; and H4) Household wealth increases as a result of 
the forest tenure reforms.  
Economic theory predicts that increased tenure security from tenure reform will 
increase households’ investment in forest resources. However, because investment and 
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forest management decisions are dynamic, there are several possible paths by which 
households may reach a higher steady state investment level (I*) in response to the 
tenure reform (Figure 0.2). Households’ investment paths may depend on factors such 
as their available capital, access to credit, other investment opportunities, forest 
product market conditions, forest plot characteristics, and individual preferences. For 
example, line (a) depicts a trajectory in which a household instantaneously increases 
investment to the optimal level in response to the tenure reform. A household with 
abundant capital or ability to borrow such that it can invest as soon as its land tenure is 
strengthened may follow an investment path like (a). Alternatively, a household 
without access to capital or credit or that has a high discount rate (i.e., impatient) may 
not increase investment even with strengthened tenure, as depicted by line (d). Lastly, 
in response to the tenure reform households may exhibit a period of transition during 
which the household increases the investment level towards a new steady-state level. 
During the transition period, a household may increase investment gradually, as 
depicted by line (b) or in a series of steps (c), depending on their particular 
circumstances. A household’s investment path may look like (c) if, for example, the 
household is risk averse and is unsure about the security of their new property rights, 
or if a household cannot access capital or credit quickly. Such a household may wait a 
period of time before increasing investment.  
Increased investment should raise productivity and cash flows, which in turn 
should stimulate forest revenue. As with changes in investment, changes in forest 
revenue may take different paths towards a higher steady state level of forest revenue, 
R* (Figure 0.3). Households’ forest revenue depends on both their investment and 
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harvesting decisions, which in turn depend on a variety of factors such as their 
available capital, access to credit, other investment opportunities, forest plot 
characteristics, product market conditions, and personal preferences. For example, a 
household that is able to invest in its forest plot immediately following the reform may 
see a gradual increase in forest revenue over a transition period, as depicted by line 
(a), before it reaches the long-term steady state level of forest revenue, R*. 
Alternatively, a household that is unable to invest following the reform may not 
experience any increase in forest revenue, as depicted by line (b). Furthermore, a 
household may experience a temporary dip in forest revenue during the transition 
period, as depicted by line (c). This temporary dip may occur if a household with 
strengthened land tenure now waits until the new, longer optimal harvesting age is 
reached. The next subsection will explain how the three manuscripts in this 
dissertation investigate these hypotheses. 
Outline of the three manuscripts 
In Manuscript 1, I examine the relationships in H1 and H2. Specifically, I examine 
how forest tenure reform affects harvesting behavior and investment in forest plots. 
Increased tenure security gives households confidence that if they invest in their plot 
(planting, maintenance, etc.) then they will be able to obtain the benefits from those 
efforts in the future (Demsetz 1967; Besley 1995). As such, I hypothesize that 
households that were subject to forest tenure reform will have an incentive to invest in 
their forests resources and delay harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold is 
reached (H1).   
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Furthermore, in manuscript 1, I investigate the heterogeneity in the effects of the 
forest tenure reform by focusing on risk and time preferences as the source of 
heterogeneity (H2). Households making forest management decisions face many 
uncertainties. Furthermore, decisions about forest management often involve a long 
time horizon (Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 
2011). As such, households’ risk and time preferences take an important role in their 
forest management decisions (Newman 2002; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al. 
2008), and may affect their responses to forest tenure reforms. Certain types of 
households’ risk and time preferences may lead forest tenure reform to affect forest 
management in ways that are consistent with what policymakers intended. For 
example, assuming that with forest tenure reform a household believes that there has 
been a reduction in the risk of expropriation of its forest plot, then a household that is 
more risk averse may make more investments on the forest plots than a risk neutral or 
risk seeking household. Alternatively, households’ risk and time preferences may 
cause them to respond to receiving a forest tenure reform in a way that is contrary to 
what policymakers intended. For example, in response to forest tenure reform, a 
household that has a high discount rate (impatient) may make less investment than a 
household with a low discount rate. Relatedly, a household that is more loss averse 
(i.e., has a tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains and to 
dramatically overweight losses relative to gains) may make less investment after a 
forest tenure reform than a household that is less loss averse. Therefore the intended 
effect (increased investment) that policymakers expected in response to a forest tenure 
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reform may be weak or may not be exhibited by households with high discount rates 
or a high degree of loss aversion.  
In manuscript 2, I examine the association between poverty and individual 
preferences (H3). Households living in poverty are often assumed to be highly risk 
averse and have high discount rates (impatient), characteristics that keep them from 
making investments (Fisher 1930; Lipton 1968; Lumley 1997; Bardhan and Udry 
1999; Fafchamps 2003). Since Binswanger’s early use of experimental economics to 
capture risk preferences in India in the 1980s and Pender’s work also in India in the 
late 1990’s, economists have been examining the correlation between poverty, risk and 
time preferences. However, empirical findings on whether individual time and risk 
preferences vary with wealth have been mixed (e.g., Binswanger 1980; Pender 1996; 
Kirby et al. (2002) Nielsen 2001; Wik 2004; Mosley and Verschoor 2005; Chytilová 
and Morduch (2010)). Manuscript 2 offer new empirical evidence. 
Finally, manuscript 3 examines whether or not household wealth has increased as a 
result of the forest tenure reform (H4). In addition to increasing investment in forest 
resources, an additional goal of the forest tenure reform in many developing countries 
is to improve households’ livelihoods. Economic theory predicts that with more secure 
property rights, households will have a greater incentive to invest in their forest 
resources without fear of expropriation, which will stimulate income (Demsetz 1967; 
Besley 1995; Feder 1999; Coning and Deb 2007). There is growing evidence that 
forest tenure reforms cause changes in local livelihoods but those changes have been 
both positive and negative (Shackleton and Campbell 2001; Edmunds and Wollenberg 
2003; Jagger, Pender and Gebremedhin 2005; Sikor and Nguyen 2007). Manuscript 3 
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offers new empirical evidence based on a large-scale forest property rights reform. 
Specifically, I examine how changes in forest land tenure affect households’ net worth 
per capita, and further examine to see if the source of this effect is from changes in 
revenue from bamboo and non-timber forest products.   
I examine these issues empirically in the context of China’s collective forests, 
where a large-scale reform of forest property rights began in 2003 in rural areas where 
the poverty rate is still high. The reform was aimed at delegating responsibility of 
forest management from the collective (by townships and villages) to households and 
strengthening property rights with the distribution of forest certificates that establish 
the use of a specific forest plot for a period of 30-70 years and expand rights to include 
those of land transfer, inheritance, and mortgaging (Xu et al. 2009). An advantage of 
this study is that we utilize this actual change in forest property rights whereas 
previous studies have used proxy variables (e.g., number of conflict with abutters and 
duration of residence in a village) that are either subjective or indirect measures and 
may not accurately measure tenure security (Godoy et al 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; 
Hagos and Holden 2006). China’s collectively owned forests total approximately 100 
million hectares and are home to more than 400 million people, which arguably makes 
these reforms the largest one undertaken in modern times both in terms of forest area 
and people affected (Xu et al. 2010). In China, many people living in or near forests 
are poor (Zhou and Veeck 1999), and while there has been a dramatic reduction in the 
poverty rate in China over the last decades, poverty is still a serious problem, 
particularly in rural areas (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 2009). The recent rapid and 
dramatic changes in forest tenure in poor regions in China makes it an ideal context to 
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study how individual preferences affect forest management decisions and the 
implications for the effectiveness of strengthening property rights to stimulate 
investment in forest resources and improve households’ livelihoods. 
To test these hypotheses, I combine original field experiment data on risk and time 
preferences collected from among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an 
original panel survey data set collected from among the same 103 households in 2006 
and 2009. The panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and 
qualitative data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the 
reform). The major strength of the time and risk preference data is that I use 
experiments with real monetary rewards, which reduces hypothetical biases that exist 
in previous related studies (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, our risk preference experiment design follows a recently developed 
methodology that expands the classic lottery experiment of Holt and Laury (2002) to 
allow for estimation of a more flexible and richer description of a person’s risk 
preference as described under prospect theory—the degree of risk aversion, the degree 
of loss aversion, and a nonlinear probability weighting measure (Tanaka et al. 2010).  
 In examining these hypotheses there are econometric challenges that must be 
addressed. For example, in manuscript 1, I aim to identify how heterogeneity in 
households’ time and risk preferences may impact the average effect of forest plot 
certification on household forest management (H1). To identify this effect, the ideal 
would be to compare forest management outcomes under the counterfactual of no 
forest certification. But plots cannot both receive a forest certificate and not receive a 
forest certificate, and so actual counterfactuals cannot be observed. Instead we need to 
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estimate the value of this unobserved counterfactual’s outcomes by obtaining a 
comparison group of plots that did not receive a forest certificate. The identification 
problem is that it is difficult to identify a reliable comparison group for those receiving 
a forest certificate because of non-random placement of forest plot certification and/or 
self-selection of households into forest plot certification. Without a carefully selected 
comparison group, we risk incorrectly attributing differences in measured forest 
management outcomes between those plots for which households received a forest 
certificate and plots for which households did not receive a forest certificate to forest 
plot certification when in fact they may be due to initial differences in observed (e.g., 
education of the head of household) and unobserved characteristics (e.g., 
entrepreneurial ability) between the two groups (Conning and Deb 2007). To address 
these sources of biases, we use a variety of econometric techniques throughout the 
three manuscripts, including: preprocessed matched data in a difference-in-differences 
framework, fixed effects, and instrumental variable approach. 
The outcome of this research has implications for policymakers in China and 
elsewhere by informing when they can expect property right reforms to stimulate 
investment in the resource and when they may not as a result of heterogeneity in 
households’ risk and time preferences. The results may indicate that instruments to 
deal with risk, time preferences, and poverty need to be coupled with such reforms. 
Although this research is conducted in the context of forests, the general finding may 
also apply to other natural resources where lack of property rights have been 
recognized as a key barrier to sustainable management of natural resources.  
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Figure 0.1 Main Hypotheses 
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Figure 0.2 Examples of investment paths following forest tenure reform 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  T* indicates the optimal rotation age under well-defined property rights. This figure 
assumes that the optimal rotation time with well-defined property rights is longer than with 
weaker property rights and that prior to the reform the rotation is shorter than optimal. I* is the 
optimal steady state investment level. (a) indicates a trajectory in which a household 
instantaneously increases investment to the optimal level after the tenure reform. (b) and (c) 
include a transition period after the tenure reform during which the investment level increases 
towards the new steady state level.  (d) is a trajectory in which the tenure reform does not 
affect the investment level.  
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Figure 0.3 Examples of forest revenue paths following forest tenure reform 
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Note:  T* indicates the optimal rotation age under well-defined property rights. This figure 
assumes that the optimal rotation time with well-defined property rights is longer than with 
weaker property rights and that prior to the reform the rotation is shorter than optimal.  R* 
indicates the optimal steady state forest revenue level. (a) indicates a transition period after the 
tenure reform during which the forest revenue increases towards the new steady state level. (b) 
indicates a trajectory where the tenure reform does not affect forest revenue. (c) is a trajectory 
where forest revenue falls temporarily during the transition period. 
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MANUSCRIPT 1 
Impact of Risk and Time Preferences on Responses to Forest Land Tenure 
Reform: Empirical Evidence from Fujian, China 
 
1.1 Abstract 
 
We examine how preferences over time (present vs. future) and risk can affect 
households’ forest management responses to strengthened forest property rights. We 
investigate this question in the context of rural Fujian, China, where a large-scale 
reform of property rights began in 2003. The different extent of the reform and its 
different timing across villages provide a natural experiment to test how time and risk 
preferences affect households’ forest management activities in response to the reform. 
Empirically, we combine original field experiment data on time and risk preferences 
collected from among 103 households with an original panel survey data set collected 
from among the same households. The panel data set contains data for three years: 
2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform). We preprocess the data 
using matching methods and then use difference-in-differences to identify the impact 
of the reform and its sensitivity to risk and time preferences on three measures of 
household forest management: labor for applying forest inputs to each plot, 
expenditure on inputs for each forest plot and labor for harvesting forest products from 
each plot. The status of the forest tenure reform on each forest plot is captured by an 
indicator variable of whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot. 
Results show that risk and time preferences impact households’ forest management 
responses to forest plot certification. Specifically, in response to forest certification, 
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more risk averse households used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying 
forest inputs, while more loss averse households used more labor for harvesting. 
Households with higher discount rates (i.e., stronger preference for income today) 
used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on forest inputs in response to forest 
certification. 
1.2 Introduction 
 
Forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world (White et 
al. 2002). The cause of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but 
there is a growing realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is 
the insecurity of rights to ownership and use of forest resources (White et al. 2002; 
Sunderlin et al. 2005; FAO 2007; Sunderlin et al. 2008). Property rights to ownership 
and use of forest resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced. This 
insecurity undermines sound forest management, for without secure rights forest 
holders have few incentives to invest in managing and protecting their forest 
resources. This realization has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward 
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from 
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and 
extract forest resources (Edmonds 2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth et al. 2004). In the 
most forested developing countries, this trend has resulted in a doubling of the percent 
of forest owned or controlled by indigenous and rural communities between 1985 and 
2000 (White et al. 2002). By 2050, 40% of the world’s forest is expected to be 
managed or owned by communities and individuals (FAO 2003). However, a puzzle 
remains unsolved—such reforms on property rights have not consistently led to the 
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intended sustainable resource use and management, particularly in developing 
countries (Bromley 1989; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston et al. 1999; Bohn et al. 
2000; Wunder 2000; Barr 2001; White et al. 2002; Jagger et al. 2005). 
Despite the existence of this puzzle, a lack of attention has been given to 
understanding the heterogeneity in how people respond to property rights reforms 
depending on their individual preferences. In particular, given that forest management 
decisions need to be made by looking into the future and therefore inherently contain 
uncertainties (e.g., price uncertainty; uncertainty about future growth and quality of 
retained stands; uncertainty about property rights and expropriation; uncertainty 
associated with outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest fire and the occurrence of 
extreme weather events), the two key factors that would influence a forest 
management decisions are: 1) the household’s preference for income today versus in 
the future (time preference), and (2) the household’s attitude towards risk (risk 
preference).  
In this paper, we examine how households’ preferences over time (present vs. 
future income) and risk affect forest management responses to property rights reforms. 
For example, even if households are given secure property rights, those with strong 
preference for current benefits (commonly observed among the poor) may have the 
incentive to harvest forest resources faster. Given that resource management is a 
dynamic problem and thus inherently faces uncertainties, failure to recognize the 
impacts of households’ time and risk preferences may result in outcomes that 
policymakers sought to prevent through the implementation of the reform.   
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We examine these issues by capitalizing on a large-scale reform of forest land 
tenure in Fujian Province, China that began in 2003. Under this reform, the 
responsibility of forest planting and management were transferred from collective 
management (by townships and villages) to households. The different extent of the 
reform, its different timing across villages and the resulting variation in the years 
households received forest certificates for plots provide a natural experiment to test 
how time and risk preferences affect households’ forest management activities in 
response to the reform. 
Empirically, we combine original field experiment data on risk and time 
preferences collected from among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an 
original panel survey data set collected from among the same 103 households in 2006 
and 2009. The panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and 
qualitative data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the 
reform). To capture household forest management, we examine labor used for 
applying forest inputs to each plot, expenditure on inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticide 
and seeds) for each plot, and labor used for harvesting from each plot. The status of 
the forest tenure reform on each forest plot is captured by an indicator variable of 
whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot. The major strength of 
the time and risk preference data is that we use experiments with real monetary 
rewards, which reduces hypothetical biases that exist in previous related studies 
(Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos et al. 2006). Our time preference 
experiment uses methods originally developed by Coller and Williams (1999) and 
Harrison and Lau (2002). The data are then used to estimate three parameters in a 
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general time discounting model using nonlinear least-squares (Benhabib et al. 2007; 
Tanaka et al. 2010). Furthermore, our risk preference experiment design follows a 
recently developed methodology that expands the classic lottery experiment of Holt 
and Laury (2002) to allow for the estimation of a more flexible and richer description 
of a person’s risk preference as described under prospect theory (Liu 2008; Tanaka et 
al. 2010). To capture risk preferences, we use the data to estimate three parameters: 
the degree of risk aversion, the degree of loss aversion and a nonlinear probability 
weighting measure. The combined experiment and household survey data allow us to 
link behavior elicited in experiments to actual economic institutions and performance, 
which few studies have previously done (Cardenas et al. 2005).  
To identify the effect of forest tenure reform and how risk and time preferences 
augment the effect, we use matching techniques to preprocess the data (Ho et al. 2007) 
and then use the preprocessed matched data in a difference-in-differences framework. 
The strategy capitalizes on the exogenous variation across villages of the starting year 
of the reform, and the resulting variation in the year households received a forest 
certificate for their plots. Results show that risk and time preferences impact 
households’ forest management responses to forest plot certification. Specifically, in 
response to forest certification more risk averse households reduced labor for 
harvesting more and increased labor for applying inputs more, while more loss averse 
households increased labor for harvesting more. As such, the results of this paper have 
implications for policymakers in China and elsewhere by informing them about how 
heterogeneity in households’ preferences may impact the outcomes of property right 
reforms.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of the forest 
tenure reform history in China, with an emphasis on the recent tenure reforms in 
Fujian, China. The next section provides an overview of the most relevant literature, 
followed by the hypotheses to be tested. An explanation of the data collection 
procedures and a description of the data follow. Then the empirical framework is 
outlined, followed by the results and a conclusion.  
1.3 China’s Forest Tenure Reform 
 
This paper examines changes in forest property rights in the context of China, 
specifically in Fujian Province. China’s forest area accounts for 4.5 percent of the 
world’s total. China has two main categories of forest landownership. Approximately 
42 percent of forest land in China is owned by the state and the rest is owned by the 
collective (Liu and Lixia 2009). Since the early 1950s, forest tenure and management 
policies of China’s collective forests have undergone fundamental changes. 
Collectivization of non-state owned forests began in 1956, and remained dominant 
until the reforms of the 1980s (Xu et al. 2009). Under collectivization, administrative 
villages, usually comprised of a number of natural villages or clusters of families, 
functioned as the legal owners of collective forests, and households had little active 
participation in management. For households there were no links between or among 
their rights to forests, their responsibility for forest establishment and management, 
and their benefits from forests (Dachang 2001). 
The first major wave of reforms in China’s collective forests began in 1981, and 
was aimed at transferring the responsibility of forest planting and management from 
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the collective to households (Miao et al. 2004). By 1986, nearly 70% of collectively 
owned forest land had been transferred to rural household management (Xu et al. 
2009). In 1987, however, due the occurrence of unsustainable logging the government 
reverted a large portion of forest land under household management back to collective 
management (Hyde et al. 2003).  
By 1986, while 70% of the collectively owned forest land in China had been 
transferred to rural household management, in Fujian only 32% of the collective forest 
land had been distributed for household management (CFYB 1987). This low 
percentage of forest land under household management was due to the fact that Fujian 
had not fully participated in the first round of the tenure reforms in the 1980s. Instead, 
the provincial government in Fujian had implemented a shareholding system to keep 
forests under collective management while distributing “paper shares” of collective 
forests based on family population. In Fujian, forest land was not actually physically 
distributed, rather only dividends from the forest were distributed to households. At 
first Fujian’s shareholding system was highly regarded by forest administrators for its 
ability to maintain forests under collective management but fifteen years after 
establishment of the system, two issues became increasingly evident (Xu et al. 2009). 
First, forestry’s contribution to rural incomes was negligible in spite of the fact that 
forest land occupies more than 60% of the total provincial land area, and 80% of rural 
land area (Qin 2008). Second, enforcing forest conservation had become increasingly 
difficult for local forest authorities due to lack of cooperation from farmers. For 
example, the severity of forest fire incidents grew over the course of the 1990s, and 
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there is anecdotal evidence that many of the fires were caused by farmers (Xu et al. 
2009).  
Under these circumstances, in 2003 the second wave of reforms was officially 
approved by the provincial government in Fujian province.1 In this second wave of 
reforms, Fujian, the largest but once resistant collective forest province, adopted forest 
tenure reforms aimed at individualization of forest land. The decisions regarding forest 
land reallocation during this reform required a 2/3 majority vote by the village 
representative committees or the village assemblies. Redistribution of plots was 
accompanied by legal contracts and forest certificates with extended contract periods 
of 30 to 70 years, whereas previously contract periods had only been 5 to 15 years 
(Liu and Lixia 2009). Furthermore, adoption of the Rural Land Contract Law allowed 
for the expansion of rights under the new forest certificates to include those of land 
transfer, inheritance, and mortgaging (Xu et al. 2009). 
Since 2007, fourteen provinces have initiated reforms aimed at both delegating 
collectively owned forest land to direct household management and strengthening 
property rights with forest certificates for both households already managing forest 
plots individually and for new forest plots distributed to households. China’s main 
objectives with this reform are to increase forest coverage, increase farmers’ 
enthusiasm for forest management and investment, and improve farmers’ livelihoods 
(Liu and Lixia 2009). However, China’s extensive reform, may not achieve these 
desired outcomes. The primary recipients of forest certificates during China’s reforms 
have been the rural poor. Individuals living in poverty often exhibit risk aversion and 
have relatively high rates of time preference (a preference for income and 
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consumption today), which keeps them from making long-term investments (Fisher 
1930; Lawrance 1991; World Bank 2000). These common characteristics of the poor 
not only have traditionally been cited as reasons why the poor remain poor but they 
may also hinder the anticipated outcome of creating and strengthening forest property 
rights through the issuance of forest certificates for household forest plots. Therefore, 
it is of critical importance to understand the effect of time and risk preferences on 
household forest management responses to changes in forest property rights.  
1.4 Property Rights, Individual Preferences, and Natural Resource Management 
 
Economic theory predicts that if a natural resource is open access, individual 
extractors do not fully incorporate the resource cost associated with current extraction 
and thus the resource is overexploited (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968). Moreover, 
without secure property rights, individuals lack long-term incentives to use their forest 
resources (White et al. 2002). In rural areas of poor countries, many forests are subject 
to open-access extraction even if the government has the property right for the forest 
because property rights are difficult and costly to enforce (Larson et al. 1990). This 
lack of secure property rights is recognized as one of the key underlying causes of 
continued forest degradation in many parts of the world. In response to this 
recognition, many governments have begun to reform forest ownership policies by 
devolving resource management to the local level, giving individuals or communities 
rights to manage and extract the resources (White et al. 2002; FAO 2003). 
Research to date, however, presents conflicting conclusions regarding the impacts 
of tenure security reform on forest management decisions. For example, Besley (1995) 
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and Holden et al. (2009) find empirical evidence that better land rights facilitated 
investment in trees in Ghana and Ethiopia, respectively. At the same time, other 
examples illustrate that tenure reforms have not led to their intended consequence of 
sustainable resource management (e.g., Indonesia (Barr 2001), Russia (White et al. 
2002) and newly independent states of Eastern Europe (INDUFOR OY/ECO for The 
World Bank and World Wildlife Fund Alliance 2001) and others (Bromley 1989; 
Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston et al. 1999; Bohn et al. 2000).   
This paper examines why tenure reforms may not work as intended from a 
microeconomics perspective, focusing on how risk and time preferences augment 
individual households’ responses to forest property rights reforms. In forest 
management, households must make decisions about investments over a long time 
horizon. Furthermore, forest management decisions involve uncertainty over prices 
and about future growth and quality of retained stands and various production risks 
such as outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest fire; and the occurrence of extreme 
weather events (e.g., blizzards, flooding, earthquakes, etc.) as well as uncertainty 
about property rights and possible expropriation (Alvarez and Koskela 2004; Nielsen 
and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). Specifically in China, the problems of pests 
and disease are extremely serious with increasing types, expanding affected areas, and 
shortening of intervals between attacks, as well as threats from forest fire (Kunshan et 
al. 1997; Wenhua 2004; Dong et al. 2006). Between 2003 and 2007, China (along with 
the United States, the Russian Federation, India and Poland) reported the highest 
average number of forest fires at more than 10,000 per year (FAO 2010). China also 
has a history of extreme weather events causing severe damage to forest resources. For 
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example, storms and blizzards in January 2008 damaged 18.6 million hectares of 
forest in eight provinces in China (FAO 2010). Since forest management involves 
dynamic decision making with uncertainty in future returns, household forest 
management decisions, as well as responses to increased tenure security, will depend 
on households’ time and risk preferences (Newman 2002; Nielsen and Kristensen 
2005; Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al. 2008; Wilson et 
al. 2011).  
Failure to recognize the impact of risk and time preferences on individual 
responses to forest property rights reforms may result in outcomes policymakers 
sought to prevent. These factors become even more important in poor economies 
because risk and time preferences are often found to be correlated with wealth—the 
poor tend to be more risk averse and have a strong time preference for the present.2 
Yet to our knowledge, no previous study has directly examined how risk and time 
preferences affect household responses to property right reforms. This paper extends 
the literature on property rights reform by using a large-scale property rights reform to 
examine the heterogeneity of its impact due to risk and time preferences.  
The most relevant set of previous work includes Godoy et al.’s (1998; 2001) 
studies in Bolivia on how tenure insecurity and rate of time preference affect forest 
resource harvesting and Hagos et al.’s (2006) study in Ethiopia on how tenure 
insecurity and time and risk preferences affect investment in land conservation. Godoy 
et al. (1998; 2001) use the duration of a household’s residence in the village and the 
number of conflicts with abutters as proxies for tenure security, and find mixed results. 
The length of residence in the village was associated with a lower area of old-growth 
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forest cleared but with a greater area of fallow forest cleared, whereas the opposite 
was true for conflict with abutters. Conflict was associated with a smaller area of 
fallow forest cleared but with a greater area of old-growth forest cut. Hagos et al. 
(2006) find that neither the degree of tenure security nor individual time and risk 
preferences explains the differences in land conservation and investment decisions.  
Although these studies are informative, the measures of risk and time preferences 
and tenure security need to be improved to achieve stronger confidence in the 
estimates. Hagos et al. (2006) elicited risk and time preferences from households using 
hypothetical questions. Results using this method to elicit risk and time preferences 
may suffer from hypothetical bias, which means that people respond differently when 
the situation is hypothetical than when the situation is real (Cardenas et al. 2005). By 
designing questions or experiments to elicit time and risk preferences that offer 
subjects real payoffs based on their choices, hypothetical bias can be reduced. (Smith 
et al. 1993; List et al. 2002). Godoy et al. (1998) elicited time preferences by asking 
subjects if they would prefer one piece of candy now (at the midpoint of an interview) 
or two at the end of the interview. Although this method involves a real reward, the 
authors acknowledge that the choice of candy to measure time preference over a very 
short time may not capture with accuracy time preference or commitment for 
economic investments, which take place over a longer stretch of time, such as for 
forest resources. Godoy et al. (2001) elicited risk preferences using hypothetical 
questions but elicited time preferences using a series of choices with real monetary 
payoffs. In this paper, we use risk and time preference parameters elicited using 
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economic experiments with real monetary payoffs; therefore the hypothetical bias is 
reduced.  
In addition, the measures of tenure security also require improvement to achieve 
more reliable estimates. These studies use proxy variables such as number of conflicts 
with abutters and duration of residence in a village (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 
2001; Hagos and Holden 2006). These proxies are either subjective or indirect 
measures and may not accurately measure tenure security. In this paper, we utilize 
actual changes in forest property rights and use a more explicit and discrete measure 
of forest property right changes. 
Furthermore, we estimate the joint effect of risk and time preferences on individual 
responses to changes in property rights, which none of these previous studies have 
done. Interacting the risk and time preferences with changes in forest property rights 
allows us to capture how risk and time preferences augment forest management 
decisions in response to changes in forest property rights.  
1.5 Hypotheses  
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis (1) is based on the theory that increased tenure security gives 
households an incentive to invest in their forest resources; that is to increase labor 
allocation for applying inputs, to increase expenditure on inputs, and to delay harvest 
Hypothesis 1: The estimated forest certification effect (the conditional 
average difference in each forest management activity on plots for which 
a household has a forest certificate) will be positive when the dependent 
forest management variable is the value of labor used to apply inputs or 
expenditure on inputs and negative when it is the value of labor used for 
harvesting forest product. 
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until the optimal harvest time (Demsetz 1967; Besley 1995). A forest certificate 
increases a household’s tenure security. Increased tenure security gives households 
confidence that if they invest in their plot (planting, maintenance, etc.) then they will 
be able to obtain the benefits from those efforts in the future. As such, households that 
receive a forest certificate for a plot will use more labor to apply inputs, spend more 
on inputs and will delay harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold is reached. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Risk and time preferences augment households’ responses 
to forest property right reforms. 
 
Households making forest management decisions face many uncertainties such as 
those related to prices, growth and quality of retained stands, redistribution of forest 
land, outbreaks of disease, pest infestations, forest fire, and extreme weather events. 
Furthermore, decisions about forest management often involve a long time horizon 
(Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). As 
such, households’ risk and time preferences play an important role in their forest 
management decisions (Newman 2002; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al. 2008), 
and by extension will affect their responses to forest property right reforms. 
To model risk preferences we use prospect theory because it allows for the 
estimation of a more flexible and richer description of a person’s risk preferences than 
under expected utility theory. Most previous risk preference experiments conducted in 
the field are based on the expected utility theory notion of risk preferences but these 
models often fit experimental and field data less well than models with multiple 
components of risk preference (Camerer 2000; Cardenas et al. 2008). In expected 
utility theory, an individual’s risk preferences are solely characterized by the 
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concavity of the utility function and are classified as risk averse, risk neutral or risk 
seeking. In contrast, prospect theory allows for the possibility that an individual may 
be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking, depending on whether choices involve 
gains or losses and whether the probabilities of gains or losses are large or small 
(Kahneman et al. 1979). Under prospect theory, an individual’s risk preferences are 
described by three measures: the degree of risk aversion, the degree of loss aversion, 
and a nonlinear probability weighting measure. We use these three parameters to 
represent a household’s risk preferences. Hypotheses 2a thru 2f describe our 
hypotheses regarding each of these parameters. 
Hypothesis 2a: A more risk averse household will allocate less labor for 
application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs and allocate more 
labor to harvesting. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: A more risk averse household will exhibit a stronger 
behavioral response to forest certification (allocate more labor to 
application of forest inputs, spend more on forest inputs, and allocate less 
labor to harvesting). 
 
With regard to a household’s degree of risk aversion, we hypothesize that a more 
risk averse household will be less likely to assume the risks associated with forest 
production (such as potential loss of forest stock due to pests, disease, illegal logging, 
natural disaster, redistribution of property, etc.) therefore, a more risk averse 
household will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs, spend less on forest 
inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting. This hypothesis is based on the theory 
that higher risk aversion decreases the optimal harvesting threshold, which has been 
the main conclusion in most studies dealing with forest management under production 
risk (Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Couture and Reynaud 2008). However, it should be 
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noted that some studies have found that the effect of risk aversion on the optimal 
rotation is ambiguous and depends on economic and biological parameters, as well as 
how risk is modeled (Couture and Reynaud 2008). 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that more risk averse households will exhibit a 
stronger behavioral response to forest certification. Assuming that a forest certificate 
reduces the risks associated with loss of forest stock due to redistribution of property, 
a more risk averse household that receives a forest certificate for a plot will respond to 
that reduction in risk by allocating more labor to application of forest inputs, spending 
more on forest inputs, and allocating less labor to harvesting forest products than risk 
neutral or risk-seeking households that receive a forest certificate.  
Hypothesis 2c: A more loss averse household will allocate less labor for 
application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more 
labor to harvesting. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: A more loss averse household that receives a forest 
certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs, 
spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting 
 
Loss aversion refers to an individual’s tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses 
to acquiring gains. Furthermore, people have a tendency to dramatically overweight 
losses relative to gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). 
In forest management, households make management decisions involving potential 
losses and gains. Psychologically, losses may overshadow objectively commensurate 
gains in evaluation of prospects (Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler 1990). In general, 
individuals tend to be more reluctant to accept an uncertain gain over a more certain, 
albeit lower gain. As a result, households may not invest in forests or may harvest 
prior to the optimal harvesting threshold (when in actuality investments in the forest 
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resource and delaying harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold would be 
beneficial). We therefore hypothesize that a more loss averse household will allocate 
less labor for application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate 
more labor to harvesting.  
To understand how loss aversion may impact a household’s response to forest 
certification we consider the potential endowment effect of forest certification. As 
described by Kahneman and Tversky (1991), an endowment effect “is produced, 
apparently instantaneously, by giving an individual property rights over a consumption 
good.” As a result of the endowment effect, households may be more averse to loss of 
forest stock from the plot with a forest certificate than from a plot without a forest 
certificate. Therefore, we hypothesize that more loss averse households that receive a 
forest certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs, 
spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting because they will be 
more averse to potential loss of forest stock from a plot with a forest certificate than to 
loss from a plot without a forest certificate. 
Hypothesis 2e: The effects of the probability weighting parameter on 
forest management are ambiguous. 
 
Hypothesis 2f: The effects of the probability weighting parameter on 
forest management responses to receiving a forest certificate are 
ambiguous.  
 
The probability weighting parameter indicates whether or not an individual puts 
excessive decision weight on small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Since 
we do not know whether the actual probabilities that households may lose their forest 
stock to such events as pest infestation, disease, illegal logging, natural disaster, or 
 32 
 
redistribution of property rights are high or low, we cannot hypothesize about how a 
household’s tendency to excessively weight small probabilities will affect its decision 
making process on its forest management decisions or on its responses to forest 
certification.  
In addition to risk preferences, we examine how a household’s time preference 
affects its forest management decisions and responses to receiving a forest certificate. 
To represent each household’s time preference we use a discount rate. There are 
several competing models for time discounting that have received a significant amount 
of attention in both experimental psychology (e.g., de Villiers and Herrnstein (1976), 
Ainslie and Haslam (1992), etc.) and behavioral economics (e.g., Laisbons (1997), 
Lowenstein and Prelec (1992), O’Donoghue and Rabin(1999).3 The competing models 
were developed to account for observed behavioral regularities that are not consistent 
with the classic exponential discounting model. For example, the most common 
documented behavioral regularity is called “reversal of preferences.” It occurs, for 
example, when a subject prefers $10 now rather than $12 a day later, but also prefers 
$12 in a year plus a day rather than $10 in a year. This type of preference is not 
consistent with exponential discounting but would be consistent with a rate of time 
preference that declines with time such as hyperbolic discounting. We use a 
hyperbolic discounting parameter because we find that the hyperbolic discounting 
functional form fits our data better than the exponential discounting functional form 
(constant discount rate). Similar to our findings, other studies have found that the 
hyperbolic discounting functional form fits field data better than the exponential 
discounting functional form (Rachlin, Raineri and Cross 1991; Kirby and Marakovic 
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1995; Myerson and Green 1995; Kirby 1997). Hypotheses 2g and 2h describe our 
expectations related to a household’s discount rate. 
Hypothesis 2g: Households with higher discount rates will allocate less 
labor to applying inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more 
labor to harvesting. 
 
Hypothesis 2h: Households with higher discount rates that receive a forest 
certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of inputs, spend 
less on forest inputs and allocate more labor to harvesting. 
 
Forest management decisions often have a long time horizon, making households’ 
time preferences (i.e., preference between immediate income and future income) 
important in the decision making process. In forest management, the Faustmann model 
is best known for providing a benchmark model for determining optimal timber 
rotation age (Newman 2002). In the model, a forest owner’s goal is to choose the 
rotation period that maximizes the net present value of the forest. In the infinite 
rotation model, the decision rule is to harvest when the marginal benefit of delaying 
(new growth) is equal to the marginal cost of delaying (lost interest on the timber 
revenue and on future stands). An increase in the interest rate will tend to shorten the 
optimal rotation length. As such, we hypothesize that households with higher discount 
rates (i.e., impatient) will shorten the optimal rotation length and allocate labor to 
harvesting more frequently. Furthermore, we hypothesize that households with 
stronger preference for consumption or income today (i.e., higher discount rate) will 
allocate less labor to applying inputs and spend less on forest inputs, as other short-
term return investment opportunities will be more attractive than the long-term returns 
from investing in forest resources. Additionally, households with a stronger preference 
for income today that receive a forest certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for 
 34 
 
application of inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting 
than households with weaker preferences for income today that receive a forest 
certificate.   
1.6 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The household panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and 
qualitative data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming City and Datian 
County, and 10 villages in Fujian Province for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 
2005 and 2008 (after the reform). Survey data for the years 2000 and 2005 were 
collected in 2006 by a research team from Peking University, Gothenburg University 
and Forest Trends. The 2006 survey team conducted interviews in three townships, 
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600 
households. In 2009, two of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts 
were made to conduct a follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties 
that had been included in the previous survey.  
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households included in the 
previous survey were located. The 104 located households were asked to complete the 
survey and to participate in two decision-making tasks (the risk and time preference 
experiments) during which they could earn a real monetary payoff. All households 
completed the survey but one household chose not to participate in the decision-
making tasks due to lack of time. Each household was paid 15 yuan compensation to 
complete the survey plus their earning in the decision-making tasks.4   
 35 
 
In the analysis, we construct a balanced panel data set by using only those forest 
plots that were managed by the household in 2000, 2005 and 2008, so that we have 
pre- and post- reform data for every plot in the analysis. This results in a sample size 
of 197 plots, owned by 69 households. The status of forest plot certification for each 
forest plot is captured by an indicator variable of whether or not the household has a 
forest certificate for the plot. In the year 2000, none of the plots in our balanced panel 
data set had forest certificates.5 By the year 2005, 36 of these plots had received forest 
certificates. And by the year 2008, 69 plots had received forest certificates.   
To capture household forest management, we use the value of labor used for 
applying forest inputs to each plot, expenditure on inputs for each plot, and the value 
of labor used for harvesting from each plot. The expenditure on inputs includes 
expenditure on fertilizer, irrigation, animal or machinery rental fees, seeds and other 
forest inputs. The two labor-related outcome variables are based on the sum of the 
annual value of family and exchanged labor and the annual expenditure on hired labor 
for applying forest inputs and for harvesting forest products. The annual expenditure 
of hired labor is calculated based on responses to survey questions regarding the 
number of working days of hired labor and the wage per working day paid to hired 
labor for each forest management activity. For the annual value of family and 
exchanged labor, we sum the responses to the survey question regarding the number of 
working days of family and exchanged labor for each forest management activity. We 
then multiply the total number of family and exchanged labor working days times the 
average county wage paid to hired forest labor based our survey data, and use the 
resulting value as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a household’s time. We 
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recognize that an estimated shadow wage would be a more accurate measure of a 
household’s opportunity cost of time spent laboring on its forest plot; however, the 
data necessary to estimate a shadow wage are not available (Jacoby 1993).   
Descriptive statistics for our balanced panel data set indicate that from 2000 to 
2008 the value of labor used for applying forest inputs increased from 487 to 4,390 
yuan per hectare (table 1.1). Likewise, the expenditure on forest inputs increased from 
466 to 1,010 yuan per hectare from 2000 to 2008. From 2000 to 2005, there was an 
increase in the labor used for harvesting forest products from 148 to 525 yuan per 
hectare, and then a slight decrease to 489 yuan per hectare in 2008.  
As a preview to more rigorous estimates of forest plot certification effects, we 
examine the descriptive statistics for the forest management variables by whether or 
not a household has received a forest certificate for its plot. Interestingly, we find that 
the change in the mean value of labor used for harvesting forest products and for 
applying forest inputs is statistically different at the 1% and 10% significance level, 
respectively, indicating that forest plot certification had an effect on households 
decisions regarding allocation of labor to their forest plot (table 1.2). Specifically, the 
change between 2000 and 2008 in the mean value of labor used for harvesting forest 
products was 558 yuan per hectare for those plots for which households never received 
a forest certificate and 61 yuan per hectare for those plots for which households 
received a forest certificate. However, the change between 2000 and 2008 in the mean 
expenditure on forest inputs by forest plot certification status was not statistically 
significant, indicating that forest plot certification has not had an effect on the trend in 
households’ expenditure on forest inputs.  
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Table 1.3 identifies the household and forest plot control variables that will be 
used in this analysis and provides descriptive statistics for the year 2000. In 2000, an 
average household had 4.9 household members; a head of household, who was 46 
years old and has had 4.7 years of education; and total assets of 10,430 yuan. On 
average each household held a total of 2.3 hectares of forest land. The average forest 
plot had an area of 0.59 hectares, was 1.43 kilometers from home, and was 0.87 
kilometers from the road. Bamboo was the primary forest type of 52% of the plots.   
Risk Preference Data  
To elicit a measure of risk preference, we follow the experimental design 
developed by Tanaka et al. (2010) and later modified by Liu (2008), both of whom 
expand the classic Accept/Reject lottery experiments of Holt and Laury (2002) to 
incorporate prospect theory. We use cumulative prospect theory and a non-linear 
probability weighting measure extended from the one-parameter form of Drazen 
Prelec’s (1998) axiomatically-derived weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Following Liu (2008), we assume a utility function of the following form: 
, ; , 	 
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where U(x,p; y,q) denotes the expected prospect value over binary prospects 
consisting of the outcomes x and y with the probability of p and q, respectively. The 
function v(x) denotes a power value function.6 The parameter σ describes the curvature 
of an individual’s value function. An individual’s risk preferences are described as risk 
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averse when σ > 0, risk neutral when σ = 0, and risk loving when σ < 0. The parameter 
λ describes the curvature of an individual’s value function above zero relative to the 
curvature of the value function below zero. The higher the value of λ, the more loss 
averse the individual is. The parameter α is a non-linear probability weighting 
measure, which is extended from a model by Prelec (1998). The probabilities are 
weighted by the function π(p). When α <1, π(p) has an inverted S-shape, indicating 
that an individual tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high 
probabilities, as shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). This model reduces to 
expected utility theory when α = 1 and λ=1. 
In the experiment, participants were asked to choose between sets of lottery 
options. For example, Figure 1.1 illustrates one set of options that a subject was asked 
to choose between. In this example, Option A offers a 30% chance of receiving 20 
yuan and a 70% chance of receiving 5 yuan. Option B offers a 10% chance of 
receiving 34 yuan and a 90% chance of receiving 2.5 yuan. A total of 35 choices, 
divided between three series were asked. The payoffs ranged from a loss of 10 yuan to 
a gain of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in rural China (CSY 2009). If 
a subject was illiterate (27% of our sample), then the enumerator read the choice to the 
subject and recorded the subject’s answers on the record sheet. Monotonic switching 
was enforced, meaning that once the subject switched to option B they were not 
allowed to switch back to option A.7 By enforcing monotonic switching, we eliminate 
the possibility of inconsistent choices within each series and also make the task more 
clear and concise for participants, as they only need to identify one switch point in 
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each series.8 Once the subject had completed the entire series of choices, one question 
was chosen randomly for payoff.  
In our sample, the average derived values for α and λ are 0.73 and 6.02, 
respectively, and both are statistically different from 1 at the 1% significance level by 
t-test, implying that our experimental results reject expected utility theory in favor of 
prospect theory’s inverted S-shaped probability weighting and loss aversion.9 The 
average derived value of σ is 0.42, indicating on average rural individuals in China 
exhibit risk aversion.10 Figure 1.2, Panel A, B and C illustrate the distribution of σ, α, 
λ, respectively. While the distributions for σ and α in Panel A and B exhibit a rather 
normal distribution, the distribution for λ in Panel C is bimodal with a share of 
subjects exhibiting low degrees of loss aversion and another share of subjects showing 
high degrees of loss aversion.   
We use the individual values for σ (degree of risk aversion), λ (degree of loss 
aversion) and α (nonlinear probability weighting measure) to represent the risk 
preferences of each household in our empirical model, which will be discussed in 
section 1.7.11   
Time Preference Data 
Our time experiment design follows the methods originally developed by Coller 
and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Williams and Lau (2002). The data are then used 
to estimate three parameters—the conventional time discounting parameter (r), 
present-bias (β), and hyperbolicity of the discount function (θ)—in a general time 
discounting model using nonlinear least-squares, which allows us to test which 
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discounting model fits the data best—exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, or a 
more general form (Benhabib et al. 2007; Tanaka et al. 2010).  
In the time preference experiment subjects were asked to choose between, for 
example, a real monetary payoff today or a larger payoff six months from now. The 
hypothetical bias of earlier studies that aim to capture time preferences is addressed 
here because participants received a real monetary payment based on their choices. 
Choices were always posed as a choice between a monetary payoff today versus a 
larger monetary payoff in the future.12  
To ensure the credibility of a future payment, subjects were told that the future 
payments would be delivered by China Post, which is the official postal service of the 
Peoples Republic of China, an agency with which rural households are very familiar 
and comfortable using for the delivery of money. Furthermore, we believed the 
credibility problem to be minimal because our participants were part of a panel survey 
and this was the second time that the household had been visited by a research team 
from Peking University. Repeat visits by our research team built trust with and 
provided reassurance to the participants.  
Following the experimental design of Tanaka et al. (2010), the subjects were asked 
a total of 75 questions divided into 15 series of 5 questions each.13 A single series of 
questions is depicted in Figure 1.3. In this example, the subject was asked to choose 
Plan A or Plan B for each of the 5 questions. Plan A, the future payoff plan remained 
the same for each question in the series, while the immediate option increased as the 
subject moved down the column from 25 yuan to 125 yuan, at 1/6 increments of the 
future payoff. As in the risk experiment, monotonic switching within each series was 
 41 
 
also enforced here. The point at which an individual switches from choosing the more 
immediate reward to taking the delayed reward provides a bound on his or her 
discount rate. The discount rate indicates the rate that would make a person indifferent 
between the immediate and the delayed reward. An individual with a high discount 
rate has a preference for the present, whereas an individual with a low discount rate 
has a preference for the future. 
We used 15 combinations of future payoff and time in the experiments; that is 15, 
60 and 150 yuan with delays of 2 weeks, 3 months, and 6 months and 30 and 120 yuan 
with delays of 1 week, 2 months and 4 months.14 The maximum payoff of 150 yuan is 
equal to roughly 2 to 3 days pay in rural China (CSY 2009). For each future payoff-
time combination, we asked 5 questions, with the immediate payoff equal to 1/6, 1/3, 
1/2, 2/3, and 5/6 of the future payoff in the 5 question series. Once the subject had 
completed all 75 questions, one question was randomly chosen for payment. The 
subject’s choices on the selected question, determined how much money and when it 
was to be delivered. The average payoff in the time experiment was 59 yuan. Fifty-
eight of the subjects received payment immediately, while 45 subjects received a 
future payment. The average delay for future payments was 68 days. 
Table 1.4 compares the aggregate results of the estimations. Estimating the full 
model with unrestricted θ gives a relatively high value of θ=5.16, which is similar to 
Tanaka et al.’s (2010) estimate of θ=5.07, and influences the estimates of r and β but 
does not improve the R2 compared with estimations from the quasi-hyperbolic model. 
While quasi-hyperbolic discounting model seems to fit the aggregate sample best, at 
the individual level the quasi-hyperbolic model has convergence problems for 32 
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subjects (31% of our sample), whereas there are no convergence problems for the 
exponential and hyperbolic models when estimating each subject’s time parameters. 
Therefore, we focus on the estimates from the hyperbolic model and use those 
parameters to represent the time preference of each household in our empirical model, 
which will be discussed in section 1.7. Figure 1.4 depicts the distribution of the 
hyperbolic discounting parameter, from our experiment. Surprisingly, the figure shows 
that the hyperbolic time preference parameter was relatively low for the majority of 
our subject, indicating that they have a relatively weak preference for income today. In 
the hyperbolic discounting model, we find that on average a subject would be willing 
to trade 92 yuan today for 100 in 1 week, 74 yuan today for 100 yuan in 1 month and 
32 yuan today for 100 yuan in 6 months. 
1.7 Empirical Framework 
 
 Our objective is to identify how heterogeneity in households’ time and risk 
preferences may impact the average effect of forest plot certification on household 
forest management. The ideal would be to compare forest management outcomes 
under the counterfactual of no forest certification. But plots cannot both receive a 
forest certificate and not receive a forest certificate, and so actual counterfactuals 
cannot be observed. Instead we need to estimate the value of this unobserved 
counterfactual’s outcomes by obtaining a comparison group of plots that did not 
receive a forest certificate. The identification problem is that it is difficult to identify a 
reliable comparison group for those receiving a forest certificate because of non-
random placement of forest plot certification and/or self-selection of households into 
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forest plot certification. Without a carefully selected comparison group, we risk 
incorrectly attributing differences in measured forest management outcomes between 
those plots for which households received a forest certificate and plots for which 
households did not receive a forest certificate to forest plot certification when in fact 
differences may be due to initial differences in observed (e.g., education of the head of 
household) and unobserved characteristics (e.g., entrepreneurial ability) between the 
two groups (Conning and Deb 2007). 
Identification Strategy 
In this study we use a two-step approach to reduce estimator bias caused by 
potential self-selection of households into forest plot certification. In the first step, we 
preprocess the data set with nonparametric matching methods so that the treated group 
(plots for which a household received a forest certificate) is as similar as possible to 
the control group (plots for which a household did not receive a forest certificate) to 
reduce estimator bias caused by potential self-selection of households into forest plot 
certification based on observed characteristics (Ho et al. 2007). The goal of matching 
is to create a data set that looks closer to one that would result from a randomized 
experiment. When we get close, we break the link between the treatment variable and 
the pretreatment controls, which makes the parametric form of the analysis model less 
relevant or irrelevant entirely. To break this link, we need the distribution of covariates 
to be the same within the matched treated and control groups. 
Specifically, we divide all the plots into two groups: plots that received a forest 
certificate and plots that did not receive a forest certificate. We then use 1-to-1 nearest 
neighbor matching (without replacement) to match each plot that received a forest 
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certificate (“treated plot”) with a plot that did not receive a forest certificate (“control 
plot”) based on the propensity score (the predicted probability of forest plot 
certification). The variables used to estimate the propensity score in a logistic 
regression include three household level variables (age of household head, household 
head’s education level, and the household’s total land holdings) and four plot level 
variables (distance from plot to home, distance from plot to the road, slope of the plot, 
and whether the plot’s forest type is primarily bamboo). Once the propensity score is 
estimated, a comparison observation for each treated observation is created by 
choosing the “nearest neighbor”, which is the untreated household with the closest 
propensity score. Control observations that are not matched are discarded. This 
reduced our sample to 134 plots owned by 69 households. Following Ho et al. (2007), 
we selected the matching method that produced the best covariate balance with each 
treated plot. As a result, in the preprocessed data set, the treatment variable is closer to 
being independent of other covariates, which helps us obtain more accurate causal 
effect estimates in the parametric model.   
In the second step, using the preprocessed matched data we exploit plot-level 
variation in the year that households received a forest certificate for a plot in a 
difference-in-differences framework. The variation in the year that the household 
received a forest certificate is the result of exogenous variation across villages of the 
starting year of the reform. Using this framework, we can compare the before-after 
changes in forest management activities on those plots for which households received 
a forest certificate (the treatment group) to the before-after changes in forest 
management activities on those plots that households did not receive forest certificates 
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(the control group). The difference-in-differences framework allows us to difference 
out any common trends between the treatment and the control group.     
In summary, we use a two-step approach in which we preprocess the data using 
matching methods and then use that preprocessed data in a difference-in-differences 
framework in order to obtain more robust estimates of the forest plot certification 
effect on households’ forest management and how that effect may vary depending on 
heterogeneity in time and risk preferences of each household. 
Empirical Model 
The base estimate of the forest certification effect is obtained from the difference-
in-differences estimation using the preprocessed data: 
  forest management ijt = β0 + β1(fcertij) + β2(year2005t) + β3(year2008t)  
    + β4(AfterReformijt) + eijt                       (2) 
where forest managementijt  refers to each of the three forest management related 
dependent variables: the value of labor used for applying inputs (input laborijt); 
expenditure on forest inputs including chemical fertilizer, pesticide and seeds 
(inputsijt); and the value of labor used for harvesting (harvest laborijt) by household i 
on forest plot j at time t. All forest management variables are measured in yuan per 
hectare at the plot level. fcertij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if household i 
had a forest certificate for plot j in any year. The coefficient on fcertij controls for 
characteristics that may differ between plots that received forest certificates during the 
recent tenure reform and plots that did not. year2005t  and year2008t are dummy 
variables that take the value one if the observation is for the year 2005 and 2008, 
respectively. The coefficients on year2005t  and year2008t  control for any systematic 
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differences for years 2005 and 2008, respectively. AfterReformijt is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one when household i has a forest certificate for plot j in a post-
reform year. The coefficient on AfterReformijt is the estimated forest certification 
effect, which provides a measure of the conditional average difference in forest 
management activities on plots for which a household has a forest certificate.  
To test our main hypothesis that time and risk preferences affect how households 
respond to property right reforms, we add the risk and time preference parameters and 
their interaction variables to equation (2) to capture the interaction effects between the 
risk and time preference variables and the change in forest certification status 
(AfterReformijt). Our main difference-in-differences model is: 
forest management ijt = β0 + β1(fcertij) + β2(year2005t) + β3(year2008t)  
   + β4(AfterReformijt) + β5(riski) + Β6(lossi) +Β7(probweighti) 
   + Β8(timeprefi) + β9(risk *AfterReformijt)  
   + Β10(loss*AfterReformijt) +  β11(probweight *AfterReformijt) 
   + Β12(timepref*AfterReformijt) +  ∏ Xi   +  ΩPijt + Vv  + eijt     (3) 
riski is the risk aversion parameter; lossi is the loss aversion parameter; probweighti is 
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the probability weighting parameter is 
greater than one, indicating that individuals place excessive decision weight on small 
probabilities; and timeprefi is the hyperbolic time discounting parameter for household 
i. The interaction terms (risk*AfterReformijt, loss*AfterReformijt , probweight 
*AfterReformijt,  and  timepref*AfterReformijt) capture heterogeneity of the treatment 
effect due to households’ risk and time preferences. For example, risk*AfterReformijt 
picks up any differential patterns in changes in household forest management activities 
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on plots that receive a forest certificate relative to plots that do not receive a forest 
certificate that may be correlated with the households’ risk preferences. The 
interaction term timepref*AfterReformijt, picks up any differential patterns in changes 
in household forest management activities on plots that receive a forest certificate 
relative to plots that do not receive a forest certificate that may be correlated with 
households’ time preferences. Xi is a vector of demographic controls, Pijt  is a vector of 
plot characteristic controls, and Vv is village fixed effects. Table 3 identifies each of 
the control variables used in this analysis.15 For a better fit, we estimate a log 
transformation of equations (2) and (3) for each of the three forest management 
dependent variables. Table 1.5 summarizes our hypotheses from section 1.5 in terms 
of the sign of the estimated coefficients in equation (3). 
1.8 Empirical Results 
 
Overall we find that there is evidence that risk and time preferences impact 
households’ forest management responses to forest plot certification (tables 1.6, 1.7 
and 1.8; columns 3 and 4).16 
Impact on labor used for harvesting forest products  
We hypothesized that the estimated certification effect (the conditional average 
difference in labor used for harvesting from plots with forest certificates) would be 
negative because increased tenure security from plot certification allows a household 
to have greater confidence towards future benefits, and hence delay harvest to allow 
the forest stock to grow larger. We do not find evidence of the hypothesized negative 
certification effect on labor used for harvesting (table 1.6). In all models the 
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coefficient on AfterReform is negative but not statistically significant (columns 1-4). 
When we allow the certification effect to vary with households’ risk and time 
preferences, include both household and plot controls and village effects, and evaluate 
the estimate at the median values of the time and risk preferences parameters, the 
implied total certification effect on labor for harvesting is -2.64% but is not 
statistically significant (column 4).17 
Interestingly, when we allow the certification effect to vary with households’ risk 
and time preferences, we find that the negative effect of certification on the value of 
labor allocated to harvest is larger for households that are more risk averse and smaller 
for those households that are more loss averse (column 3-4). Specifically, the 
interaction term between ln(risk) and AfterReform is -1.37%, suggesting that for a 
household with a risk parameter that is 10% higher (more risk averse), the certification 
effect on value of labor for harvesting is 14% less. And the coefficient on the 
interaction term between ln(loss aversion) and AfterReform is 1.34%, suggesting that 
for a household with a loss aversion parameter that is 10% higher (suggesting more 
loss averse), the certification effect on labor for harvesting is 13% more. This result 
implies that the intended effect of certification (reduce or delay harvest) is actually 
larger for more risk averse households and smaller for more loss averse households. 
The certification effect did not vary statistically significantly with households’ degree 
of time preference or their tendency to place excessive decision weight on small 
probabilities.  
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More generally, results indicate that households that are more risk averse or that 
tend to place excessive decision weight on small probabilities allocate more labor to 
harvesting forest products (table 1.6, columns 2-4). 
 
Impact on expenditure and labor used for applying forest inputs 
We find no evidence of a certification effect on either the expenditure on forest 
inputs or on labor used to apply forest inputs (tables 1.7 and 1.8). The implied total 
effect of certification is insignificant for both dependent variables and the signs are 
mixed.  
However, when the estimation effect is allowed to vary with households’ risk and 
time preferences, we find that for a household with a risk parameter that is 10% higher 
(more risk averse), the certification effect on labor used for applying inputs is 5.6% 
lower (table1. 7, columns 3 and 4). Also, we find that for a household with a time 
preference parameter that is 10% higher (stronger preference for income today), the 
forest certification effect on labor for applying inputs and expenditure on forest inputs 
is 9% and 14% lower, respectively (table 1.7 and 1.8, columns 3 and 4).  
More generally, results indicate that households that are more risk averse tend to 
use less labor for applying inputs and have lower expenditure on forest inputs (tables 
1.7 and 1.8, columns 2-4). 
Robustness Checks  
To check the robustness of our results, we run three additional variations of 
equation (3). First, we estimate the model using the number of days rather than the 
value of labor used for applying inputs and for harvesting (appendix tables 1.3 and 
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1.4). Second, we estimate the model using the exponential time discounting parameter 
instead of the hyperbolic time discounting parameter (appendix tables 1.5, 1.6 and 
1.7). Third, we estimate the model using the number of years since the household 
received a forest certificate for a plot rather than the dummy variable, AfterReformijt, 
that takes the value one when household i has a forest certificate for plot j in a post-
reform year (appendix tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10). We find that the results are robust to 
these alternative specifications with one exception. The exception is that when we 
estimate the model using the number of years since the household received a forest 
certificate for a plot rather than the dummy variable, the coefficient on the interaction 
variable between the years since the household received a forest certificate for a plot 
and the hyperbolic discounting parameter becomes insignificant in the full model.  
1.9 Conclusion 
 
Despite their potential importance, the heterogeneity in response to property rights 
reforms due to individual preferences has not been studied adequately. Progress is 
constrained by a lack of data. Measures of outcomes (such as forest investment, 
harvesting of timber, etc.) are difficult to come by and eliciting measurement of risk 
and time preferences is difficult (Frederick et al. 2002; Cardenas et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, previous studies on tenure issues often use proxies to measure tenure 
security that are either subjective or indirect and may not accurately measure tenure 
security (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos and Holden 2006).  
In this paper, we examined how preferences over time and risk affect household 
forest management responses to property rights reforms by capitalizing on a large-
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scale reform of forest land tenure in Fujian Province, which began in 2003. 
Empirically, we combined original field experiment data on time and risk preferences 
collected among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an original panel 
survey data set collected among the same households in 2006 and 2009. We examined 
three dependent variables as measures of household forest management activities, and 
the status of the forest tenure reform on each forest plot was captured by an indicator 
variable of whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot in an after 
reform year. To identify how risk and time preferences augment the effect of forest 
plot certification on forest management activities, a two step approach in which we 
preprocess the data using matching methods and then use that preprocessed data in a 
difference-in-differences framework in order to obtain more robust estimates of the 
forest plot certification effect on households’ forest management and how that effect 
may vary depending on heterogeneity in the time and risk preferences of households. 
Results suggest that more secure tenure as a result of forest certification affects 
households’ forest management decisions. Although forest certification led to a 
decrease in labor allocated to harvesting as expected, surprisingly there was no 
evidence that forest plot certification led to an increase in labor used to apply forest 
inputs nor in forest input expenditure. The insignificant certification effect on labor 
used to apply forest inputs and forest input expenditure suggests that further research 
should examine whether or not households face credit constraints that prevent them 
from increasing investment on their forest plots in response to increased tenure 
security. 
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Results suggest that household preferences, particularly households’ degree of risk 
aversion, affect the impacts of forest tenure reforms. According to our results, the 
negative impact of forest certification on labor allocated to harvesting was smaller for 
households that were more risk averse. This indicates that when households are risk 
averse, forest certification will be more likely to have the intended effect of 
households reducing or delaying forest product harvests. Furthermore, we find that the 
certification effect on labor for applying inputs is positive for households that are more 
risk averse. 
The results indicate that households with a higher preference for income today that 
received a forest certificate used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on forest 
inputs than those with a lower preference for income today that received a forest 
certificate. Time preferences did not significantly augment labor for harvesting. The 
insignificant effect of time preference on labor for harvesting may be a result of the 
short time frame for which our time preference parameter can account, relative to the 
longer time frame over which forestry decisions are made. Recall that the longest 
period of time that participants were asked to consider in the time preference 
experiment was 6 months. A time preference parameter collected based on a 6-month 
time frame may not accurately capture time preferences concerning longer term 
decisions, such as those decisions made in forest management. The insignificance of 
the time preference parameter suggests that further research should be done in 
designing experiments that could more accurately capture households’ time 
preferences when decisions are over a longer time horizon.   
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The results of this paper have implications for policymakers in China and 
elsewhere by informing how heterogeneity among households may impact the 
outcomes of property right reforms. Although this research is conducted in the context 
of forests, the general finding may also apply to other natural resources such as 
fisheries or groundwater where strengthening property rights have not always shown 
success in the manner intended. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 While the Fujian provincial government formally approved the reform in 2003, 
precedents had already been established in 1998 in Hongtian Village, Yongan County 
of Fujian Province when a rural village suffering from severe deforestation due to 
ineffective collective management, decided to reform forest tenure. Another village, in 
2002 individualized user rights to villagers (those who accepted the forest user rights 
were required to pay a land rental fee to the villages) and sold some of the forest to 
people outside the village to help eliminate village debt (Xu and Jiang 2009). 
2 For a review of literature studying the correlation between poverty and preferences 
over risk and time see manuscript 2, section 2.3. 
3
 For a critical review of time discounting and time preference see Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).  
4 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan at the time of the survey, August 1, 2009. 
5
 The year 2000 is pre-reform, however; for 21 plots households reported that they had 
a forest certificate, which they had received as early as 1978. These “forest 
certificates” are not equivalent to the forest certificates distributed during the recent 
reform which began in 2002. Likely, these 21 “forest certificates” are not forest 
certificates at all but rather they are household responsibility land certificates, and the 
household has converted barren or cropland to forest, and so were confused about their 
forest certificate status when asked by enumerators. We exclude these 21 plots from 
the analysis, so as to not contaminate the effect of household having a certificate on 
forest management with the changes in forest management on plots with the earlier 
type of “forest certificate.” 
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6
 In Tanaka et al. (2010), the value function has the form:  v(x)=xσ for x>0 and v(x)=-
λ(-x)σ. For ease of comparison with respect to the conventional form of expected 
utility under constant relative risk aversion, where u(x)=x1-σ /(1-σ), Liu (2008) rewrites 
the value function as v(x)=x1-σ. We follow Liu’s choice of value function for ease of 
understanding. 
7
 Three examples were given in the instructions to help ensure that the subjects did not 
feel that they must make a switch within the series. In one example, the subject never 
switches to Option B. In another example, the subject switches at question 7 to Option 
B. And in a third example, the subject switches to Option B at question 1.   
8
 Inconsistent choices within series of questions (in both risk and time preference 
experiments of the type reported on in this paper) are problematic for identifying 
parameters when structures are imposed on the subject’s responses but the theory 
underlying those structures does not justify the subject’s responses. In risk and time 
preference experiments, where subjects have been allowed to switch back and forth 
between A and B, often only a small percentage of individuals do so. Using 
experiments where in some rounds subjects are given an added option of indicating 
indifference between Option A and B, researchers have found that subjects who switch 
back and forth between Option A and B are not actually making  inconsistent choices 
but rather the subjects are expressing their indifference over a range of choices (Holt 
and Laury 2002; Andersen et al. 2006). In our experiments, we follow the methods of 
Tanaka et al. (2010) and Liu (2008), both of whom enforce mono-tonic switching. 
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9
 For more details on the methods used to estimate the risk preference parameters see 
manuscript 2 and its appendix. 
10
 For comparison to other studies, Liu (2008) in a sample of Chinese farmers found 
values for (σ, α, λ) of (0.48, 0.69, 3.47) and Tanaka et al. (2010) in a sample of 
Vietnamese farmers found values of (0.40, 0.75 and 3.0). The values for σ and α 
across the studies are very similar; however, our value for λ is approximately twice as 
much as the values in the previous comparable studies, indicating that our sample 
exhibits on average a higher degree of loss aversion.   
11
 In the experiment, 77% of our subjects identified themselves as the head of their 
households. Since the head of households are those who likely have the most weight in 
forest management decisions, we believe that the individual risk preferences elicited in 
the experiments can accurately represent the preferences of the household.  
12
 Our design differs from the time preference experiments of Coller and Williams 
(1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) in that we do not frame the choices with a front-end 
delay. An example of using a frontend delay, is a choice between money one month 
from today and more money seven months from now, rather than asking participants 
to choose between money today and more money six months from now, as we did. A 
frontend delay is used in time preference experiments to control (at least partially) for 
the credibility problem. The credibility problem is that participants may not believe 
that they will receive future payments, and therefore will be biased toward choosing 
the immediate payoff. However, in much of the behavior economics literature, a 
significant proportion of the action seems to revolve around payoffs that are truly 
immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate (Frederick et al. 2002). By using a 
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front-end delay, we would lose information about how individuals treat choices 
between payoffs that are truly immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate. 
Ideally, to address the credibility problem, while still having a way to capture the 
information about choices between immediate payoffs and future payoffs, an 
experimental design would include both questions with and without front-end delays. 
Due to time constraints, in that participants may become exhausted with too many 
questions, we choose to only use questions without a front-end delay.   
13
 To see the entire set of payoff-time combinations that were used in the experiment 
and more details regarding the estimation of the time discounting parameters see 
Manuscript 2 and its appendix. 
14
 The 15 combinations of future payoff and time as described in the text were used in 
9 of the 10 villages. In the first village, we used the same payoffs but shorter 
timeframes. Specifically, in the first village we used payoffs of 15, 60 and 150 yuan 
with delays of 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months and 30 and 120 yuan with delays of 1 
week, 2 weeks and 2 months. In the first village, 5 out of 10 households always choose 
the future payoff. We thought that this high degree of preference for the future 
amongst the households might be due to the timeframes being to short, and so in the 
remaining villages we increased the timeframes.  
15
 Appendix table 1.1 describes each of the variables used in this analysis. 
16
 Tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 summarize results for the variables of interest. Appendix 
table 1.2 shows results with coefficients for all plot and household level control 
variables for the full models (column 4 in tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8). 
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17
 The median value of the risk aversion parameter is 0.4 (risk averse), the loss 
aversion parameter is 2.04 (very low level of loss aversion), the probability weighting 
dummy is 1 (tends to put excessive decision weight on small probabilities), and the 
hyperbolic time discounting parameter is 0.012 (weak preference for income today). 
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              Table 1.1  Forest management variables descriptive statistics by year  
 
Variable Year Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Value of labor for harvesting forest 2000 148 461 0 3222 
 2005 525 1113 0 5911 
 2008 489 1326 0 11087 
Value of labor for applying inputs 2000 487 2564 0 29165 
 2005 704 4298 0 54643 
 2008 4390 7569 0 53355 
Expenditure on forest inputs 2000 466 2319 0 30000 
 2005 775 3308 0 34972 
  2008 1010 2696 0 21641 
Notes:  n=197 plots. All values are in yuan per hectare. Values for the years 2005 and 
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian 
Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Table 1.2  Forest management variables means by forest certification status  
 Variable 
Plots that 
do not 
receive a 
forest 
certificate 
Plots that 
receive a 
forest 
certificate 
Statistical 
significance 
of difference 
in means     
(t-test) 
No. of observations  128 69 
In 2000: 
Value of labor for harvesting forest 166 116 0.295 
Value of labor for applying inputs 447 560 0.720 
Expenditure on forest inputs 283 807 1.520 
Between 2000 and 2008: 
∆ Value of labor for harvesting forest 558 -61 1.686 *** 
∆ Value of labor for applying inputs 4605 2599 3.111 * 
∆ Expenditure on forest inputs 425 762 1.018   
Notes: t-stat is absolute value.  *, ** and *** denote significant difference in the 
means at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All values are in yuan per hectare. 
Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer 
price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 
Source:  Authors’ data 
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Table 1.3  Comparison of means for year 2000 (before reform) 
 
 
 Variable All Plots 
Plots for which 
households do 
not receive a 
forest 
certificate 
Plots for which 
households 
receive a forest 
certificate 
Statistical 
significance of 
difference in 
means (t-test) 
No. of observations 197 128 69 
Household Characteristics 
Age of head of household 46.22 45.84 46.91 0.599 
Household head education (years)         4.68 4.54 4.94 0.999 
Household size (age 5 to 59) 4.22 4.20 4.25 0.184 
Household assets (yuan) 10430 11888 7725 1.456 
Total area of households forest land (ha) 2.30 2.07 2.74 1.121 
Plot Characteristics  
Area of plot (ha) 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.022 
Distance of plot to home (km) 1.43 1.43 1.44 0.041 
Distance of plot to road (km) 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.450 
Bamboo (=1 if bamboo) 0.52 0.59 0.39 2.752 ***   
Slope of plot (=1 if gradient is > 25') 0.71 0.73 0.67 0.877 
Source: Authors’ data  
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Table 1.4  Comparison of exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic and full discounting models 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-hyperbolic  Equation(1) 
µ 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
r 0.009 *** 0.018 *** 0.002 *** 0.006 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
β 
β=1 β=1 0.573 *** 0.601 *** (0.032) (0.039) 
θ 
θ=1 θ=2 θ=1 5.162 (3.514) 
Observations 3090 3090 3090 3090 
Adjusted R2 0.510   0.512   0.517   0.517   
Notes:  *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source:  Authors’ data. 
 
  
  
 
69
 
Table 1.5  Summary of hypothesized sign for each coefficient of interest 
 
Variable of Interest Coefficient Hypothesis 
harvest 
labor input labor inputs 
AfterReform β4 1 - + + 
Risk aversion β5 2a + - - 
Loss aversion β6 2c + - - 
Probability weighting dummy β7 2e ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous 
Time preference β8 2g + - - 
Risk aversion*AfterReform β9 2b - + + 
Loss aversion*AfterReform β10 2d + - - 
Probability weighting *AfterReform β11 2f ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous 
Time preference*AfterReform β12 2h + - - 
Implied certification effect 
 
 ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous 
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Table 1.6  The effect of forest plot certification on labor used for harvesting forest 
products 
 
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products (yuan/ha) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform -2.091 -2.255 -0.682 -2.175 
(1.03) (1.28) (0.24) (1.04) 
ln(risk aversion) 0.729 0.445 0.969 
(2.92)*** (4.94)*** (4.07)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.062 -0.96 -0.449 
(0.12) (2.31)** (0.86) 
ln(probability weighting dummy) 2.36 4.482 2.649 
(2.03)** (2.63)** (1.76)* 
ln(time preference) 0.101 -0.058 0.112 
(0.54) (0.18) (0.55) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -1.126 -1.374 
(3.90)*** (11.70)*** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform 1.119 1.336 
(1.99)* (3.67)*** 
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform -2.638 -2.031 
(1.02) (1.11) 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform -0.05 0.025 
(0.11) (0.08) 
Constant -9.624 -11.991 -5.304 
  (8.07)*** (6.22)*** (0.56) 
Implied certification effect -2.091 -2.255 -1.712 -2.643 
  (1.03) (1.28) (0.90) (1.50) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.03 0.37 0.09 0.40 
Household characteristics No  Yes No  Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded.  Implied 
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523, ln(time preferance) = 
 -4.394, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. Household characteristic control 
variables include:  ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), ln(r_hyp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), 
hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest characteristic control variables include: 
fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and slope25over.  All include controls for the year 
2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Table 1.7  The effect of forest plot certification on labor used for applying forest 
inputs 
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for applying forest inputs (yuan/ha) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform 0.117 0.369 -7.809 -7.773 
(0.06) (0.20) (2.29)** (2.51)** 
ln(risk aversion) -0.685 -0.673 -0.719 
(3.78)*** (10.38)*** (4.41)*** 
ln(loss aversion) 0.013 0.150 0.001 
(0.03) (0.39) (0.00) 
ln(probability weighting) 0.589 -1.300 -1.147 
(0.26) (0.69) (0.59) 
ln(time preference) -0.266 -0.046 -0.086 
(1.37) (0.28) (0.34) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform 0.571 0.555 
(2.72)*** (2.19)** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform -0.431 -0.356 
(0.57) (0.44) 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform 6.015 6.915 
(1.57) (1.92)* 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform -1.206 -0.943 
(2.68)*** (1.68)* 
Constant -11.417 -5.36 -11.359 0.944 
  (15.49)*** -0.48 (5.97)*** (0.10) 
Implied certification effect 0.117 0.369 2.900 2.741 
  (0.06) (0.20) (1.42) (1.14) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.42 
Household characteristics No  Yes No  Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Same notes as table 1.6. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Table 1.8  The effect of forest plot certification on expenditure on forest inputs 
Dependent Variable: Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/ha) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform -1.380 0.661 -7.651 -6.708 
(0.50) (0.23) (1.85)* (1.78)* 
ln(risk aversion) -1.045 -0.430 -0.999 
(5.09)*** (3.44)*** (5.13)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.830 -0.313 -0.735 
(1.92)* (0.46) (1.23) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.266 0.208 1.390 
(1.63) (0.09) (0.85) 
ln(time preference) 0.026 0.262 0.287 
(0.11) (0.89) (0.84) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -0.122 -0.010 
(0.42) (0.03) 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform -0.878 -0.887 
(0.77) (0.79) 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform 2.575 3.925 
(0.54) (0.90) 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform -1.468 -1.376 
(2.46)** (2.06)** 
Constant -9.783 -37.127 -8.794 -29.73 
  (8.15)*** (2.15)** (3.26)** (1.73)* 
Implied certification effect -1.38 0.661 0.812 2.635 
  (0.50) (0.23) (0.25) (0.80) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.26 
Household characteristics No  Yes No  Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Same notes as table 1.6. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Figure 1.1  Example of risk preference experiment choice 
 
 
 
 
Option A  Option B 
 
 
Tokens in 
the bag you 
will draw from 
if you choose A: 
 
Tokens in  
the bag you 
will draw from 
if you choose B: 
N o.  Option Description  Option Description 
1 
 
A If         , then receive 20 yuan If         , then receive  5 yuan 
 
B If         , then receive 34 yuan If         , then receive 2.5 yuan  
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Figure 1.2  Distribution of risk preference parameters  
Panel A. Distribution of σ (curvature of the value function, risk aversion parameter) 
 
Panel B. Distribution of α (probability weighting parameter)
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Panel C. Distribution of λ (loss aversion parameter)
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Figure 1.3  Example of  time preference experiment choice set 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
 
6-1 Receive 150 yuan in 6 months Receive 25 yuan today 
 
6-2 Receive 150 yuan in 6 months Receive 50 yuan  today 
 
6-3 Receive 150 yuan in 6 months Receive 75 yuan today 
 
6-4  Receive 150 yuan in 6 months Receive  100 yuan today 
 
6-5   Receive 150 yuan in 6 months Receive  125 yuan today 
 
         I choose A for questions 26 to                   .                      I choose B for questions               to 30. 
  
  
 77 
 
Figure 1.4  Distribution of hyperbolic discounting parameter 
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Appendix 1 
 
Appendix Table 1.1  Variable descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables 
input labor Value of labor allocated to application of forest inputs 
(yuan/hectare)  
harvest labor Value of labor allocated to harvesting (yuan/hectare)  
inputs  Expenditure on forest inputs, including chemical fertilizer, 
pesticide and seeds (yuan/hectare)  
Variables of Interest 
AfterReform  Dummy for plot has a forest certificate in data year after the 
reform (1 yes, 0 no)  
risk aversion Risk aversion parameter  
risk aversion*AfterReform  risk aversion and AfterReform interaction variable  
loss aversion Loss aversion parameter  
loss aversion*AfterReform loss aversion and AfterReform interaction variable 
probability weight dummy Dummy for the nonlinear probability weighting (1 tends to 
overweight small probabilities, 0 otherwise)  
r_hyp  Hyperbolic time discounting parameter  
r_hyp*AfterReform  r_hyp and AfterReform interaction variable  
 
 
Control Variables  
year2005  Dummy for year 2005  
year2008  Dummy for year 2008  
 
 
Demographic Control Variables  
agehead  Age of head of household  
yreduhead  Years of education of head of household  
num5and59age  Number of household members between age 5 and 59  
assets  Household's total assets   
hhtotarea  Household's total forest plot area (ha) 
hhnewplot  Household  received a new forest plot in forest tenure reform (1 
yes, 0 no)  
Plot Characteristic Control 
Variables 
 
fcert Dummy for plot has had a forest certificate (in any year) (1 yes, 0 
no) 
area                                              Forest plot area (hectares)  
disthome  Distance of plot from home (km) 
distroad  Distance of plot from road (km) 
slope25over  Dummy for gradient of plot is greater than 25  (1 yes, 0 no)  
bamboo  Dummy for bamboo plot  (1 bamboo, 0 other)  
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Appendix Table 1.2  The effect of forest plot certification on forest management 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(harvest 
labor) 
ln(input 
labor) ln(inputs) 
fcert -0.018 0.08 -2.575 
(0.02) (0.05) (1.16) 
year2005 2.539 0.538 2.535 
(2.24)** (0.60) (1.61) 
year2008 0.330 12.133 4.960 
(0.18) (7.17)*** (2.24)** 
AfterReform -2.175 -7.773 -6.708 
 
(1.04) (2.51)** (1.78)* 
ln(risk aversion) 0.969 -0.719 -0.999 
 
(4.07)*** (4.41)*** (5.13)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.449 0.001 -0.735 
 
(0.86) (0.00) (1.23) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.649 -1.147 1.39 
 
(1.76)* (0.59) (0.85) 
ln(time preference) 0.112 -0.086 0.287 
 
(0.55) (0.34) (0.84) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -1.374 0.555 -0.010 
 
(11.70)*** (2.19)** (0.03) 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform 1.336 -0.356 -0.887 
(3.67)*** (0.44) (0.79) 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform -2.031 6.915 3.925 
(1.11) (1.92)* (0.90) 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform 0.025 -0.943 -1.376 
(0.08) (1.68)* (2.06)** 
ln(agehead) -2.602 -3.004 3.817 
(1.11) (1.22) (0.88) 
ln(yreduchead) -0.296 -0.156 0.100 
(1.84)* (1.14) (0.66) 
ln(num5and59age) -0.107 0.054 0.159 
(0.95) (0.48) (0.84) 
ln(assets) 0.155 0.102 -0.111 
(0.78) (0.53) (0.58) 
ln(hhtotalarea) -0.348 -0.116 -0.456 
(0.75) (0.19) (0.81) 
hhnewplot 0.373 -0.404 -2.280 
(0.30) (0.26) (1.46) 
 
 
 
 
Table continued on the next page. 
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Appendix Table 1.2 [Continued] The effect of forest plot certification on forest 
management 
Variable 
ln(harvest 
labor) 
ln(input 
labor) ln(inputs) 
lnarea 0.919 0.580 0.404 
(2.70)*** (1.05) (0.89) 
lndisthome 0.116 -0.108 -0.422 
(0.54) (0.23) (0.84) 
lndistroad 0.090 0.073 -0.078 
(0.83) (0.54) (0.47) 
slope25over 1.072 1.207 -0.071 
(1.14) (1.09) (0.05) 
bamboo 6.797 0.767 0.128 
(6.01)*** (0.68) (0.09) 
Constant -5.304 0.994 -29.73 
  (0.56) (0.10) (1.73)* 
Implied certification effect -2.643 2.741 2.635 
  (1.50) (1.14) (0.80) 
N 414 414 414 
R2 0.40 0.42 0.26 
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Village fixed effects included. Absolute value of 
t-stat in parentheses. Robust standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing 
data excluded.  Implied certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523, 
ln(time preferance) = -4.394,  ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. ln(disthome), 
ln(distroad), and slope25over.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.3  Robustness Check 1: The effect of forest certification on labor 
days for harvesting forest products 
Dependent Variable:  Logged labor used for harvesting forest products (days/hectare) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform -1.598 -1.753 -0.428 -1.702 
(0.97) (1.23) (0.18) (1.00) 
ln(risk aversion) 0.590 0.361 0.780 
(2.97)*** (4.89)*** (4.10)*** 
ln(loss aversion) 0.056 -0.770 -0.361 
(0.13) (2.29)** (0.86) 
ln(probability weighting dummy) 1.913 3.605 2.124 
(2.02)** (2.59)** (1.74)* 
ln(time preference) 0.089 -0.050 0.095 
(0.58) (0.19) (0.57) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -0.888 -1.093 
(3.83)*** (11.27)*** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform 0.907 1.06 
(2.01)** (3.62)*** 
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform -2.068 -1.548 
(0.99) (1.05) 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform -0.019 0.032 
(0.05) (0.12) 
Constant -10.336 -7.897 -12.257 -6.743 
  (10.48)*** (1.09) (7.80)*** (0.89) 
Implied certification effect -1.598 -1.753 -1.300 2.741 
  (0.97) (1.23) (0.83) (1.14) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.03 0.37 0.09 0.40 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded.  Implied 
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523, ln(time preferance) = -
4.394, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. Household characteristic control 
variables include:  ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), ln(r_hyp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), 
hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest characteristic control variables include: 
fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and slope25over.  All include controls for the year 
2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.4  Robustness Check 1: The effect of forest certification on labor 
days for applying inputs 
Dependent Variable:  Logged labor used for applying inputs (days/hectare) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform 0.117 0.259 -6.470 -6.559 
(0.08) (0.17) (2.28)** (2.60)** 
ln(risk aversion) -0.559 -0.549 -0.585 
(3.72)*** (10.11)*** (4.31)*** 
ln(loss aversion) 0.008 0.138 -0.019 
(0.02) (0.43) (0.05) 
ln(probability weighting dummy) 0.358 -1.211 -1.066 
(0.19) (0.77) (0.65) 
ln(time preference) -0.234 -0.044 -0.080 
(1.45) (0.32) (0.39) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform 0.473 0.461 
(2.85)*** (2.28)** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform -0.32 -0.244 
(0.52) (0.37) 
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform 4.908 5.671 
(1.54) (1.93)* 
ln(time preference)*AfterReform -1.011 -0.811 
(2.74)*** (1.78)* 
Constant -11.806 -7.135 -11.686 -1.76 
  (19.20)*** (0.78) (7.33)*** (0.21) 
Implied certification effect 0.117 0.259 2.404 2.261 
  (0.06) (0.17) (1.45) (1.17) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.41 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Same notes as appendix table 1.3. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.5  Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest plot certification on 
labor for harvesting forest products 
Dependent Variable:  Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products 
(yuan/hectare) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform -2.091 -2.274 -0.653 -2.015 
(1.03) (1.30) (0.24) (0.99) 
ln(risk aversion) 0.726 0.449 0.961 
(2.92)*** (4.94)*** (4.09)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.055 -0.975 -0.429 
(0.11) (2.35)** (0.84) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.361 4.494 2.648 
(2.03)** (2.63)** (1.76)* 
ln(exponential  0.127 -0.030 0.124 
discounting parameter) (0.69) (0.09) (0.61) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -1.126 -1.37 
(3.90)*** (12.15)*** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform 1.114 1.319 
(2.04)** (3.70)*** 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform -2.638 -2.044 
(1.02) (1.10) 
ln(exponential -0.048 -2.044 
discounting parameter)*AfterReform (0.09) (1.10) 
Constant -9.624 -6.741 -11.837 -5.554 
  (8.07)*** (0.74) (6.42)*** (0.59) 
Implied certification effect -2.091 -2.274 -1.721 -2.744 
  (1.03) (1.30) (0.86) (1.50) 
N  414 414 414 414 
R2 0.03 0.37 0.09 0.40 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded.  Implied 
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.5232, ln(time preference – 
exponential discounting parmater) = -3.932, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. 
Household characteristic control variables include:  ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), 
ln(r_exp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest 
characteristic control variables include: fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and 
slope25over.  All include controls for the year 2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.6  Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest plot certification on 
labor for applying inputs 
Dependent Variable:  Logged value of labor used for applying inputs (yuan/hectare) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform 0.117 0.363 -7.861 -8.076 
(0.06) (0.19) (2.38)** (2.75)*** 
ln(risk aversion) -0.674 -0.671 -0.704 
(3.76)*** (10.41)*** (4.37)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.023 0.142 -0.035 
(0.06) (0.38) (0.08) 
ln(probability weighting) 0.604 -1.297 -1.133 
(0.27) (0.69) (0.58) 
ln(exponential  -0.245 -0.035 -0.052 
discounting parameter) (1.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform 0.588 0.562 
(2.76)*** (2.23)** 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform -0.481 -0.378 
(0.64) (0.48) 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform 6.112 7.042 
(1.63) (2.00)* 
ln( exponential -1.469 -1.222 
discounting parameter)*AfterReform (2.83)*** (1.96)* 
Constant -11.417 -4.754 -11.270 1.955 
  (15.49)*** (0.43) (6.06)*** (0.19) 
Implied certification effect 0.117 0.363 2.582 2.548 
  (0.06) (0.19) (1.33) (1.14) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.42 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.5. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.7  Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest certification on 
expenditure on forest inputs 
Depdendent Variable:  Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/hectare) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AfterReform -1.380 0.649 -7.836 -6.752 
(0.50) (0.23) (1.97)* (1.85)* 
ln(risk aversion) -1.046 -0.433 -1.001 
(5.06)*** (3.53)*** (5.12)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.831 -0.291 -0.715 
(1.96)* (0.44) (1.20) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.268 0.213 1.403 
(1.64) (0.09) (0.86) 
ln(time preference - exponential  0.044 0.283 0.314 
discounting parameter) (0.17) (0.91) (0.84) 
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform -0.106 0.016 
(0.37) (0.05) 
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform -0.929 -0.96 
(0.82) (0.84) 
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform 2.66 4.047 
(0.58) (0.95) 
ln(time preference – exponential  -1.833 -1.664 
discounting parameter)*AfterReform (2.67)** (2.19)** 
Constant -9.783 -37.028 -8.894 -29.541 
  (8.15)*** (2.15)** (3.45)** (1.73)* 
Implied certification effect -1.38 0.649 0.436 2.246 
  (0.50) (0.23) (0.14) (0.72) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.26 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.5. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.8  Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest plot certification on 
labor for harvesting forest products  
Dependent Variable:  Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products 
(yuan/hectare) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
YearsPostFC -0.874 -0.912 -0.213 -0.484 
(1.57) (1.75)* (0.32) (0.85) 
ln(risk aversion) 0.759 0.44 0.962 
(2.92)*** (4.91)*** (3.85)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.131 -0.891 -0.455 
(0.25) (2.32)** (0.84) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.259 4.520 2.945 
(2.17)** (2.99)*** (2.27)** 
ln(time preference) 0.120 -0.071 0.135 
 (0.64) (0.23) (0.66) 
ln(risk aversion)* YearsPostFC -0.398 -0.506 
(3.38)*** (8.57)*** 
ln(loss aversion)* YearsPostFC 0.234 0.351 
(1.56) (2.75)*** 
ln(probability weighting)* YearsPostFC -0.802 -0.763 
(1.59) (1.64) 
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC 0.06 0.029 
 (0.53) (0.24) 
Constant -9.702 -5.869 -12.314 -4.126 
  (8.04)*** (0.66) (6.61)*** (0.44) 
Implied certification effect -0.874 -0.912 -0.905 -0.860 
  (1.57) (1.75)* (1.47) (1.34) 
N  414 414 414 414 
R2 0.04 0.37 0.09 0.40 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded.  Implied 
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.5232, ln(time preference – 
exponential discounting parmater) = -3.932, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. 
Household characteristic control variables include:  ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), 
ln(r_exp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest 
characteristic control variables include: fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and 
slope25over.  All include controls for the year 2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.9  Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest plot certification on 
labor for applying inputs 
Dependent Variable:  Logged value of labor used for applying inputs (yuan/hectare) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
YearsPostFC -0.331 -0.460 -3.057 -3.214 
(0.51) (0.73) (2.48)** (2.72)*** 
ln(risk aversion) -0.657 -0.66 -0.662 
(3.55)*** (9.55) (3.73)*** 
ln(loss aversion) 0.015 0.074 -0.109 
(0.04) (0.19) (0.23) 
ln(probability weighting) 0.492 -1.261 -0.852 
(0.23) (0.71) (0.46) 
ln(time preference) -0.24 -0.07 -0.064 
 (1.23) (0.42) (0.26) 
ln(risk aversion)* YearsPostFC 0.206 0.199 
(2.51)** (1.87)* 
ln(loss aversion)* YearsPostFC -0.038 0.061 
(0.17) (0.23) 
ln(probability weighting)* YearsPostFC 2.121 2.180 
(1.86)* (2.03)** 
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC -0.407 -0.353 
 (1.85)* (1.41) 
Constant -11.664 -4.732 -11.617 1.837 
  (15.64)*** (0.42) (6.25)*** (0.17) 
Implied certification effect -0.331 -0.460 0.717 0.456 
  (0.51) (0.73) (0.88 (0.50) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.42 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.8. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 1.10  Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest certification on 
expenditure on forest inputs 
Depdendent Variable:  Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/hectare) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
YearsPostFC -0.630 -0.145 -3.08 -2.56 
(0.86) (0.21) (2.08)** (1.73)* 
ln(risk aversion) -1.032 -0.422 -0.976 
(5.01)*** (3.48)*** (4.94)*** 
ln(loss aversion) -0.817 -0.468 -0.831 
(1.83)* (0.76) (1.48) 
ln(probability weighting) 2.17 -0.006 1.284 
(1.56) (0.00) (0.77) 
ln(time preference) 0.04 0.227 0.25 
 (0.16) (0.83) (0.75) 
ln(risk aversion)*YearsPostFC -0.026 0.015 
(0.28) (0.11) 
ln(loss aversion)*YearsPostFC -0.172 -0.098 
(0.58) (0.33) 
ln(probability weighting)*YearsPostFC 1.239 1.422 
(0.86) (1.05) 
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC -0.478 -0.420 
 (1.86)* (1.43) 
Constant -9.872 -36.868 -8.74 -29.90 
  (8.12)*** (2.18)** (3.37)*** (1.71)* 
Implied certification effect -0.630 -0.145 0.150 0.628 
  (0.86) (0.21) (0.15) (0.62) 
N 414 414 414 414 
R2 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.25 
Household characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Plot characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Village fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.8. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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MANUSCRIPT 2 
Poverty, Risk, and Time Preferences: A Study of Rural Chinese Households 
2.1 Abstract   
 
Those living in poverty are often assumed to have both high levels of risk aversion 
and high rates of impatience, preferences that make it difficult for these households to 
save and take the risks necessary to begin to accumulate capital. In this paper, we 
investigate the relationship between poverty and individual preferences for time and 
risk. To meet this objective, we use field experiment data collected in Fujian, China to 
measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households combined with 
household survey data. Specifically, we use net worth per capita as the primary 
measure of wealth, and also use alternative variables as proxies for wealth (forest land 
area, house value, assets, and liabilities) to check for robustness. To address the 
problem of endogeneity of wealth, we use households’ net worth rank within their 
village as an instrumental variable for net worth per capita. On average we find that 
participants are risk averse, moderately loss averse and have relatively low discount 
rates (i.e., patient). Contrary to the classic assumption, we find that wealth does not 
have a significant effect on risk aversion or loss aversion (with the one exception that 
households with more forest land per capita are less loss averse). However, consistent 
with this assumption we find statistically weak evidence that households with lower 
wealth have higher discount rates (i.e., more impatient).  
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2.2 Introduction 
 
In 2005 there was an estimated 1.4 billion people in the world that still lived below 
the poverty line of $1.25 a day. And in China, while there has been a dramatic 
reduction in the poverty rate over the last two decades, falling from 84% to 15.9% 
over 1981 to 2005, the number living on less than $1.25 a day was still at 106.1 
million people in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 2009).1 A multitude of factors 
contribute to the ongoing existence of poverty in the world: physical geography; lack 
of government investment in public goods and services like primary health care, 
education and infrastructure; governance failures; political conflicts and cultural 
barriers (Sachs 2005). And at a more fundamental level, the ongoing existence of 
poverty has been attributed to the idea that the poor remain poor because attempts to 
escape poverty are hindered by the fact that they are poor (Fisher 1930; Myrdal 1957; 
World Bank 2000; Mosley and Verschoor 2005). This argument, often referred to as 
the `vicious circle of poverty’, is that poverty persists as a result of those 
characteristics of poverty that make escape difficult including: poor health, lack of 
skill, lack of support mechanisms, remoteness from markets and institutions, social 
exclusion and lack of physical assets or access to credit (Mosley and Verschoor 2005).  
This paper investigates the correlation between poverty and individual preferences 
for time and risk. Specifically, we use field experiment data collected in Fujian, China 
to measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households combined with 
household survey data to examine the correlation between wealth and risk and time 
preferences. This relationship is important in understanding this ‘vicious circle’ 
because two key elements in many versions of this ‘vicious circle’ are that those living 
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in poverty have both high levels of risk aversion and high rates of impatience (Fisher 
1930; Lipton 1968; Lumley 1997; Fafchamps 2003). For example, regarding time 
preferences, Irving Fisher wrote,  
A small income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high rate of 
impatience, partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary 
both for the present itself and for the future as well, and partly from lack of 
foresight and self-control. (Fisher 1930, p.73)  
 
And with regard to risk preferences, Michael Lipton wrote, “The risk premium is an 
increasing function of risk and a decreasing function of assets.”(Lipton 1968, p.335) In 
other words, the poorer a household, the more impatient they are and the more they 
seek to avoid risk. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these households to 
save and take the risks necessary to begin to accumulate capital. Therefore, the manner 
in which individuals discount the future and make decisions that involve risks are 
important for understanding behavior in developing countries. 
The ‘vicious circle of poverty’ also has implications for the linkages between 
poverty and the environment. People everywhere consume water, food, energy and 
other natural resources in order to live, and these productive activities deplete the 
same natural resources upon which people depend. This is particularly true for poor 
communities in developing countries where livelihoods are often entirely dependent 
upon the local environment. When basic needs cannot be met with resources derived 
from the local environment, or when those resources are used in an unsustainable 
manner, subsistence communities expand into other areas to meet their needs, often 
drawing on those resources until they too are depleted. Thus the downward cycle 
continues (WCED 1987; UNCED 1993; World Bank 1996). Furthermore, since the 
poor are characterized as risk averse and impatient (meaning a short planning time 
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horizon), they may be less likely to invest in conservation and new technologies to 
protect their natural resource base (Mink 1993; Perring 1996). 
Since Binswagner’s early use of experimental economics to capture risk 
preferences in India in the 1980s and Pender’s work also in India in the late 1990s, 
economists have been examining the correlation between poverty, risk and time 
preferences. However, empirical evidence on whether individual time and risk 
preferences vary with wealth has been inconclusive (Binswanger 1980; Pender 1996; 
Cardenas and Carpenter 2008).2  Furthermore, most studies have focused on 
correlations, with few aiming to identify the direction of causality (Tanaka, Camerer, 
and Nguyen 2010). Is one impatient and risk averse because they are poor? Or is one 
inhibited from escaping poverty because they are risk averse and impatient? As such, 
there is a need to examine the direction of causality between wealth and risk and time 
preferences. In this paper, we address the potential endogeneity of wealth and begin to 
explore the direction of causality by using an instrumental variable for wealth. 
We believe that this paper has several contributions. First, we add to the empirical 
literature aimed at understanding the linkages between risk and time preferences and 
poverty. Second, this is one of the few papers to examine risk preferences of rural 
Chinese households (Liu 2008; Carlsson et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2010).3 Third, to our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to measure time preferences of rural Chinese 
households using field experiments with real monetary rewards. 
Overall, we find that on average participants exhibited risk aversion, moderate loss 
aversion and relatively low discount rates (i.e., patience). There is little evidence that 
wealth, measured by net worth per capita, affects risk and loss aversion. However, 
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there is weak evidence that households with more forest land per capita are less loss 
averse. Also, we find weak evidence that net worth per capita has a negative 
significant effect on the discount rate, indicating that households with higher net worth 
per capita have lower discount rates (i.e., more patient). 
2.3 Previous Literature: Methods and Findings 
 
Over the last three decades researchers have used a variety methods to measure 
both time and risk preferences. Binswagner (1980) was the first to use experimental 
economic methods in the field to measure risk preferences. Binswagner used an 
Ordered Lottery Selection design in which each participant is presented with a series 
of lotteries. Participants are then asked to choose one lottery from the list. Each lottery 
is determined by the toss of a fair coin. While the probability is a 50/50 chance, the 
payouts in each lottery pair are varied. The variation in payoffs causes the expected 
payoffs to vary. A participant should trade off expected return for less variability, 
depending on how risk averse the participant is.  
Since the 1980’s several other researchers have followed Binswagner’s Ordered 
Lottery Selection design to elicit risk preference measures from rural households in 
developing countries (e.g., Nielsen (2001) in Madagascar; Barr (2003) in Zimbabwe; 
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) in Ethiopia, etc.), while others have used the 
Accept/Reject Lotteries experiment methods of Holt and Laury (2002) (e.g., Liu 
(2008) and Gong et al. (2010) in China, Tanaka et al. (2010) in Vietnam).4 In an 
Accept/Reject Lotteries design, participants are given an ordered array of binary 
lottery choices to make. The lotteries are presented in two columns. Initially, the first 
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column has a higher expected payoff and variance in payoffs but eventually as the 
probability of the high payoff in the second column increases, the expected value of 
the second column becomes higher than the expected value of the first column. More 
risk averse individuals will choose the first column for longer. After all choices have 
been made, typically one row is randomly chosen for play and payment is made 
depending on the participants choice on that row. 
Contrary to the ideas of Lipton (1968) and others that risk aversion would 
increase with poverty, Binswanger found no statistically significant correlation 
between wealth and risk aversion. However, results of empirical studies after 
Binswanger have been mixed. In these studies, researchers have typically used either 
wealth or income (or in some cases both) as an indicator of poverty, and a variety of 
assets have been used in these studies to proxy for wealth. For example, Binswanger 
(1980) uses total gross sales value of a household’s physical assets, whereas, Nielsen 
(2001) and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) use a variety of livestock measures (such as 
number of oxen or changes in cattle holdings) to proxy for wealth (and poverty). 
Similar to Binswagner (1980), Mosley and Verschoor (2005) and Liu (2008) found no 
significant correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Also, Mosley and Verschoor 
(2005) and Tanaka et al. (2010) found that household income is not significantly 
correlated with risk aversion. However, Tanaka et al. (2010) found that mean village 
income had a significant negative relationship with risk aversion, indicating that 
households living in wealthy villages are less risk averse. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) 
found a significant positive relationship between income and risk aversion, while 
 96 
 
Neilson (2001) and Wik (2004) found a significant negative relationship between 
income and risk aversion.5   
While many researchers have explored the correlation between poverty and risk 
aversion, few have examined the relationship between poverty and loss aversion (Liu 
2008; Tanaka et al. 2010). In expected utility theory, risk attitudes are solely described 
by the degree of risk aversion (the concavity of the utility function). Prospect theory 
allows for a broader description of risk attitudes by allowing for the possibility that 
individuals may be loss averse. Loss aversion refers to an individual’s tendency to 
strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gain, and describes the curvature of an 
individual’s value function above zero relative to the curvature of the value function 
below zero (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In China, Liu (2008) found that wealth is 
not significantly correlated with loss aversion. Similarly, Tanaka et al. (2010) found in 
Vietnam that household income is not significantly correlated with loss aversion but 
that mean village income is highly correlated with loss aversion, indicating that 
households in poorer villages are more loss averse. 
Time preference and poverty 
Over the last three decades, researchers have also endeavored to measure time 
preferences by estimating a discount rate. Some discount rates have been derived from 
“real-world” behaviors while others have been derived from experimental elicitation 
procedures. Some questions were hypothetical, while others involved real monetary 
rewards. Furthermore, a variety of different protocols have been used to conduct time 
preference experiments, making it difficult for comparison across studies. Here we 
will only review findings from those studies most relevant to examining the 
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relationship between time preferences and poverty in developing countries.6 For a 
complete review of this literature see Frederick, Loewenstien and O’Donoghue 
(2002). 
As with the relationship between risk preferences and poverty, empirical finding 
related to the relationship between time preferences and poverty have also been mixed. 
Again, as indicators of poverty, studies have used either wealth or income, or in some 
cases both.7 Most studies use exponential discounting, however this model often does 
not fit experimental and field data well (Frederick et al. 2002). Pender (1996) found 
weak evidence in India that wealthier respondents had lower discount rates. Also, 
Neilsen (2001) in Madagascar and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2008) and Holden, Shiferaw, 
and Wik (1998) in Ethiopia both found that wealthier households had significantly 
lower discount rates, indicating that the poorer a household is, the more impatient they 
are. However, Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch (2010) and Kirby et al. (2002) found 
that wealth was not correlated with the discount rate in India and Bolivia, respectively.  
Findings in studies that use income rather than wealth as an indicator of poverty 
are also mixed. Tanaka et al. (2010) in Vietnam found that both households with 
higher income and households that live in villages with higher mean incomes have 
significantly lower discount rates. Kirby et al. (2002) and Gunatilake, 
Wickramasinghe, and Abeygunawardena (2007) also find a negative significant 
relationship between income and the discount rate in Bolivia and Sri Lanka, 
respectively. However, Nielsen (2001), Anderson et al. (2004), and Bauer and 
Chytilová (2008) found that there was no statistically significant relationship between 
income and time preferences. 
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2.4 Survey Procedure and Data Description 
 
The household and village survey, as well as the risk and time preference field 
experiments were conducted in late July and early August of 2009. The household 
data set contains year 2008 data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming 
City and Datian County, and 10 villages located in the northwest area of Fujian 
Province. The data is part of a larger panel data set collected in 2006 (for the years 
2000 and 2005) by a research team from Peking University, Gothenberg University 
and Forest Trends. In 2006, the survey team completed a survey in three townships, 
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600 
households. At that time, data was collected for the years 2000 and 2005. In 2009, two 
of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts were made to conduct a 
follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties that had been included in 
the previous survey.   
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households from the previous 
survey were located. These 104 households were asked to complete the survey and to 
participate in two decision-making tasks (the risk and time preference experiments) 
during which they could earn a real monetary payoff. All subjects completed the 
survey but one subject choose not to participate in the decision-making tasks due to 
lack of time. Each subject was paid 15 yuan compensation to complete the survey plus 
its earning in the decision-making tasks.8 
Enumerators visited households in pairs on the first day and individually each day 
after that. Each visit began with the enumerators interviewing the household to 
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complete the household survey. When the survey was fifty percent complete, the risk 
decision-making task was completed and the appropriate payoff for the risk task was 
delivered. Then, the enumerator continued with the household survey. Following the 
completion of the survey, the participant completed the time decision-making task. A 
final short survey was conducted that included self-rating risk preference questions 
and hypothetical time preference questions. In total, the survey and decision-making 
tasks took between 3 and 4 hours to complete. The risk decision-making task took 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. The time decision-making task took a little less time, 
on average between 30 and 45 minutes. During each decision-making task, 
enumerators carefully explained the task instructions to the participants and were 
instructed to only begin the task when they felt confident that the participant 
understood. For those participants who were illiterate (27% of subjects), enumerators 
read each choice in the decision task out loud to the participant, the participant stated 
his or her answer, and the enumerator recorded the answer on the record sheet. 
Sample description 
The sample consisted of 103 individuals, of which 81 identified themselves as 
head of household. These individuals most likely are those who are faced with day-to-
day consumption and investment decisions over different time horizons and with 
varying degrees of risk and who have the primary responsibility for sustaining the 
household. Eighty-six percent of the subjects were male and 46% had worked off farm 
during 2008 (table 2.1). The mean age was 51.5 year old, and on average subjects had 
5.4 years of education. Average household size was 4.5 people, with a mean 
dependency ratio (number of children divided by number of adults) of 0.15, which is 
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indicative of China’s 1979 one child policy and the tradition that the oldest son and his 
spouse are responsible for caring for elderly parents (Zhang and Goza 2006). The 
typical household managed 0.07 hectares of farmland per capita and 0.59 hectares 
forest land per capita.  
We are primarily interested in the relationship between poverty and risk and time 
preferences. As a proxy for poverty, we choose to examine household wealth levels, as 
measured by net worth per capita, defined as total assets minus liabilities. Household 
assets include: the value of the household’s house, consumptive assets, productive 
assets, and livestock; savings held in bank accounts; loans provided to others; and 
other investments and deposits. Note that a real housing market does not exist in rural 
China and that house values are those estimated by the interviewee, rather than the 
market price. Household liabilities include both productive and non-productive loans. 
The mean net worth per capita in 2008 was 25936 yuan (table 2.2), approximately 
USD $3373. House value constitutes the largest share of household wealth. This is not 
surprising, as it is common for households in China to spend a large share of their 
income on their homes (McKinley and Wang 1992; Wu 1997). Culturally, the idea of 
“face” (or honor) is very important in the Chinese culture. In rural Chinese villages, 
the family home, which is visible to the local villagers, is an important signal of 
wealth. The home plays an important role for the person who is concerned with face. 
A person can gain more face by having a beautiful house (Carlsson and Qin 2010). In 
our empirical work, we will use net worth per capita to measure household wealth. 
Furthermore, we use both forest land per capita and sub-categories of net worth to 
check the robustness of our results. 
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Risk Experiment Design  
To elicit a measure of risk preference, we follow the experimental design 
developed by Tanaka et al. (2010), who expands the classic Accept/Reject Lotteries of 
Holt and Laury (2002) to incorporate prospect theory. Following, Tanaka et al. (2010) 
we use cumulative prospect theory and a non-linear probability weighting measure 
extended from the one-parameter form of Drazen Prelec’s axiomatically-derived 
weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; 
Prelec 1998). We assume a utility function of the following form: 
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U(x,p; y,q) denotes the expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the 
outcomes x and y with the probability of p and q, respectively. The function v(x) 
denotes a power value function.9 The parameter σ describes the curvature of an 
individual’s value function. An individual’s risk preferences are described as risk 
averse when σ > 0,  risk neutral when σ = 0, and risk loving when σ < 0. The 
parameter λ describes the curvature of an individual’s value function above zero 
relative to the curvature of the value function below zero. The higher the value of λ, 
the more loss averse the individual is. The parameter α is a non-linear probability 
weighting measure, which is extended from a model by Prelec (1998). The function 
π(p) weights the probabilities. When α <1, π(p) has an inverted S-shape, indicating 
that an individual tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high 
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probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This model reduces to expected utility 
theory when α = 1 and λ=1. 
In our experiment, participants were asked to choose between two sets of lottery 
options. For example, Figure 1.1 illustrates one set of options that a subject was asked 
to choose between. In this example, Option A offers a 30% chance of receiving 20 
yuan and a 70% chance of receiving 5 yuan. Option B offers a 10% chance of 
receiving 34 yuan and a 90% chance of receiving 2.5 yuan. A total of 35 choices, 
divided between three series were asked. Monotonic switching was enforced, meaning 
that once the subject switched to option B they were not allowed to switch back to 
option A. 10 By enforcing monotonic switching, we eliminate the possibility of 
inconsistent choices within each series and also make the task more clear and concise 
for participants, as they only need to identify one switch point in each series.11 Once 
the subject had completed the entire series of choices, one question was chosen 
randomly for payoff. The choices in the risk experiment were designed so that any 
combination of choices in the three series determine a particular combination of 
prospect theory parameter values.  
Table 2.3 shows the entire payoff matrix for the experiment. The payoffs range 
from a loss of 10 yuan to a gain of 850 yuan.12 We use a relatively high maximum 
payoff of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in rural China. The average 
payoff in the risk experiment was 27 yuan (inclusive of the 10 yuan participation 
compensation), which is roughly half a single days wage in the survey area in 2008.   
In the payoff matrix note that at first, the first column (Option A) dominates the 
second column (Option B) in terms of expected payoff and variance in the payoffs, but 
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eventually, as the value of the high outcome in the second column increases, the 
expected value of the second column begins to dominate (table 2.3). The more risk 
averse individual would choose option A longer before switching to option B. The 
point at which participants switch from option A to option B in series 1 and 2 allows 
for the classification of an individual’s risk preferences as risk adverse, risk neutral or 
risk seeking (the curvature of the value function) and to identify if the subject tends to 
overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (the non-linear 
probability weighting parameter). The points at which participants switch from option 
A to option B in series 1, 2 and 3, together allow for the identification of the loss 
aversion parameter.13   
Risk preferences description 
In our sample, the average derived values for α and λ are 0.73 and 6.02, 
respectively, and both are statistically different from 1 at the 1% significance level by 
t-test. This implies that our experimental results reject expected utility theory in favor 
of prospect theory’s inverted S-shaped probability weighting and loss aversion. The 
average derived value of σ is 0.42, indicating on average rural individuals in China 
exhibit risk aversion. For comparison to other studies, Liu (2008) in a sample of 
Chinese farmers found values for (σ, α, λ) of (0.48, 0.69, 3.47) and Tanaka et al. 
(2010) in a sample of Vietnamese farmers found values of (0.40, 0.75 and 3.0). The 
values for σ and α across the studies are very similar; however, our value for λ is 
approximately twice as much as the values in the previous comparable studies, 
indicating that our sample exhibits on average a higher degree of loss aversion. Figure 
1.2, Panel A, B and C illustrate the distribution of σ, α, λ, respectively. While the 
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distributions for σ and α in Panel A and B exhibit a rather normal distribution, the 
distribution for λ in Panel C is bimodal with a share of subjects exhibiting low degrees 
of loss aversion and another share of subjects showing high degrees of loss aversion.   
Comparability of self-rated risk survey questions 
Dohmen et al. (2005) find that a general risk question can be used to predict actual 
risk-taking behavior, while Liu (2008) find that self-reported risk attitude does not 
predict risk aversion. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) find that risk aversion is lower 
when the rewards are hypothetical rather than real. To further investigate the 
comparability of self-rated risk questions to risk preference measures from field 
experiments with monetary rewards, we also asked participants two questions to allow 
the participants to self-rate their risk preferences. The first question was “How do you 
see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you 
try to avoid taking risks?” Participants were asked to circle a number on a scale of 0 to 
10, where the value 0 indicates that you are unwilling to take risks and the value 10 
means that you are fully prepared to take risks. While the first question was asked 
about taking risks in general, the second question was more specific, asking about 
taking risks in investment, such as in agricultural investment.  
Figure 2.1, a box plot of the quartile level of the risk aversion parameter given the 
level of self-rated risk aversion in each of these two questions, shows that the self-
reported risk aversion levels are noisy measures. Simple regressions using self-rated 
risk aversion (general) as the independent variable and risk aversion as measured in 
the experiments as the dependent variable, reveal that the self-rated risk aversion 
predicts the experiment risk aversion measure at a 5% significance level. However, the 
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self-rated risk aversion in the context of taking risks in investment is not correlated 
with the experiment risk aversion measure. 
Time Preference Experimental Design 
There are several competing models for time discounting that have received a 
significant amount of attention in both experimental psychology (e.g., de Villiers and 
Herrnstein (1976), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), etc.) and behavioral economics (e.g., 
Laisbons (1997), Lowenstein and Prelec (1992), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).14 The 
competing models were developed to account for observed behavioral regularities that 
are not consistent with the classic exponential discounting model. For example, the 
most common documented behavioral regularity is called “reversal of preferences”. It 
occurs, for example, when a subject prefers $10 now rather than $12 in one day, but 
also prefers $12 in a year plus a day rather than $10 in a year. This type of preference 
is not consistent with exponential discounting but would be consistent with a rate of 
time preference that declines with time. There are a variety of specifications of 
discounting with this property of rates of time preference that decline with time, most 
notably hyperbolic discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  
Our time experiment design follows procedures similar to those originally 
developed by Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002). The 
data are then used to estimate three parameters—the conventional time discounting 
parameter (r), present-bias (β), and hyperbolicity of the discount function (θ)— in a 
general time discounting model using nonlinear least-squares, which allows us to test 
which discounting model fits the data best—exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, 
or a more general form (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 2007; Tanaka et al. 2010).15  
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In the time preference experiment subjects were asked to choose between, for 
example, a real monetary payoff today or a larger payoff six months from now. The 
hypothetical bias typically found in earlier time preference studies is addressed here 
because participants received a real monetary payment based on their choices. Choices 
were always posed as a choice between a monetary payoff today or a larger monetary 
payoff in the future.16  
To ensure the credibility of a future payment, subjects were told that the future 
payments would be delivered by China Post, which is the official postal service of the 
Peoples Republic of China, an agency with which rural households are very familiar 
and comfortable using for the delivery of money. Furthermore, we believed the 
credibility problem to be minimal because our participants were part of a panel survey 
and this was the second time that the household had been visited by a research team 
from Peking University. Repeat visits by our research team built trust and reassurance 
with the participants.  
Following the experimental design of Tanaka et al. (2010), the subjects were asked 
a total of 75 questions divided into 15 series of 5 questions each.17 A single series of 
questions is depicted in Figure 1.3. In this example, the subject was asked to choose 
Plan A or Plan B for each of the 5 questions. Plan A, the future payoff plan remained 
the same for each question in the series, while the immediate option increased as the 
subject moved down the column from 25 yuan to 125 yuan, at 1/6 increments of the 
future payoff. As in the risk experiment, monotonic switching within each series was 
also enforced here. The point at which an individual switches from choosing the more 
immediate reward to taking the delayed reward provides a bound on his or her 
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discount rate. The discount rate indicates the rate that would make a person indifferent 
between the immediate and the delayed reward. An individual with a high discount 
rate has a preference for the present, whereas an individual with a low discount rate 
has a preference for the future. 
We used 15 combinations of future payoff and time in the experiments; that is 15, 
60 and 150 yuan with delays of 2 weeks, 3 months and 6 months and 30 and 120 yuan 
with delays of 1 week, 2 months and 4 months.18 For each future payoff-time 
combination, we asked 5 questions, with the immediate payoff equal to 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 
2/3 and 5/6 of the future payoff in the 5 question series. Once the subject had 
completed all 75 questions, one question was randomly chosen for payment. The 
subject’s choices on the selected question, determined how much money and when it 
was to be delivered. The average payoff in the time experiment was 59 yuan. Fifty-
eight of the subjects received payment immediately, while 45 subjects received a 
future payment. The average wait time for future payments was 68 days. 
Time Preferences Description 
Table 1.4 compares the aggregate results of the estimations. Estimating the full 
model with unrestricted θ gives a relatively high value of θ=5.16, which is similar to 
Tanaka et al.’s (2010) estimate of θ=5.07, and influences the estimates of r and β but 
does not improve the R2 compared with estimations from the quasi-hyperbolic model. 
While quasi-hyperbolic discounting model seems to fit the aggregate sample best, at 
the individual level the quasi-hyperbolic model has convergence problems for 32 
subjects (31% of our sample), whereas there are no convergence problems for the 
exponential and hyperbolic models when estimating each subject’s risk parameters. 
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Therefore, we focus on the estimates from the hyperbolic model and use those 
parameters to represent the time preference of each household in our empirical model. 
The estimated values of r is 0.018. Since the delay is measured in days, the hyperbolic 
discounting parameter, multiplied by 100, can approximately be interpreted as 
expressing the percent decrease per day. It is an approximation because for a 
hyperbolic function the percent decrease gets smaller as the delay increases. On 
average, we find (based on the hyperbolic model estimates) that a subject would be 
willing to trade 89 yuan today for 100 in 1 week, 65 yuan today for 100 yuan in 1 
month, and 24 yuan today for 100 yuan in 6 months. 
Figure 1.4 depicts the distribution of the hyperbolic discounting parameter, from 
our experiment. Surprisingly, the figure shows that the hyperbolic time preference 
parameter was relatively low for the majority of our subject, indicating that they have 
a relatively weak preference for income today.  
Comparability of hypothetical time preference questions 
 Several experimenters have compared discount rates derived from questions 
with hypothetical and real rewards. Johnson and Bickel (2002), Madden et al. (2003), 
Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) did not find differences between hypothetical and real 
rewards in their experiments. However, Kirby and Marakovic (1996) and Coller and 
Williams (1999) found that hypothetical choices resulted in lower discount rates than 
real choices. To further examine the comparability of discount rates estimated from 
experiments with real monetary rewards to those with hypothetical rewards, we asked 
participants two hypothetical contextualized time preference questions. Specifically, 
we asked subjects: 
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Imagine that you were given 10 yuan and told that you can use it to buy two 
types of tree seedling to plant on your forest plot. Imagine that your plot 
currently has no trees growing on it. Type 1 tree seedling costs 1 yuan and will 
grow into a tree that can be harvested and sold for 10 yuan in 5 years. Type 2 
tree seedling costs 1 yuan each and will grow into a tree that can be harvested 
and sold for 30 yuan in 10 years. How much of the 10 yuan would you like to 
invest in Type 1 tree seedling? How much of the 10 yuan would you like to 
invest in Type 2 tree seedling?  
 
The mean investment in Type 1 trees (faster growing, lower return species) was 4 
yuan, and in type 2 trees (slower growing, higher return species) was 6 yuan. Figure 
2.2 shows a box plot of the quartile level of the hyperbolic time discounting parameter 
given the level of investment in the Type 2 tree (slower growing, higher return 
species). The hypothetical parameter is a rather noisy parameter, although there is a 
similar pattern to the distribution of the time preference parameter (Figure 2.2). A 
regression with the hyperbolic discounting parameter as the independent variable and 
the investment in the type 2 tree (slower growing, higher return species) as the 
dependent variable indicates that investment in type 2 tree is negatively correlated 
with the experimental hyperbolic time discounting parameter, indicating that higher 
investment in the slower growing, higher return species is correlated with individuals 
who displayed a lower discount rate (i.e., more patient) in the time preference 
experiment. However, the coefficient on investment in type 1 trees in not significant 
(t=1.62).    
2.5 Correlations 
 
We begin our empirical analysis of the determinants of risk and time preferences 
by estimating ordinary least squares regressions for the risk aversion, loss aversion and 
hyperbolic time discounting parameter. In each regression, we include individual and 
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household level characteristics. At the individual level, we control for the subjects 
gender, age and whether or not the subject has off farm employment. At the household 
level, we include net worth per capita (1000s of yuan), which is the variable of 
interest. We also control for household size, a dependency ratio that equals the number 
of children divided by the number of adults, the number of household members who 
work and the distance to both the post office and county seat.  
Additionally, in the regressions where the dependent variable is the hyperbolic 
time discounting parameter we include two additional control variables: the subject’s 
degree of risk aversion as measured from our risk decision-making task and the 
subject’s earnings in the risk preference experiment. Participants were told that future 
payments in the time decision-making task would be delivered via China Post. If risk 
averse participants viewed receiving the future payments in the time decision-making 
task as “risky”, then their risk aversion may impact their decisions in the time task; 
that is risk averse participants may choose the immediate reward, which they view as 
“safer”. To control for this potential bias, we include risk aversion in the regressions 
where time preference is the dependent variable. If this was a potential source of bias 
in the time decision-making task, then we would expect to find a significant positive 
relationship between risk aversion and the time discounting parameter. In addition, 
earnings from the risk decision-making task were distributed to the participant prior to 
their participation in the time decision-making task. We might expect that higher 
earnings in the risk decision-making task might influence decisions in the time 
decision-making task. Individuals with higher earnings in the risk decision-making 
task may exhibit more patience in the time decision-making task (choosing the larger 
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future reward more often than they would have if they had not just received a sum of 
money). To control for this potential bias, we include the earnings in the risk 
experiment in the regressions where the dependent variable is the time preference 
parameter. If this is a source of bias, we would expect to see a significant negative 
relationship between the two variables. 
We also estimate each model with township fixed effects to control for 
unobservable factors that may be correlated with an individual’s risk and time 
preferences, such as access to formal credit and insurance markets. 
Correlations with risk preferences 
Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant correlation between any of 
the characteristics and risk aversion (table 2.4, columns 1 and 2). However, we do find 
a statistically significant negative correlation between net worth per capita and loss 
aversion (table 2.4, columns 3 and 4). This indicates that wealthy individuals are less 
loss averse. Also, we find a significant negative relationship between loss aversion and 
the dependency ratio, indicating that those from households with a higher dependency 
ratio (relatively more children than adults) tend to be less loss averse.   
Correlations with time preferences 
We find a significant negative correlation between net worth per capita and the 
discount rate, indicating that poorer individuals have a higher discount rates (i.e., more 
impatient) (table 2.5). Additionally, we find a significant positive relationship between 
the discount rate and both age and off farm employment. Those individuals who are 
older or who have off farm employment tend to have higher discount rates (i.e., 
impatient). There is also weak evidence that the discount rate is positively correlated 
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with years of education and the number of household members who work, indicating 
that more education and more workers in a household are associated with higher 
discount rates.  
Consistent with previous studies (Holden et al. 1998; Nielsen 2001; Gunatilake et 
al. 2007; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2008), there is weak evidence that more risk averse 
individuals have higher discount rates. Earnings from the risk experiment were not 
significantly correlated with the time preference parameter, indicating that choices in 
the time preference decision-making task were not influenced by earnings in the 
previous risk preference decision-making task. 
2.6 Instrumental Variable for Wealth 
 
While we find that low levels of wealth are associated with higher levels of loss 
aversion and impatience, we cannot conclude that wealth causes these preferences 
because of the endogeneity of wealth. Unobservable or omitted variables that affect 
wealth may also affect a household’s risk and time preferences, making the estimated 
coefficient on net worth per capita biased. For example, if an individual’s profession is 
risky (such as mining), then the individual may be wealthier (assuming higher pay for 
higher risk work) and also being in such a risky environment may decrease their risk 
aversion (growing more comfortable with taking risks). In this case, the profession 
affects both the risk preferences and wealth, and we would falsely attribute decreases 
in risk aversion to increases in wealth, when in fact it was the individual growing more 
comfortable taking risks due to employment as a miner, which was causing a decline 
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in their aversion to risk. In this case, the coefficient on wealth would be biased 
upward. 
To address potential endogeneity of wealth and omitted variables bias, we use an 
instrumental variable approach.19 Instrumental variable estimation solves the omitted 
variable problem by using only part of the variability in the endogenous variable that 
that is uncorrelated with the omitted variables to estimate the relationship between the 
endogenous regressor, wealth, and the dependent variable (Angrist and Krueger 2001). 
Following Godoy et al. (2009), we use households’ wealth rank in the village as an 
exogenous instrumental variable for wealth. Specifically, we assign a value of 1 to the 
household with the highest net worth per capita in a village. The rank of each other 
household in the village is expressed as a share of the net worth per capita of the 
wealthiest household in the village. For example, if a village had 3 households, one 
household with a net worth per capita of i.) 200000 yuan (the richest household); ii) 
100000 yuan (second richest household); and iii.) 40000 yuan (the poorest household), 
then the three households would have the following ranks: i.) 1 (200000/200000), ii.) 
0.5 (100000/200000), and iii.) 0.2 (40000/200000). We calculate households’ wealth 
rank in the village for each household in each of the survey years. 
Households’ rank in the village according to net worth per capita is highly 
correlated with net worth per capita but is not directly correlated with the risk and time 
preference parameters. Risk and time preferences could only influence household rank 
in net worth through households’ net worth per capita. Furthermore, rank is not a 
variable over which a household has control and therefore is exogenous to the 
household. A household might decide that it wants to change its wealth rank in the 
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village by increasing its net worth but a household’s final rank in the village will 
depend on the decisions of other households over which this household has no control. 
We conduct tests to validate the use of households’ net worth per capita rank in the 
village as an instrumental variable for household net worth per capita. An instrumental 
variable should be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (Angrist and 
Krueger 2001). We find that this condition is supported by the results from the first 
stage regression, in which the instrumental variable shows strong and statistically 
significant correlation with net worth per capita in each model (appendix tables 2.4 
and 2.5). Second, we compute an F statistic to test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the instrumental variable is equal to zero in the first stage regression. A 
general rule of rule of thumb is that if the F statistic value is greater than 10, then the 
instruments do not seem to be weak. In our case, this is a test on net worth per capita 
rank in the village, and the F statistics equals 27.45 in the first stage of the risk and 
loss aversion structural models and 25.81 in the first stage of the hyperbolic 
discounting model. From these tests, we conclude that households’ net worth per 
capita rank in the village is a valid instrumental variable for net worth per capita.  
2.7 Empirical Results 
 
When we use the instrumental variable approach in 2SLS, the effect of net worth 
per capita on risk aversion remains insignificant, consistent with the OLS estimate 
(table 2.6, columns 1 and 2). In contrast, the effect of net worth per capita on loss 
aversion, which was negative and significant in the OLS regressions, becomes 
insignificant (table 2.6, columns 3 and 4). This indicates that after addressing the 
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endogeneity of wealth problem by using an instrumental variable approach, wealth no 
longer has a statistically significant relationship with risk or loss aversion. Our result 
that wealth is not correlated with risk aversion is consistent with the classic results of 
Binswanger (1980) and with the more recent results of Tanaka et al. (2010) who also 
uses an instrumental variable approach to deal with the endogeneity problem. The 
result that loss aversion is not correlated with household wealth is also consistent with 
previous findings by Liu (2008) and Tanaka et al. (2010) in China and Vietnam, 
respectively. 
We find weak evidence that net worth per capita has a negative significant effect 
on the discount rate, indicating that households with higher net worth per capita have 
lower discount rates (i.e., more patient, table 2.7). When we use the instrumental 
variables approach in 2SLS, the effect of net worth per capita on the hyperbolic 
discounting parameter remains negative; however, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on net worth per capita falls to the 10% level in the model without 
township fixed effects and the 15% level when we use township fixed effects. This 
result, although weaker, is consistent with the findings in earlier studies that do not 
address the endogeneity of wealth or income (Pender 1996; Holden et al.1998; Nielsen 
2001; Gunatilake et al. 2007; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2008), as well as with the findings 
of Tanaka et al. (2010), who uses an instrumental variable approach to deal with the 
problem of income endogeneity. These results are contrary to Bauer et al. (2010), 
Kirby et al. (2002), Nielsen (2001), Anderson et al. (2004), and Bauer and Chytilová 
(2008), all of whom do not find a significant relationship between wealth and time 
preferences.  
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Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, we examine alternative measures of wealth, including: 1) 
forest land area per capita, 2) house value per capita, 3) assets per capita and 4) 
liabilities per capita. House value, asset, and liabilities are sub-categories of the net 
worth per capita measure. We use forest land per capita rather than total land per 
capita or farm land per capita because we believe the former will be more indicative of 
a household’s wealth than the later. This is because responsibility land, the main 
tenure type of agricultural land in China, has traditionally been allocated on the basis 
of the number of family members, the number of laborers in each family, or the desire 
and/or ability of the household to engage in agricultural production, resulting in little 
variation in agricultural land holdings across households (Brandt et al. 2002). 
However, during the recent 2003 forest tenure reform the method of allocation was 
decided on by farmers through their voting representatives on village committees. This 
resulted in greater variance in forest land holdings per capita, making forest land area 
per capita a potentially better proxy for household wealth than agricultural land area 
per capita.20 
We find again that each of these alternative proxies for wealth is not correlated 
with risk aversion, and this result remains even after addressing the endogeneity of 
wealth with respective instrumental variables (table 2.8). In agreement with our main 
result that there is no significant relationship between net worth per capita and risk or 
loss aversion, we find that there is no evidence that house value, assets or liabilities 
per capita affects risk or loss aversion (table 2.8 and 2.9, rows 2 to 4). However, we 
find that there is a negative relationship between forest land per capita and loss 
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aversion, and this result is statistically significant at the 1% level in three of the four 
models (table 2.9, row 1). This indicates that wealth in the form of forest land per 
capita effects loss aversion. This may indicate that increases in forest land per capita 
decrease loss aversion, although we should be careful not to put too much weight to 
the direction of causality in a cross-sectional study like this one, as it hinges on the 
validity of our choice of an instrument variable for wealth. 
With regards to the relationship between wealth and time preferences, robustness 
checks indicate that house value, assets, and forest land per capita each have a 
significant negative relationship with the discounting parameter, however, in the 
instrumental variable approach in 2SLS and control for township fixed effects each of 
these wealth categories becomes insignificant (table 2.10). 
We also check the robustness of our results to the statistical significance of the 
individual hyperbolic discounting parameters. When we estimate the hyperbolic 
discounting parameter for each individual in the sample, only 41 subjects have an 
estimated parameter that is statistically significant between the 1% and 10% level. 
Using only those subjects that had a statistically significant hyperbolic discounting 
parameter, we estimate the regressions in tables 2.5 and 2.7 again. These results (table 
2.11) are consistent with the main results. Again, we find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between net worth per capita and the discount rate when using 
OLS. However, when we use the instrumental variable approach in 2SLS and control 
for township fixed effects, the significance level falls to 12%, indicating that there is 
only weak evidence that an increase in net worth per capita makes individuals more 
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patient (i.e., lower discount rate). This finding concurs with the classic assumption that 
households with low wealth have high discount rates (i.e., more impatient). 
2.8 Conclusion  
  
In this paper we investigate the correlation between poverty and individual 
preferences for time and risk. Specifically, we use field experiment data collected in 
Fujian, China to measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households 
combined with household survey data to examine the correlation between risk and 
time preferences and wealth. We find little evidence that wealth is correlated with risk 
aversion and loss aversion, however there is evidence that wealth is correlated with 
time preferences. Ordinary least squares regressions indicated that those who have a 
lower net worth per capita, lower house value per capita, or lower forest land per 
capita (poorer) tend to be more loss averse, as well as exhibit a higher discount rate 
(i.e., impatient). Those with lower assets per capita (poorer) also exhibit significantly 
more impatience.  
To address the problem of endogeneity of wealth, we use households’ net worth 
rank within their village as an instrumental variable for net worth. When we use the 
instrumental variable in 2SLS, we find that the wealth proxy variables no longer have 
a statistically significant effect on risk and loss aversion with the one exception that 
households with more forest land per capita are less loss averse. This suggests that 
forest land plays a significant role as a safety net for negative shocks. When a 
household experiences a negative shock, a household with more forest land per capita 
may be able to recover more quickly by harvesting from its forest land. Knowing that 
 119 
 
they have this safety net, a household may be less averse to loss. We find weak 
evidence that net worth per capita has a negative significant effect on the discount rate, 
indicating that households with higher net worth per capita have lower discount rates 
(i.e., more patient). However, caution should be taken in concluding the direction of 
causality in a cross-sectional study like this one, as it depends on the validity of our 
choice of instrumental variable for wealth. To better identify the direction causality 
between poverty and time and risk preferences, future research on this topic should 
include collecting a panel data set that includes both household characteristics and 
time and risk preference experiment data for multiple years, so that changes in wealth 
and time and risk preferences overtime can be examined.  
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Endnotes 
 
1
 China participated in the International Comparison Program (ICP) for this first time 
in 2005. The ICP collects data across countries on the prices of an internationally 
comparable list of goods and services, in 2005. The ICP is used to derive Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) rate, which is the basis for the international poverty line. Based on 
this new data, Chen and Ravallion (2008) find a substantially higher poverty rate for 
China than past estimates. Using an international poverty line of $1.25 at 2005 PPP, 
Chen and Ravallion estimate that 15% of the population was living in consumption 
poverty in 2005. While this implies that about 130 million more people in poverty by 
the new standard, the new ICP data also suggest an even larger reduction in the 
number of poor since 1981. 
2
 See Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for a review of the literature. 
3
 Kachelmeir and Shehata (1992) examined risk preferences of college students at 
Beijing University, as well as at both a Canadian and American university. 
4
 See appendix table 2.7 for a review of risk preference elicitation in developing 
countries. 
5
 See appendix table 2.8 for a review of previous findings on the relationship between 
poverty and risk preferences. 
6
 See appendix table 2.9 for a review of time preference elicitation in developing 
countries. 
7
 See appendix table 2.10 for a review of previous findings on the relationship between 
poverty and time preferences. 
8
 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
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9
 In Tanaka et al. (2010), the value function has the form:  v(x)=xσ for x>0 and v(x)=-
λ(-x)σ. For ease of comparison with respect to the conventional form of expected 
utility under constant relative risk aversion, where u(x)=x1-σ /(1-σ), Liu (2008) rewrites 
the value function as v(x)=x1-σ. We follow Liu’s choice of value function for ease of 
understanding. 
10
 Three examples were given in the instructions to help ensure that the subjects did 
not feel that they must make a switch within the series. In one example, the subject 
never switches to option B. In another example, the subject switches to option B at 
question 7. And in a third example, the subject switches to option B at question 1.   
11
 Inconsistent choices within series of questions (in both risk and time preference 
experiments of the type reported on in this paper) are problematic for  identifying 
parameters when structures are imposed on the subject’s responses but the theory 
underlying those structures does not justify the subject’s responses. In risk and time 
preference experiments, where subjects have been allowed to switch back and forth 
between A and B, often only a small percentage of individuals do so. Using 
experiments where in some rounds subjects are given an added option of indicating 
indifference between option A and B, researchers have found that subjects who switch 
back and forth between option A and B are not actually making inconsistent choices 
but rather the subjects are expressing their indifference over a range of choices (Holt 
and Laury 2002; Andersen et al. 2006). In our experiments, we follow the methods of 
Tanaka et al. (2010) and Liu (2008), both of whom enforce mono-tonic switching. 
12
 Note that in the risk experiment is possible for the subject to lose up to 10 yuan. 
However, it would be unethical to ask rural households who participate in the 
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experiment to pay us if they incur the loss. To address this issue at the beginning of 
the game we announce that there will be participation compensation of 10 yuan (which 
is equivalent to the highest possible loss in the risk experiment). Liu et al. (2008) 
follows a similar strategy to ensure the subjects are treated ethically. While Camerer 
(2000) suggests that losses that are in fact net gains may be treated differently from 
real losses, we believe that because the 10 yuan participation fee was pointed out at 
the very beginning of the experiment, 30-45 minutes later when the subject got to 
Series 3 the individual would not consider the 10 yuan as a windfall but rather earning 
they had made for participating, and therefore treat the possible losses in the 
experiment as true losses. 
13
 The risk preference parameter estimation methods are detailed in appendix 2. 
14
 For a critical review of time discounting and time preference see Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). 
15
 Benhabib et al.’s (2007) model is detailed in appendix 2, as well as the time 
preference parameter estimation procedure. 
16
 Our design differs from the time preference experiments of Coller and Williams 
(1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) in that we do not frame the choices with a front-end 
delay. An example of using a front-end delay, is a choice between money one month 
from today and more money seven months from now, rather than asking participants 
to choose between money today and more money six months from now, as we did. A 
front-end delay is used in time preference experiments to control (at least partially) for 
the credibility problem. The credibility problem is that participants may not believe 
that they will receive future payments, and therefore; will be biased toward choosing 
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the immediate payoff. However, in much of the behavior economics literature, a 
significant proportion of the action seems to revolve around payoffs that are truly 
immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue 2002). By using a front-end delay, we would lose information about how 
individuals treat choices between payoffs that are truly immediate versus payoffs that 
are not immediate. Ideally, to address the credibility problem, while still having a way 
to capture the information about choices between immediate payoffs and future 
payoffs, an experimental design would include both questions with and without front-
end delays. Due to time constraints, in that participants may become exhausted with 
too many questions, we choose to only use questions without a front-end delay.  
17
 The entire set of payoff-time combinations that were used in the experiment are 
displayed in appendix table 2.4. 
18 The 15 combinations of future payoff and time as described in the text were used in 
9 of the 10 villages. In the first village, we used the same payoffs but shorter 
timeframes. Specifically, in the first village we used payoffs of 15, 60 and 150 yuan 
with delays of 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months and 30 and 120 yuan with delays of 1 
week, 2 weeks and 2 months. In the first village, 5 out of 10 households always choose 
the future payoff. We thought that this high degree of preference for the future 
amongst the households might be due to the timeframes being to short, and so in the 
remaining villages we increased the timeframes.  
19
 We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausmann (DWH) test as detailed in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009) to test the exogeneity of net worth per capita. To do so, we estimated a 
regression with net worth per capita as the dependent variable. The explanatory 
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variables included households’ net worth rank per capita in the village (the 
instrumental variable) and all of the other control variables as in table 2.5, column 1 
and 3 (for risk aversion and loss aversion) and table 2.6, column 1 (for the hyperbolic 
discounting parameter). From each of  those regressions, we obtain the predicted 
residual, and use them to run the regression as reported for risk aversion and loss 
aversion (table 2.5, column 1) and for the hyperbolic discounting parameter (table 2.6, 
column 1) but add the residual as an additional explanatory variable. In all three cases, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that household net worth per capita is exogenous 
(the robustified DWH test statistic is 1.32, 1.24 and 0.67 when the dependent variable 
is risk aversion, loss aversion and the hyperbolic discounting parameter, respectively).  
20
 This is a result of the 1989 Village Self-Governance Law, under which decisions on 
village affairs should be made by farmers through voting. Furthermore, provincial 
decrees stated that decisions regarding forest land reallocation should be made by 
village representative committees or by village assemblies required a 2/3 vote 
majority.  
 
  
 125 
 
References 
 
Anderson, C. Leigh, Maya Dietz, Andrew Gordon, and Marieka Klawitter. 2004. 
“Discount Rates in Vietnam.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 
(4): 873-887. 
Ainslie, G. and N. Haslam. 1992. Hyperbolic Discounting. In G. Lowenstein & J. 
Elster, eds. Choice Over Time. Russell Sage Foundation. 
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger. 2001. “Instrumental Variables and the 
Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments.” 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (4): 69-85. 
Barr, Abigail. 2003. “Risk Pooling, Commitment, and Information:  An experimental 
test of two fundamental assumptions.” Working Paper Series Paper No. 187, 
The Center for the Study of African Economies. 
Bauer, Michal, and Julie Chytilová. 2008. “The Impact of Education on the Subjective 
Discount Rate in Ugandan Villages.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4057, Institute 
for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany. 
Bauer, Michal, Julie Chytilová, and Jonathan Morduch. 2010. “Behavioral 
Foundations of Microcredit:  Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural 
India.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4901, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, 
Germany. 
Benhabib, Jess, Alberto Bisin, and Andrew Schotter. 2007. “Present-Bias, Quasi-
hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs.” Unpublished manuscript, New 
York University. 
Binswanger, Hans P. 1980. “Attitudes toward Risk: Experimental Measurement In 
Rural India.” Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 62 (3): 13. 
Brandt, Loren, Jikun Huang, Guo Li, and Scott Rozelle. 2002. “Land Rights in Rural 
China:  Facts, Fictions and Issues.” The China Journal 47: 67-97. 
Camerer, C., 2000. Prospect theory in the world: Evidence from the field. In D. 
Kahneman & A. Tversky, eds. Choices, Values and Frames. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation and Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cameron, Colin A. and Pravin K. Trivedi.  2009. Microeconometrics Using Stata. 
Stata Press, Texas. 
 
Cardenas, J. C., and J. P. Carpenter. 2008. “Behavioral Development Economics: 
Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World.” Journal of Development 
Economics Studies 44 (3): 311-338. 
 
 126 
 
Carlsson, Fredrik, and Ping Qin. 2010. “It is better to be the head of a chicken than the 
tail of a phoenix: a study of concern for relative standing in rural China.” 
Journal of Socio-Economics 39 (2): 180-186. 
Carlsson, Fredrik, Peter Martinsson, Ping Qin, and Matthias Sutter. 2009. “Household 
decision making and the influence of spouses’ income, education, and 
communist party membership:  A field experiment in rural China.” Working 
Paper in Economics, No. 356, School of Business, Economics and Law, 
University of Gothenburg. 
Casse, T., U. Nielsen, S. Ranaivoson, and J. Randrianamarivo. 2005. “Farmer 
strategies and forest conservation: a case study from south-western 
Madagascar.” International Journal of Social Economics 32 (8): 704-716. 
Chen, Shaohau, and Martin Ravallion. 2008. “China is Poorer than we Thought, But 
No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4621, Washington, D.C. 
Chen, Shaohua, and Martin Ravallion. 2009. “The Developing World Is Poorer Than 
We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4703, Washington, D.C. 
Coller, M., and M. B. Williams. 1999. “Eliciting Individual Discount Rates.” 
Experimental Economics 2 (2): 107-127. 
CSY (2009). China Statistical Yearbook 2009. China Statistics Press. 
 
de Villiers, P.A. and R.J. Herrnstein.1976. “Towards a Law of Response Strength.” 
Psychological Bulletin 83(6): 1131-1153. 
Dohmen, T. J., A. Falk, D. Huffman, J. Schupp, U. Sunde, and G. G. Wagner. 2005. 
“Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, Representative, 
Experimentally-Validated Survey.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1730, Institute 
for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany. 
Fafchamps, Marcel. 2003. Rural Poverty, Risk and Development. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc., Massachusetts. 
Fisher, Irving. 1930. The Theory of Interest. New York: Macmillan. 
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue. 2002. “Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2): 
351-401. 
Godoy, R., M. Jacobson, J. DeCastro, V. Aliaga, J. Romero, and A. Davis. 1998. “The 
Role of Tenure Security and Private Time Preference in Neotropical 
Deforestation.” Land Economics 74(2): 162-170. 
 127 
 
Godoy, R., K. Kirby, and D. Wilkie. 2001. “Tenure security, private time preference, 
and use of natural resources among lowland Bolivian Amerindians.” 
Ecological Economics 38(1): 105-118. 
Godoy, Ricardo, Victoria Reyes-García, Vincent Vadez, William R. Leonard, Susan 
Tanner, Tomás Huanca, David Wilkie, and TAPS Bolivia Study Team. 2009. 
“The relation between forest clearance and household income among native 
Amazonians:  Results from the Tsimane’ Amazonian panel study, Bolivia.” 
Ecological Economics 68 (6): 1864-1871. 
Gong, Yazhen, Kathy Baylis, Jintao Xu, Robert Kozak, and Gary Bull. 2010. “Risk 
Aversion and Farm Input Choice: Evidence from Field experiments in China.” 
Unpublished manuscript, the Selected Works of Kathy Baylis, 
http://works.bepress.com/kathy_baylis/27. 
Gunatilake, H.M, W.A.R. Wickramasinghe, and P. Abeygunawardena. 2007. “Time 
Preference and Natural Resource Use by Local Communities: The Case of 
Sinharaja Forest in Sri Lanka.” ERD Working Paper No. 100, Asian 
Development Bank. 
Hamoudi, A. and D. Thomas. 2006. “Do You Care?  Altruism and Inter-Generational 
Exchanges in Mexico.” Working Paper Series, CCPR-008-06, California 
Center for Population Research, University of California, Los Angeles, CA. 
Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau, and M. B. Williams. 2002. “Estimating Individual 
Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment.” The American Economic 
Review 92 (5): 1606-1617. 
Holden, Stein T., Bekele Shiferaw, and Mette Wik. 1998. “Poverty, market 
imperfections and time preferences: of relevance for environmental policy?” 
Environment and Development Economics 3 (1): 105-130. 
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” 
The American Economic Review 92 (5): 1644-1655. 
Humphrey, S. J. 2004. “Decision-making Under Risk among Small Farmers in East 
Uganda,” Journal of African Economics 13(1): 44-101. 
Johnson, Matthe W, and Warren K Bickel. 2002. “Within-subject comparison of real 
and hypothetical money rewards in delay discounting.” Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior 77 (2): 129-146. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata. 1992. “Examining Risk Preferences 
Under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s 
Republic of China.” The American Economic Review 82 (5): 1120-1141. 
 
 128 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Choice Under Risk.” Econometrica 98 (6): 1325-48. 
Kirby, Kris N., and Nino N. Marakovic. 1996. “Delay-discounting probabilistic 
rewards: Rates decrease as amounts increase.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 
3 (1): 100-104. 
Kirby, Kris N., Ricardo Godoy, Victoria Reyes-García, Elizabeth Byron, Lillian 
Apaza, Pérez Leonard, Vincent Vadez, and David Wilkie. 2002. “Correlates of 
delay-discount rates:  Evidence from Tsimane’ Amerindians of the Bolivian 
rain forest.” Journal of Economic Psychology 23 (3): 291-435. 
Laibson, D. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (2): 443-477. 
Lipton, Michael. 1968. “The Theory of the Optimising Peasant.” Journal of 
Development Studies 4 (3): 327-351. 
Liu, Elaine M. 2008. “Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and 
Technology Adoption Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China.” Working Paper 
No. 1064, Princeton University. 
Lowenstein, G. and D. Prelec. 1992. “Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence 
and Interpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 573-597. 
Lumley, Sarah. 1997. “The environment and the ethics of discounting:  An empirical 
analysis.” Ecological Economics 20 (1): 71-82. 
Madden, Gregory J., Andrea Begotka M., Bethany R. Raiff, and Lana L. Kastern. 
2003. “Delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards.” Experimental and 
Clinical Psychopharmacology 11 (2): 139-145. 
McKinley, Terry, and Li Na Wang. 1992. “Housing and wealth in rural China.” China 
Economic Review 3 (2): 195-211.  
Mink, Stephen. 1993. “Poverty and the environment.” Finance & Development 30 (4): 
8. 
Mosley, Paul, and Arjan Verschoor. 2005. “Risk Attitudes and the ‘Vicious Circle of 
Poverty’.” The European Journal of Development Research 17 (1): 59-88. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions. London: G. 
Duckworth. 
Nielsen, Uffe. 2001. “Poverty and Attitudes Towards Time and Risk - Experimental 
Evidence from Madagascar.” Working Paper, Royal Veterinary and 
Agricultural University of Denmark. 
 129 
 
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin. 1999. “Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic 
Review 89(1): 103-124. 
Pender, John. 1996. “Discount rates and credit markets: Theory and evidence from 
rural India.” Journal of Development Economics 50: 257-296. 
Pendleton, L.H. and E.L. Howe. 2002. “Market Integration, Development, and 
Smallholder Forest Clearance.” Land Economics. 78(1): 1-19. 
Perring, Charles. 1996. Sustainable Development and Poverty Alleviation in Sub-
Saharan Africa. St. Martin’s Press, Inc. 
Prelec, Drazen. 1998. “The Probability Weighting Function.” Econometrica 66 (3): 
497-527. 
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. 1st ed. 
Penguin Press. 
Tanaka, T., C.F. Camerer, and Q. Nguyen. 2010. “Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam.” American 
Economic Review 100 (1): 557-571. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 
(4): 297-323. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). 1993. 
Agenda 21: The Earth Summit Strategy to Save our Planet. Earth Press, 
Boulder, CO. 
Wik, Mette, Tewodros Aragie Kebede, Olvar Bergland, and Stein T. Holden. 2004. 
“On the measurement of risk aversion from experimental data.” Applied 
Economics 36 (21): 2443.  
World Bank. 1996. Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A World Bank Agenda. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
———. 2000. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2000: Attacking 
Poverty. 
 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common 
Future. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wu, Yanrui. 1997. “Wealth and spending patterns in China empirical evidence from 
household surveys.” International Journal of Social Economics 24 (7/8/9): 
1007-1022. 
 130 
 
Yesuf, Mahmud, and Randall A. Bluffstone. 2009. “Poverty, Risk Aversion, and Path 
Dependence in Low-Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from 
Ethiopia.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91 (4): 1022-1037. 
Yesuf, Mahmud, and Randall A. Bluffstone. 2008. “Wealth and Time Preference in 
Rural Ethiopia.” Discussion Paper 08-16, Environment for Defense. 
Zhang, Yuanting, and Franklin W. Goza. 2006. “Who will care for the elderly in 
China?: A review of the problems caused by China’s one-child policy and their 
potential solutions.” Journal of Aging Studies 20 (2): 151-164.  
 
  
 131 
 
Table 2.1  Descriptive statistics (2008) 
Variable Mean 
Risk aversion 0.42 
(0.35) 
Loss aversion 6.02 
(6.67) 
Probability weighting parameter 0.73 
(0.29) 
Hyperbolic discounting parameter 0.13 
(0.24) 
Male 0.86 
(0.34) 
Education (years) 5.36 
(3.54) 
Age (years) 51.47 
(12.12) 
Had off farm work (1=yes; 0=no) 0.46 
(0.50) 
Household size 4.53 
(1.88) 
Dependency Ratio: Number of children/number of adults 0.15 
(0.26) 
Number in household who work 3.19 
(1.51) 
Farm land per capita (hectares) 0.07  
(.084) 
Forest land per capita (hectares) 0.59  
(1.14) 
Distance to post office (km) 7.58 
(7.22) 
Distance to county seat (km) 37.36 
  (22.97) 
 Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses. For all variables except farm land 
per  capita n=103. For farm land per capita n=102 because one subject did 
not know the area of the household’s farm land.  
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Table 2.2  Household wealth composition  (2008) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Assets 
   House value 94 23146 45239 200 250833 
   Consumptive assets 103 946 1171 7 8240 
   Livestock 71 876 4979 4 42033 
   Productive assets 82 1487 6773 4 50002 
   Savings in the bank 18 6881 8802 37 30000 
   Loans provided to others 9 3572 2698 150 6667 
   Other investments/deposits 2 1500 707 1000 2000 
Liabilities 
   Productive loans 9 4531 4322 500 12500 
   Non-productive loans 21 4899 5433 333 20000 
Net worth = Assets - Liabilities 96 25936 47029 -9785 251808 
            
Note:  This table displays conditional means. All values are measured in yuan per 
capita. For net worth per capita, n=96 because seven subjects did not know the value 
of their household’s house. 1 USD = 6.94 yuan (Average for the year 2008.) 
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Table 2.3  Payoff matrix for risk experiment  
Series 1 Option A Option B 
Expected 
payoff 
difference 
(A-B) 
Probability 30% 70% 90% 10% 
20 5 2.5 34.0 3.85 
20 5 2.5 37.5 3.50 
20 5 2.5 41.5 3.10 
20 5 2.5 46.5 2.60 
20 5 2.5 53.0 1.95 
20 5 2.5 62.5 1.00 
20 5 2.5 75.0 -0.25 
20 5 2.5 92.5 -2.00 
20 5 2.5 110.0 -3.75 
20 5 2.5 150.0 -7.75 
20 5 2.5 200.0 -12.75 
20 5 2.5 300.0 -22.75 
20 5 2.5 500.0 -42.75 
  
20 5 2.5 850.0 -77.75 
 
 
 
 
 
Series 2           
Probability 90% 10% 30% 70% 
20 15 2.5 27 -0.15 
20 15 2.5 28.0 -0.85 
20 15 2.5 29.0 -1.55 
20 15 2.5 30.0 -2.25 
20 15 2.5 31.0 -2.95 
20 15 2.5 32.5 -4.00 
20 15 2.5 34.0 -5.05 
20 15 2.5 36.0 -6.45 
20 15 2.5 38.5 -8.20 
20 15 2.5 41.5 -10.30 
20 15 2.5 45.0 -12.75 
20 15 2.5 50.0 -16.25 
20 15 2.5 55.0 -19.75 
  
20 15 2.5 65.0 -26.75 
Table continued on the next page. 
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Table 2.3 [continued] Payoff matrix for risk experiment  
Series 3 Option A Option B 
Expected 
payoff 
difference 
(A-B) 
Probability 50% 50% 50% 50% 
12.5 -5 15 -10 1.25 
2.0 -2 15 -10 -2.50 
0.5 -2 15 -10 -3.25 
0.5 -2 15 -8 -4.25 
0.5 -4 15 -8 -5.25 
0.5 -4 15 -7 -5.75 
  0.5 -4 15 -5 -6.75 
Note:  All payoffs listed under option A and B are in yuan.
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Table 2.4  Correlations between risk preferences and characteristics 
 
Dependent variable: Risk aversion Loss aversion 
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) -0.001 -0.001 -0.31 -0.033 
(0.84) (0.93) (2.95)*** (2.69)*** 
Male -0.060 0.043 3.152 3.234 
(0.53) (0.42 (1.20) (1.24) 
Years of education -0.016 -0.013 -0.245 -0.206 
(1.18) (0.89) (0.95) (0.74) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.056 0.063 
(0.40) (0.32) (1.23) (1.12) 
Has off farm employment 0.044 0.026 1.900 1.857 
(0.61) (0.32) (1.23) (1.12) 
Household size -0.034 -0.029 0.378 0.568 
(1.10) (0.92) (0.67) (0.91) 
Number of children/number of adults 0.121 0.071 -3.975 4.867 
(1.05) (0.55) (1.80)* (2.01)** 
Number in household who work 0.060 0.061 -0.089 -0.333 
(1.38) (1.44) (0.11) (0.38) 
Distance to post office (km) 0.001 0.008 -0.039 0.002 
(0.17) (1.48) (0.40) (0.02) 
Distance to county seat (km) 0.002 -0.005 0.050 -0.050 
(1.12) (1.01) (1.56) (0.44) 
Constant 0.476 0.551 -0.694 -0.800 
(1.97)* (2.34)** (0.13) (0.14) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
N 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.18 
Note:  Ordinary least squares estimations. Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in 
parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant 
at 10% level.  
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Table 2.5  Correlations between time preference and characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Hyperbolic discounting parameter 
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) -0.001 -0.001 
(2.58)** (2.78)*** 
Male 0.089 0.064 
(1.76)* (1.15) 
Years of education 0.014 0.016 
(1.62) (1.75)* 
Age 0.007 0.007 
(2.55)** (2.39)** 
Has off farm employment 0.123 0.109 
(2.29)** (2.11)** 
Household size 0.014 0.011 
(0.75) (0.63) 
Number of children/number of adults -0.111 -0.082 
(1.51) (1.05) 
Number in household who work -0.04 -0.044 
(1.68)* (1.78)* 
Distance to post office (km) -0.003 -0.005 
(0.77) (1.39) 
Distance to county seat (km) -0.001 -0.002 
(1.11) (0.64) 
Risk aversion 0.13 0.153 
(1.61) (1.91)* 
Risk experiment earnings 0.000  0.000  
(0.82) (0.48) 
Constant -0.304 -0.266 
(1.78)* (1.42) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes 
N 96 96 
R2 0.23 0.29 
Note:  Ordinary least squares estimation. Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in 
parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant 
at 10% level.   
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Table 2.6  IV-2SLS for risk preferences 
 
Dependent variable: Risk aversion Loss aversion 
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.016 
(1.38) (1.48) (0.55) (0.68) 
Male -0.047 -0.035 2.927 3.062 
(0.41) (0.33) (1.12) (1.19) 
Years of education -0.016 -0.013 -0.239 -0.213 
(1.20) (0.87) (0.93) (0.76) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.054 0.061 
(0.35) (0.30) (0.72) (0.80) 
Has off farm employment 0.064 0.038 1.544 1.62 
(0.91) (0.48) (0.97) (0.95) 
Household size -0.032 -0.027 0.358 0.546 
(1.07) (0.90) (0.61) (0.85) 
Number of children/number of adults 0.098 0.048 -3.57 -4.415 
(0.86) (0.38) (1.53) (1.76)* 
Number in household who work 0.054  0.055  0.022 -0.219 
(1.24) (1.33) (0.03) (0.24) 
Distance to post office (km) 0.002 0.009 -0.054 -0.022 
(0.33) (1.60) (0.54) (0.17) 
Distance to county seat (km) 0.002 -0.006 0.045 -0.038 
(1.25) (1.10) (1.34) (0.33) 
Constant 0.477 0.572 -0.725 -1.214 
(1.94)* (2.36)** (0.14) (0.22) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
N 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.16 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, 
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. The instrumental variable 
for net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regressions is the households wealth rank in 
the village according to their net worth per capita. The first stage results of the IV-
2SLS regressions are presented in appendix D, table 1. 
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Table 2.7  IV-2SLS for time preference 
Dependent Variable: Hyperbolic Discounting parameter 
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) -0.001 -0.001 
(1.77)* (1.60) 
Male 0.095 0.066 
(1.83)* (1.16) 
Years of education 0.013 0.016 
(1.58) (1.74)* 
Age 0.007 0.007 
(2.58)** (2.40)** 
Has off farm employment 0.133 0.111 
(2.47)** (2.17)** 
Household size 0.014 0.012 
(0.78) (0.65) 
Number of children/number of adults -0.122 -0.086 
(1.50) (1.02) 
Number in household who work -0.043 -0.045 
(1.75)* (1.81)* 
Distance to post office (km) -0.002 -0.004 
(0.60) (1.16) 
Distance to county seat (km) -0.001 -0.002 
(0.96) (0.68) 
Risk aversion 0.124 0.15 
(1.61) (1.90)* 
Risk experiment earnings 0.000  0.000  
(0.96) (0.53) 
Constant -0.295 -0.258 
  
(1.76)* (1.41) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes 
N 96 96 
R2 0.23 0.29 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, 
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. The instrumental variable 
for net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regression is the households wealth rank in the 
village according to their net worth per capita. The first stage results of the IV-2SLS 
regressions are presented in appendix D, table 2. 
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Table 2.8  Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on risk aversion 
Dependent Variable:                                                                Risk aversion 
Estimation method: OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
Wealth variable IV  
Forest land area per 
capita (hectares)   
Rank in village by forest land per capita 
-0.001 -0.007 0.020 0.013 
(0.02) (0.27) (0.43) (0.33) 
 
  
House value per capita Rank in village by net worth per capita 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.87) (0.90) (1.38) (1.47) 
 
  
Assets per capita 
(savings, consumptive, 
and productive assets)  
Rank in village by assets per capita 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.05) (0.53) (0.37) (0.55) 
Liabilities per capita  Rank in village by debt per capita 
-0.010 -0.009 -0.003 0.000 
(0.72) (0.56) (0.18) (0.02) 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 
10% level.  n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House 
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of 
interest for 32 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work, 
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, and distance 
to county seat.   
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Table 2.9  Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on loss aversion 
Dependent Variable:                                                                Loss aversion 
Estimation method: OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
Wealth variable IV  
Forest land area per 
capita (hectares)   
Rank in village by 
forest land per 
capita 
-1.046 -1.11 -1.467 -1.45 
(3.02)*** (3.14)*** (1.81)*** (2.06)** 
 
  
House value per capita Rank in village by 
net worth per capita 
-0.032 -0.035 -0.015 -0.018 
(2.98)*** (2.79)*** (0.56) (0.68) 
 
  
Assets per capita 
(savings, consumptive, 
and productive assets)  
Rank in village by 
assets per capita 
-0.001 -0.004 0.101 0.085 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.88) (0.82) 
Liabilities per capita  Rank in village by 
debt per capita 
0.352 0.405 0.472 0.500 
(1.59) (1.74)* (1.54) (1.57) 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 
10% level.  n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House 
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of 
interest for 32 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work, 
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, and distance 
to county seat.   
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Table 2.10  Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on time preference 
Dependent Variable:                                                        Hyperbolic discounting parameter 
Estimation method: OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
Wealth variable IV  
Forest land area per 
capita (hectares)   
Rank in village by 
forest land per 
capita 
-0.045 -0.043 -0.032 -0.017 
(3.20)*** (2.92)*** (0.99) (0.53) 
 
  
House value per capita Rank in village by 
net worth per capita 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(2.11)** (2.43)** (1.69)* (1.57) 
 
  
Assets per capita 
(savings, consumptive, 
and productive assets)  
Rank in village by 
assets per capita 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
(2.36)** (1.98)* (1.18) (0.86) 
Liabilities per capita  Rank in village by 
debt per capita 
0.013 0.010 0.009 0.005 
(1.54) (1.24) (1.03) (0.56) 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 
10% level.  n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House 
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of 
interest for 16 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work, 
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, distance to 
county seat, risk aversion, and the amount earned in the risk experiment. 
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Table 2.11  Robustness of time preference results 
Dependent Variable: Hyperbolic discounting parameter 
Estimation Method: OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
(3.09)*** (2.73)** (1.79)* (1.64) 
Male 0.273 0.208 0.272 0.209 
(1.65) (1.09) (1.60) (1.09) 
Years of education 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.016 
(0.53) (0.75) (0.56) (0.76) 
Age 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 
(0.59) (1.19) (0.52) (1.16) 
Has off farm employment 0.162 0.223 0.169 0.223 
(1.46) (1.58) (1.60) (1.56) 
Household size 0.041 0.027 0.039 0.027 
(0.97) (0.46) (0.90) (0.46) 
Number of children/number of adults -0.325 -0.162 -0.342 -0.169 
(2.16)** (0.59) (2.20)** (0.61) 
Number in household who work -0.115 -0.071 -0.115 -0.072 
(1.84)* (0.75) (1.87)* (0.77) 
Distance to post office (km) 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 
(0.35) (0.33) (0.38) (0.29) 
Distance to county seat (km) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.23) (0.00) 
Risk aversion 0.099 0.148 0.099 0.147 
(0.70) (0.85) (0.71) (0.85) 
Risk experiment earnings (0.001) 0.001  (0.002) 0.001  
(0.23) (0.26) (0.34) (0.21) 
Constant -0.033 -0.458 0.008 -0.441 
  (0.08) (0.71) (0.02) (0.66) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes No Yes 
N 41 41 41 41 
R2 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.46 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, 
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. This set of regressions only 
includes those individuals whose hyperbolic discounting parameter when estimated 
was statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. The instrumental variable for 
net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regression is the households wealth rank in the 
village according to their net worth per capita.
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Figure 2.1  Box plot of risk aversion estimated from experiment data relative to self-
rated hypothetical risk aversion level 
 
 
Note:  For each self-rated level of risk aversion, the bottom bar corresponds to the 
minimum value of the risk aversion parameter, while the top bar corresponds to the 
maximum value. The box corresponds to the 25th to the 75th percentile values, with the 
median value represented by the line that bisects the box. Outliers are represented by a 
dot.  
-
.
5
-
.
25
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
R
is
k 
a
ve
rs
io
n
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
Self-rated level of risk aversion in a general context
-
.
5
-
.
25
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
R
is
k 
a
ve
rs
io
n
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
Self-rated level of risk aversion in an investment context
 144 
 
Figure 2.2  Box plot of hyperbolic discounting parameter estimated from experiment 
data relative to the hypothetical investment question 
 
Note:  For each investment level, the bottom bar corresponds to the minimum value of 
the hyperbolic discounting parameter, while the top bar corresponds to the maximum 
value. The box corresponds to the 25th to the 75th percentile values, with the median 
value represented by the line that bisects the box. Outliers are represented by a dot. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Risk preference parameter estimation 
Table 2.3 shows the entire payoff matrix for the experiment. The payoffs ranged 
from a loss of 10 yuan to a gain of 850 yuan. Since our intent is to relate the risk 
experiment results to the subject’s household’s forest management activities, we use a 
relatively high maximum payoff of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in 
rural China and corresponds more closely to the magnitude of monetary payoffs faced 
by individuals in forest management decisions (CSY 2009). The average payoff in the 
risk experiment was 27 yuan (inclusive of the 10 yuan participation compensation), 
which is roughly half a single days wage in rural Fujian, China in 2008 (CSY 2009).   
Note that in the risk experiment is possible for the subject to lose up to 10 yuan.  
However, it would be unethical to ask rural households who participate in the 
experiment to pay us if they incur the loss. To address this issue at the beginning of 
the game we announce that there will be participation compensation of 10 yuan (which 
is equivalent to the highest possible loss in the risk experiment). Liu et al. (2008) 
follows a similar strategy to ensure the subjects are treated ethically. While Camerer 
(2000) suggests that losses that are in fact net gains may be treated differently from 
real losses, we believe that because the 10 yuan participation fee was pointed out at 
the very beginning of the experiment, 30-45 minutes later when the subject got to 
Series 3 the individual would not consider the 10 yuan as a windfall but rather earning 
they had made for participating, and therefore treat the possible losses in the 
experiment as true losses. 
 146 
 
In the payoff matrix (table 2.3) note that at first, the first column (Option A) 
dominates the second column (Option B) in terms of expected payoff and variance in 
the payoffs, but eventually, as the value of the high outcome in the second column 
increases, the expected value of the second column starts to dominate (table 2.3). The 
more risk averse individual would choose Option A longer before switching to Option 
B. The point at which participants switch from Option A to Option B in Series 1 and 2 
allows for the classification of an individual’s risk preferences as risk adverse, risk 
neutral or risk seeking (the curvature of the value function) and to identify if the 
subject tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (the 
non-linear probability weighting parameter). The points at which participants switch 
from Option A to Option B in Series 1, 2 and 3, jointly allow for the identification of 
the loss aversion parameter. 
Suppose an individual switched from Option A to Option B at question 7 in Series 
1, question 7 in Series 2 and question 5 in Series 3. When a subject switches from Option 
A to B at the seventh question in both Series 1 and Series 2, the following inequalities should 
hold:    
5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .3)α] (20(1-σ) -5(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .1)α] (62.5(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ)) 
  
5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln.3)α] (20(1-σ) - 5(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .1)α] (75(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ)) 
  
15(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .9)α] (20(1-σ) -15(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .7)α] (32.5(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ)) 
 
15(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .9)α] (20(1-σ) -15(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .7)α] (34(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ))  
 
The ranges of σ and α that satisfy the above inequalities are 0.26<σ<0.35 and 
0.66<α<0.74. The approximate mid-points (σ, α) of these intervals are (0.30, 0.70).  
Mid-points are taken for the later purpose of using the parameters as explanatory 
variables in the regression models. When subjects do not switch, the appropriate 
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boundaries are used to solve for the  σ and α. Then with the values of σ and α, a set of 
inequalities can be constructed for the switch point in series 3, and solved for upper 
and lower bound on λ. We follow the same convention and take the mid-point as the 
estimate of λ for use in regression models. 
Appendix tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 illustrate the combinations of approximate values 
of σ (the curvature of an individual’s value function), λ (the probability sensitivity 
parameter), and  α (the loss aversion parameter), respectively. Looking at the 
corresponding columns and rows in appendix tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, you will find 
that for this individual who switched at the seventh question the values for (σ, α) are 
(0.30, 0.70) and for λ the lower bound is 2.26 and the upper bound 4.11, taking the 
midpoint the value for λ is 3.2. 
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Time preference parameter estimation 
For our time preference experiment, we use a general model proposed by 
Benhabib et al. (2007), which allows us to test exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-
hyperbolic, and a more general form. Benhabib et al.’s (2007) model assigns a value 
of reward y at time t according to yD(y,t) where: 
yD(y,t) =                                                     , - 
 0.1  1  0	- 1123                  , -  0     (1) 
The conventional time discounting parameter is r. The present-bias parameter is β, and  
hyperbolicity of the discount function is described by θ. The model reduces to 
exponential discounting when β=1 and θ=1.  When β=1 and θ=2, the model reduces to 
hyperbolic discounting. When θ=1 and β is free the model reduces to quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting. When θ >2 and β is free, the model is “hyper-hyperbolic”, meaning that, 
for example, the weight on future rewards drops even more steeply than in the 
hyperbolic model. By using this specification, we can compare the three models at 
once. 
The probability of choosing immediate reward x over the delayed reward y in t 
days is denoted by P(x>(y,t)). We use a logistic function to describe this probabilistic 
relation as follows: 
                             4  , -		 
 
56789:;<=	>?	 1123
    (2) 
The variable µ is a response sensitivity or noise parameter. We estimate the 
parameters r, β, θ, and µ in the above logistic function. For each subject, there are 
thirty observations, one observation for just before the switching point and one 
observation for just after the switching point for each of the fifteen series of questions. 
 149 
 
For example if a subject choose to receive 150 yuan in 6 months over 75 yuan today 
(Plan A) and switched to Plan B when the payoff today increased to 100 yuan, then the 
dependent variable for the first response is 1 and the dependent variable for the second 
response is 0. The complete set of discounting choices is presented in table 1. 
We estimated the above logistic function using non-linear least squares. In 
addition, to estimating the full model above, we estimated the model with restrictions 
for exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  
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Appendix Table 2.1  Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2 and the approximation of σ (parameter for the curvature of the power 
value function) 
σ Switching question in Series 1 
Series 
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  Never 
1 -0.40 -0.35 -0.30 -0.25 -0.15 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.45 
2 -0.35 -0.30 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.50 
3 -0.30 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.55 
4 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.60 
5 -0.15 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.65 
6 -0.10 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 
7 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 
8 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 
9 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 
10 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 
11 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.85 
12 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.90 
13 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
14 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.95 
Never 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95 
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Appendix Table 2.2  Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2 and the approximation of α (probability sensitivity parameter in 
Prelec’s weighting function) 
α Switching question in Series 1 
Series 
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Never 
1 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 
2 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 
3 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 
4 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 
5 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 
6 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 
7 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 
8 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 
9 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 
10 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
11 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 
12 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 
13 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 
14 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 
Never 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 
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Appendix Table 2.3  Switching point (question) in Series 3 and the approximation of λ (loss aversion parameter) 
 
λ 
σ=0.55  σ=0.60 σ=0.65  σ=0.70 σ=0.75  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  
1 -∞ 0.36 -∞ 0.35 -∞ 0.34 -∞ 0.33 -∞ 0.32 
2 0.36 1.38 0.35 1.37 0.34 1.35 0.33 1.33 0.32 1.32 
3 1.38 1.82 1.37 1.84 1.35 1.86 1.33 1.88 1.32 1.91 
4 1.82 2.24 1.84 2.24 1.86 2.25 1.88 2.26 1.91 2.28 
5 2.24 3.88 2.24 3.94 2.25 4.02 2.26 4.11 2.28 4.21 
6 3.88 4.95 3.94 5.02 4.02 5.1 4.11 5.2 4.21 5.3 
7 4.95 13.44 5.02 13.51 5.1 13.6 5.2 13.73 5.3 13.89 
8 13.44 ∞ 13.51 ∞ 13.6 ∞ 13.73 ∞ 13.89 ∞ 
Note:  To find the mid-points for estimation, a value of 0 was used in place of -∞ and a value of 18 was used in place of + ∞. 
  
 153 
 
Appendix Table 2.4 Discounting choices 
 
  Option A Option B 
Question Payoff Time Payoff Time 
1-1 60 2 weeks 10 today 
1-2 60 2 weeks 20 today 
1-3 60 2 weeks 30 today 
1-4 60 2 weeks 40 today 
1-5 60 2 weeks 50 today 
2-1 60 3 months 10 today 
2-2 60 3 months 20 today 
2-3 60 3 months 30 today 
2-4 60 3 months 40 today 
2-5 60 3 months 50 today 
3-1 60 6 months 10 today 
3-2 60 6 months 20 today 
3-3 60 6 months 30 today 
3-4 60 6 months 40 today 
3-5 60 6 months 50 today 
4-1 150 2 weeks 25 today 
4-2 150 2 weeks 50 today 
4-3 150 2 weeks 75 today 
4-4 150 2 weeks 100 today 
4-5 150 2 weeks 125 today 
5-1 150 3 months 25 today 
5-2 150 3 months 50 today 
5-3 150 3 months 75 today 
5-4 150 3 months 100 today 
5-5 150 3 months 125 today 
6-1 150 6 months 25 today 
6-2 150 6 months 50 today 
6-3 150 6 months 75 today 
6-4 150 6 months 100 today 
6-5 150 6 months 125 today 
7-1 15 2 weeks 2.5 today 
7-2 15 2 weeks 5 today 
7-3 15 2 weeks 7.5 today 
7-4 15 2 weeks 10 today 
7-5 15 2 weeks 12.5 today 
8-1 15 3 months 2.5 today 
8-2 15 3 months 5 today 
 
Table continued on  
the next page. 
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Appendix Table 2.4 [continued] Discounting  choices 
 
 Option A Option B 
Question Payoff Time Payoff Time 
8-3 15 3 months 7.5 today 
8-4 15 3 months 10 today 
8-5 15 3 months 12.5 today 
9-1 15 6 months 2.5 today 
9-2 15 6 months 5 today 
9-3 15 6 months 7.5 today 
9-4 15 6 months 10 today 
9-5 15 6 months 12.5 today 
10-1 120 1 week 20 today 
10-2 120 1 week 40 today 
10-3 120 1 week 60 today 
10-4 120 1 week 80 today 
10-5 120 1 week 100 today 
11-1 120 2 months 20 today 
11-2 120 2 months 40 today 
11-3 120 2 months 60 today 
11-4 120 2 months 80 today 
11-5 120 2 months 100 today 
12-1 120 4 months 20 today 
12-2 120 4 months 40 today 
12-3 120 4 months 60 today 
12-4 120 4 months 80 today 
12-5 120 4 months 100 today 
13-1 30 1 week 5 today 
13-2 30 1 week 10 today 
13-3 30 1 week 15 today 
13-4 30 1 week 20 today 
13-5 30 1 week 25 today 
14-1 30 2 months 5 today 
14-2 30 2 months 10 today 
14-3 30 2 months 15 today 
14-4 30 2 months 20 today 
14-5 30 2 months 25 today 
15-1 30 4 months 5 today 
15-2 30 4 months 10 today 
15-3 30 4 months 15 today 
15-4 30 4 months 20 today 
15-5 30 4 months 25 today 
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Appendix Table 2.5  First stage from IV-2SLS regressions for risk aversion and loss 
aversion 
Dependent variable: Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) 
Rank in village by net worth per capita  94.651 102.175 
(8.74)*** (9.92)*** 
Male -1.363 -4.958 
(0.12) (0.48) 
Years of education 0.279 0.686 
(0.23) (0.57) 
Age 0.035 -0.176 
(0.09) (0.50) 
Has off farm employment 1.934 -5.566 
(0.24) (0.70) 
Household size 4.390 4.546 
(1.32) (1.43) 
Number of children/number of adults -12.816 -12.139 
(15.30) (0.83) 
Number in  household who work -5.357 -4.401 
(1.29) (1.11) 
Distance to post office (km) 0.552 0.939 
(1.11) (1.63)  
Distance to county seat (km) 0.419 -0.416 
(2.54) (0.81) 
Constant -23.33 -1.631 
(0.89) (0.06) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes 
N 96 96 
R2 0.54 0.63 
F-statistic 10.20 9.15 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, 
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2.6  First stage from IV-2SLS regressions for hyperbolic discounting parameter 
Dependent variable:    Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan) 
Rank in village by net worth per capita  94.144 101.876 
(8.43)*** (9.48)*** 
Male -0.821 -4.651 
(0.07) (0.44) 
Years of education 0.177 0.647 
(0.14) (0.52) 
Age -0.004 -0.192 
(0.01) (0.52) 
Has off farm employment 1.978 -5.575 
(0.24) (0.69) 
Household size 4.512 4.613 
(1.33) (1.42) 
Number of children/number of adults -13.904 -12.696 
(0.89) (0.85) 
Number in household who work -5.651 -4.539 
(1.32) (1.11) 
Distance to post office (km) 0.609 0.986 
(1.18) (1.57) 
Distance to county seat (km) 0.420 -0.437 
(2.50)** (0.82) 
Risk aversion 0.944 0.517 
(0.09) (0.05) 
Risk experiment earnings -0.048 -0.023 
(0.49) (0.23) 
Constant -20.608 -0.215 
(0.74) (0.01) 
Township fixed effects: No Yes 
N 96 96 
R2 0.55 0.63 
F-statistic 8.35 7.88 
Note:  Absolute value of robust  t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, 
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level.
 
 
 
  
 
157
 
Appendix Table 2.7 Risk preference elicitation in developing countries 
Source Study Sample Experiment Methodology Findings 
Binswanger (1980) -India 
-Tropical area, 
characterized by 
high climatic risk 
for agriculture 
-240 participants 
-Given list of 8 choices; each with 50% probability (coin toss) but low payoff decreased 
and high payoff increased as moved down the list 
-Included one safe option where heads or tails resulted in Rs. 50 
-There was a sequence of games over time and higher levels of payoffs 
-Photographs of sums of money to be received indicated by coins placed in each field 
were given several weeks prior to the experiment to help illiterate people understand 
-Objective was to determine whether differences in 
behavior between farmers of different wealth levels are 
the consequence of different attitudes toward risk or of 
different constraint sets such as limitations on credit or on 
access to modern inputs 
-Experimental measures of risk aversion indicate that at 
higher payoffs virtually all individuals are moderately 
risk averse with little variation according to personal 
characteristics 
-Wealth tends to reduce risk aversion slightly, but its 
effect is not statistically significant 
Nielsen (2001) 
 
-Toliara province 
of Madagascar 
-70 households 
across 6 villages 
-Follow design of Binswanger (1980) 
-Each participated in 4 experiments; 2 time preferences experiments (both hypothetical 
payments); 2 risk preference experiments (1 hypothetical and 1 with real payoffs) 
-Presented with series of 6 binary choices between two payoffs with 0.5 probability  
-One experiment involved only gains, the other involved gains and losses 
-Finds a linkage between asset poverty, time discounting 
and environmental degradation in the form of 
deforestation (and slash-and-burn agriculture) 
-Finds empirical linkage between willingness to take risks 
and willingness to delay 
 
Barr (2003) -Zimbabwe  
-678 subjects 
across 23 villages 
-Follow design of Binswanger (1980) 
-Presented with six gambles; each yields high or low payoff determined by guessing 
which researcher’s hand contained a blue rather than yellow ball 
-Risk-pooling introduced by giving subjects the next days choice list and allowing them 
to form groups in which all winning would be shared equally between group members  
 
-Finds that more extrinsic commitment is associated with 
more risk pooling but that more information is associated 
with less risk pooling 
-In 4 of 5 villages networks of risk pooling contracts 
during the experiment and the networks existing in real 
life were significantly correlated 
Mette Wik et al. (2004) -Northern Zambia 
-110 participants 
across 6 villages 
-Follow design of Binswanger (1980)  
-Given choice between set of 6 games each with 50% probability of winning 
-Played 7 games during the first visit and 6 more during a second visit two weeks later 
(varied payoff levels between games) 
-Paid randomly on several games 
-Wealth indicator variables are found to be significant, 
and partial relative risk aversion decreases as wealth 
increases 
-Females are found to be more risk averse than males 
Humphrey (2004) 
 
-Uganda 
-Two regions: 
Sironko township 
in Sironko District 
and Bufumbo sub-
county in Mbale 
District 
-Presented 12 pair-wise decisions between risky lotteries 
-One question was randomly chosen for payment 
-Also asked two hypothetical valuation tasks in terms of disease control decisions 
-Find that risk preferences of east Ugandan farmers 
exhibit systematic and predictable deviations from 
expected utility maximization; including: violations of the 
independence and transitivity axioms of expected utility 
theory, and reference-dependent preferences 
Table continued on the next page. 
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Source Study Sample Experiment Methodology Findings 
Mosley and Verschoor 
(2005) 
 
-Uganda(205 
participants) 
-Ethiopia(100 
participants) 
-India(227 
participants) 
-Participants presented with various pairs of lotteries; one ‘risky’ with a higher expected 
value but riskier than the other 
-Paid randomly on 1 choice 
-Additionally, asked two hypothetical questions to elicit certainty equivalents 
-Examines all of the linkages in the ‘vicious circle of 
poverty’ 
-Finds that there is very little relationship between risk 
aversion and the income measure of poverty but there are 
strong  and significant linkages from low return on assets, 
to asset levels, to ability to diversify and manage risk, to 
income poverty 
-It may be forward-looking perceptions of vulnerability to 
risk on behalf of themselves and their families best 
explain their attitudes of risk aversion, and thus help 
determine their investment and diversification decisions, 
capacity to manage risk, and ultimately whether they 
remain in poverty 
Hamoudi and  Thomas 
(2006) 
-Mexico 
-1,253 participants 
in 11 rural 
communities in 
the states of 
Guanajuato and 
Michoacan 
-Use modified design of Binswanger (1980) 
-Use 6 questions with 50/50 probability including one safe choice 
-With riskiest choice could win 540 pesos or lose 20 pesos (if lose, loss taken from 
show-up fee) 
-Choice presented in a circle, increasing  risk as moved clockwise, high payoff would 
increase while low payoff would decrease 
-Paid randomly on 1 out of 5 preference tasks 
-Examine the relationship between inter-generational 
transfers and attitudes towards risk 
-Finds that inter-generational transfers are associated with 
attitudes toward risk (although associations are mostly 
weak or insignificant) 
- Risk attitudes measured were correlated with actual 
behaviors 
Liu (2008) 
 
-Four provinces in 
China:  Henan, 
Shandong, Hebei 
and Anhui 
-320 participants 
-Use design of Tanaka et al. (2010) 
-Payoffs ranged from lose 10 yuan to win 850 yuan 
-Examines role of risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a 
new form of agricultural biotechnology  
-Expands measure of risk preferences beyond expected 
utility theory to incorporate prospect theory parameters 
such as loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting 
-Farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse 
adopt the agricultural biotechnology (Bt cotton) later 
-Farmers with small probability weighting parameters  
adopt Bt cotton earlier 
Carlsson et al. (2009) -Guizhou 
province, China 
-117couples  
-Use procedure of Holt and Laury (2002) 
-10 pair-wise choices 
-Payoffs ranged from 1 to 38.5 yuan 
-One question chosen randomly for payoff 
-Have couples make decisions separately and then also together 
-On average individuals are risk averse 
-Find spouses in richer households have more similar 
individual risk attitudes 
-Length of marriage has no impact on similarity 
-A couples joint decision is typically closer t o the 
husband’s individual decision 
-Women with higher income, more years of education, 
and communist party membership have a significantly 
stronger influence on joint decisions 
 
 
 Table continued on the next page. 
  
 
159
 
Source Study Sample Experiment Methodology Findings 
Yesuf and Bluffstone 
(2009)  
-State of Amhara 
in the highlands of 
Ethiopia 
-262 farmers in 
seven local areas, 
in five counties 
and two zones 
-Use design of Binswagner (1980) but frame choice sets to reflect real farming 
decisions 
-Use six farming systems, all having similar costs but different output levels depending 
on 50% probability of good or bad harvest (based on coin toss)  
-Use 5 experiment sets with 6 choices each; sets 2 to 5 derived by scaling up amounts of 
set 1 by 5, 10, 20 and 30 ETB; set 5 was hypothetical 
-After experiment with only gain-gain choices those who had made enough earnings 
were asked to participate in experiment with gain-loss choices 
-Examine 4 research questions: (a) How does the buildup 
of wealth at very low income levels affect risk behavior? 
(b) In very low-income rural settings, how does the 
possibility of loss affect aversion to risk? (c) Do past 
successes within risky environments affect subsequent 
risk responses? (d) Do levels of potential gains and losses 
affect responses to risk? 
-Find high risk aversion and evidence that constraints 
have important impacts on risk-averting behavior with 
perhaps implication for long-term poverty 
 
Bauer, Chytilová, and 
Morduch (2010) 
-Rural population 
of Karnataka in 
southern India 
-573 subjects, 9 
villages, 2 taluks 
(Honavar and 
Haliyal) 
-35 people 
selected in each 
village by random 
walk (90% of 
invited 
participated) 
 
-Follow design of Binswagner (1980)  
-Asked to select 1 out of 6 different gambles, each with a high and a low payoff with a 
probability 0.5 
-In each subsequent gamble expected value increased jointly with the variance 
-Expected value of least risky gamble was Rs. 250, and higher payoff in most risky 
gamble was Rs. 1000 
 
-Used risk aversion to control for the curvature of utility 
function, when examining determinants of savings and 
borrowing behavior   
-More risk averse females  save a lower proportion of 
savings at home and more outside of home 
-More risk averse males borrow more 
Gong et al. (2010) -Yunnan Province 
in southwestern 
China 
-300 households 
across 30 villages 
-Follow design of  Holt and Laury (2002)  
-Series of 10 lottery-choices (Option A and Option B), where probability of higher 
payoff increased as participant moved down the list and Option B was more “risky” 
than Option A since its payoffs (CNY 35 and CNY 5) are more variable than the 
payoffs for Option A (CNY 20 and CNY 16) 
-One question chosen randomly for payoff 
-Participants exhibit substantial risk aversion 
-Risk aversion affects input intensity differently for 
market-oriented versus subsistence farmers 
-Risk aversion related with increasing use of pesticides by 
market-oriented producers but a reduction of pesticide use 
by subsistence farmers 
-Market producers are more concerned with stabilizing 
income, while subsistence producers are more concerned 
with stabilizing production 
Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen (2010) 
- Vietnam 
-180 participants 
across 4 villages in 
the south and 4 in 
the north 
-Use modified design of Holt and Laury (2002) 
-Use 3 series of paired lotteries, 35 choices in total 
-Choice between lotteries (A and B) 
-Probabilities stay the same in each series but payoffs increase as move down rows in 
the lottery B column 
-Monotonic switching is enforced 
-One question chosen randomly for payoff 
- Results indicate that mean village income is related to 
risk and time preferences 
-See Appendix B, Table 1 and 2 for ,more details 
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Appendix Table 2.8  Relationship between risk preferences and poverty 
Source Location and Sample Size Wealth Definition Income Definition Empirical Methods Findings 
Binswanger (1980) India -Use gross sales value 
of physical assets 
 -OLS with village fixed effects -At higher payoffs (approximately monthly labor 
income) wealth does not appear to influence risk 
aversion significantly, although at low game levels 
such an effect appears to exist 
Nielsen (2001) 
 
-Toliara province of 
Madagascar 
-70 households 
across 6 villages 
-Increase in cattle 
holdings; Reduction in 
cattle holding 
-Income -Estimated mean of discount rate 
by sub-groups 
 
-Ordered probit model 
-Respondents with a reduction in cattle holdings were 
more risk averse 
 
-Income positively related to risk aversion (opposite 
of what you would except from expected utility 
theory) 
 
-Cattle assets did not have a significant influence on 
risk aversion 
Wik et al. (2004) 
 
-Northern Zambia 
-110 participants 
across 6 villages 
 -Log of income per 
capita 
-Cash liquidity per 
capita 
-Random effects interval regression 
and pooled interval regression 
model 
-Use lower and upper boundaries of 
the interval for risk aversion 
-Found evidence of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
when income per capita increases  
Mosley and Verschoor 
(2005) 
-Uganda(205 
participants) 
-Ethiopia(100 
participants) 
-India(227 
participants) 
-Wealth (does not 
explain how wealth is 
defined) 
 
Note: Also creates an 
index of perceived 
vulnerability as a better 
measure of poverty 
-Income per capita 
 
 
 
-OLS 
-Binary logistic regression (when 
risk aversion is a RA1-6, where 
RAi = 1 for participants who state a 
preference for a risky lottery less 
than i times) 
-Only in Ethiopia are any of the risk aversion 
measures correlated with income, and only RA2 at 
the 10% level 
-In Uganda per capita wealth is correlated with three 
RA measures but not with any Arrow-Pratt measures 
-The vulnerability index (when substituted for wealth 
and income in the regressions) is significantly 
correlated for all RA risk aversion measures, so it 
may be subjective rather than objective factors that 
drive attitudes towards risk (more vulnerable, more 
risk averse in Uganda; more vulnerable, less risk 
averse in India) 
Liu (2008) -Four provinces in 
China:  Henan, 
Shandong, Hebei and 
Anhui 
-320 participants 
-Use wealth per capita, 
where wealth is defined 
as the value of durable 
goods per capita  
 -OLS -Wealthier respondents were less risk averse 
(significant at 10% level) 
-Wealth did not have a statistically significant impact 
on loss aversion or the probability weighting 
parameter 
Table continued on the next page. 
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Source Location and Sample Size Wealth Definition Income Definition Empirical Methods Findings 
Yesuf and Bluffstone 
(2009) 
Ethiopia -Several indicators of 
wealth:  value of 
domestic animals, 
number of oxen, current 
cash availability (annual 
cash income – cash 
expenditure), household 
land area, and number 
of cultivated plots 
-Livestock is major 
form of wealth 
 -Random effects model of risk 
aversion 
 
 
 
 
-Ordered probit marginal effects by 
risk category 
- All wealth indicators are negative and significant, 
indicating that wealth is correlated with lower risk 
aversion 
 
- Wealth accumulation tends to reduce severe and 
extreme risk aversion and moves respondents into 
less risk-averse categories 
Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen (2010) 
- Vietnam 
-180 participants 
across 4 villages in 
the south and 4 in the 
north 
 -Total income 
-Relative income 
within the village 
(subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the 
within-village 
standard deviation) 
-Village mean 
income 
-Non-linear estimations of the 
logistic function, allowing the 
discount rate and present bias 
parameter to depend on 
demographic variables 
-Use instrumental variables 
(rainfall and head of household 
cannot work as instruments) 
because results of Hausman and 
Davidson-MacKinnon tests suggest 
OLS is an inconsistent estimator 
 
-Household income is not significantly correlated 
with risk aversion or loss aversion 
-Mean village income is highly correlated with loss 
aversion but not risk aversion (people in poor villages 
are not necessarily afraid of uncertainty, in the sense 
of income variation; instead, they are averse to loss) 
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Appendix Table 2.9  Time preference elicitation in developing countries 
Source Location and Sample Size Experiment Methodology Findings 
Pender (1996) 
 
-Andhra Pradesh, 
India 
-96 participants, 2 
villages (1989) 
-72 participants in 
follow-up (1991) 
-Each participated in 3 experiments (6 variations of experiments used) 
- Presented with a series of 8 to 10 binary choices between a specified amount of 
rice to be received at a particular date and alternative amount to be received at 
some other date 
-Each choice presented on a separate card  
-One card randomly selected for payment 
-Time frames ranged from 7, 12, 19 and 24 months; reference point was 1 month, 
13 months or 25 months 
-Follow-up experiments conducted in 1991 
-Find that minimum discount rates in all experiments were 
higher than the maximum interest rates paid by most 
respondents 
-Use experiment data and credit market data to test three 
models of credit markets : (1) the permanent income model, 
(2) upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers, and 
(3) constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement 
-Rejects the permanent income model  
-Discount rate data are consistent with (2) and (3), while the 
credit market data are consistent with a combination of (2) 
and (3) 
Godoy et al. 
(1998) 
 
-Chimane 
Amerindian 
households in 18 
villages in the 
Bolivian rainforest 
-209 participants 
-Twenty minutes into an interview asked participants “We realize you may be 
getting tired from answering questions.  We would like to give you a rest.  Would 
you like to have one candy now or two candies at the end of the interview?” 
-If participant said no, then asked “One now or three at the end?”  
-Then delivered candy at the appropriate time 
-The average impatience of the household heads was 
associated with less deforestation 
Holden, Shiferaw, 
and Wik (1998) 
-Indonesia(41 
participants) 
-Zambia (86 
participants) 
-Ethiopia (120 
participants) 
 
-Each participant asked “If you were told you have the choice between an amount 
of money today (PV) and the amount (FV) in one year, how large would the 
amount PV have to be for you to prefer it instead of FV in one year?” 
-Question was repeatedly asked lowering the PV until a cut-off point was 
identified 
-In Indonesia and Ethiopia used cash value and in Zambia used both cash and 
maize; however, questions were hypothetical  
-Discount rates found to be very high 
-Market imperfections (credit and insurance markets) led to 
variation in discount rate 
-Poverty in assets, or cash liquidity constraints, was leading to 
or correlated with higher rates of time preference  
-In Zambia estimates of risk preferences were also estimated; 
more risk averse people tended to have lower discount rates 
Godoy, Kirby, and 
Wilkie (2001) 
-Bolivian lowlands 
-443 participants 
across 42 villages 
-Each asked 9 questions about a small reward today or larger reward at a specified 
delay (7 to 162 days) 
-Carried out experiment half way through field work to ensure delivery of future 
reward at specified time 
-Rates of time preference had a small economic and statistical 
effect on the use of natural resources (old-growth forest, 
fallow forests, fish, and game) 
Nielsen (2001)  -Toliara province of 
Madagascar 
-70 households 
across 6 villages 
-Each participated in 4 experiments; 2 time preferences experiments (both 
hypothetical payments); 2 risk preference experiments (1 hypothetical and 1 with 
real payoffs) 
-Presented with series of 6 binary choices between payoff today and 1 year from 
now 
-One experiment involved only gains, the other involved gains and losses 
 -Finds a linkage between asset poverty, time discounting and 
environmental degradation in the form of deforestation (and 
slash-and-burn agriculture) 
-Finds empirical linkage between willingness to take risks and 
willingness to delay 
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Source Location and Sample Size Experiment Methodology Findings 
Pendleton and  
Howe (2002) 
 
-Bolivian lowlands 
-Sub-sample from 
Godoy et al.’s 
(2001) data 
-209 participants 
across 18 villages 
included in data set 
-Data collected by Godoy et al. (2001) -Patient farmers clear more forest than impatient farmers 
-Similar coefficients on impatience for clearance of old-
growth and secondary-growth areas but only significant for 
secondary growth 
Kirby et al. (2002) 
 
-Beni, Bolivia 
-154 Tsimane’ 
Amerindians from 
53 households 
across  2 villages 
along the River 
Maniqui in the 
tropical rainforest  
-Participants given a list of 8 choices between X today and X+Y in the future 
-Future time frames ranged from 7 to 157 days 
-Participant were also given a list of 8 choices between a smaller number of candy 
today and a larger numbers of candy in the future 
-Conducted the experiments quarterly over the course of 1 year 
-Discount rates increased with age, decreased with 
educational levels and literacy, and tended to decrease as 
recent income rose 
-Discount rates were not associated with wealth, nutritional 
status, or moderate drug use 
-Low but reliable correlations between discount rates across 
quarters, suggesting that a person’s discount rate is a 
somewhat stable characteristic 
 
Anderson et al. 
(2004) 
 
-Vietnam 
-Two villages in the 
region of Hanoi 
city, one considered 
a rural commune 
(Thach Ban) and the 
other considered a 
urban commune 
(Quynh Mai) 
-Asked respondents to imagine that they had the opportunity to receive a loan 
form a local NGO and that they had the choice of paying back the loan 
immediately or postponing the payment to a later date, at which time they would 
have to pay a larger amount 
-9 questions 
-Future times included: 1 day, 3 months or 1 year 
-Hypothetical question 
-Trade-offs between today and tomorrow are different from 
trade-offs between any other 24-hour period 
-Examines correlations between discount rate and household 
characteristics 
-Find no relationship between income or gender and discount 
rate, an inverse correlation between age and discount rate 
-Find that those living in rural area have significantly higher 
discount rates 
 
Casse et al. (2005) -Toliara province of 
Madagascar 
-74 participants 
across 6 villages  
(part of larger 
sample of 240 
households across 
20 villages) 
-Each participant asked to choose among six hypothetical options 
-Options were between for example “X payment now or X+Y payment for one 
year later?” 
 
-High rates of time preference found 
Hamoudi and 
Thomas (2006) 
-Mexcio 
-1,253 participants 
in 11 rural 
communities in the 
states of Guanajuato 
and Michoacan 
-Use 10 questions; “Receive X today or X+Y in the future (1 and 2 months; 3 
years?”  
-Those subjects who opted for future payoff were given contact information, a 
postcard to tell them if they moved and a written pledge that the surveyor would 
return on the specified date with the specified amount 
-Examine the relationship between intergenerational transfers 
and time preference 
-Male adults who are more patient are more likely to support 
parents 
-Both mothers and fathers who are more patient appear to 
invest more in their children 
-Time preference measures collected were correlated with 
actual behaviors 
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Source Location and Sample Size Experiment Methodology Findings 
Gunatilake, 
Wickramasinghe, 
and 
Abeygunawardena 
(2007) 
-Sinharaja Man and 
Biosphere Reserve 
in Sri Lanka 
-180 participants  
-First conducted a survey to calculate the value of non-timber forest products 
(NTFP) collected by the household in the previous year 
-Then asked hypothetical stated preference survey question 
-If the Forest Department (FD) told them that they could not collect any NTFP for 
1 year and that they would be compensated for the NTFP they did not harvest but 
that the payment would be delayed X months due to administrative problems.  
How much would the FD have to pay you if payment was made exactly X months 
from the due date? 
-Investigate impact of time preference on NTFP harvesting, 
using a simultaneous question model 
-Villagers discount future consumption at an average rate of 
24%, which is above existing market rate of interest for bank 
loans (18.5%) 
-Individuals with a higher rate of time preference harvest 
more forest resources 
 
Yesuf and 
Bluffstone (2008) 
-State of Amhara in 
the highlands of 
Ethiopia 
-262 farmers in 
seven local areas, in 
five counties and 
two zones 
-Four experiment sets; each with choice between X amount today or Y amount in 
the future (3,6, and 12 months); amounts were either ETB 15 or 40 ($1.76 and 
$4.70) 
-Each choice set presented on a card and recorded on the card, after 28 cards 
completed one was chosen at random for payment 
-Find that median discount rate for each set of experiments is 
high (more than double the average interest rate on 
outstanding debt) 
-Discount rate varied systematically with wealth (physical 
asset) and risk preferences 
Bauer and 
Chytilová (2008) 
 
-Rural population in 
Mukono district, 
southern Uganda 
-910 participants, 
10 villages 
 
-Asked "Would you prefer Ush 200,000 today or Ush 250,000  in one year?"  
-Asked 5 questions, each time increasing the future payment 
-Hypothetical survey questions 
 
 
-Examine causal impact of education on subject discount rates 
using instrumental variables (varying school frequency in 
different villages and number of school-age years that overlap 
with the era of Idi Amin) 
- Find that for men education has significant impact on 
discount rate 
Bauer, Chytilová, 
and Morduch 
(2010) 
 
-Rural population of 
Karnataka in south 
India 
-573 participants, 9 
villages, 2 taluks 
(Honavar and 
Haliyal) 
-35 people selected 
in each village by 
random walk (90% 
of invited 
participated) 
 
- Asked “Would you rather consume Rs. 250  tomorrow or X+Y in t months?" 
-Asked 2 sets of 5 questions each 
-In one set t=3 and in the other t=15 months 
-Shifted future question exactly 1 year to avoid any seasonality 
-In current question included 1 day time delay to lower credibility and higher 
transaction costs associated with future payments 
-Real monetary rewards with stakes as large as a week’s wage (min Rs. 250, max 
Rs. 375) 
 
-Integrate experimental measures of time discounting and risk 
aversion with survey data on financial activity to identify time 
inconsistencies between current and future questions 
-Identify 1/3 of population exhibits choices consistent with 
hyperbolic discounting (discount future more heavily when 
asked a series of questions about consumption now vs. in 3 
months, relative to discounting in similar questions about 
consumption in 12 vs. 15 months) 
-Women with hyperbolic preferences save less at home, save 
less in total levels and are more likely to borrow generally but 
to do so through microcredit institutions specifically 
Tanaka, Camerer, 
and Nguyen 
(2010) 
- Vietnam 
-180 participants 
across 4 villages in 
the south and 4 in 
the north 
-Subjects are asked to make 75 choices between smaller rewards delivered today 
and larger rewards delivered at a specified time in the future  
-Future times include: 3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1, 2 and 3 months 
-Payment varied between 30,000 to 300,000 dong (15 days wage in rural north) 
- Enforced monotonic switching within question sets 
-A single question was selected at random for payment 
-Before experiment selected trusted agent to deliver the future payments  
-Results indicate that mean village income is related to risk 
and time preferences 
-See appendix table 2.10  
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Appendix Table 2.10  Relationship between time preference and poverty 
Source Location and Sample Size Wealth Definition Income Definition Empirical Methods Findings 
Pender (1996) -Andhra Pradesh, 
India 
-96 participants, 2 
villages (1989) 
-72 participants in 
follow-up (1991) 
-Use household’s net wealth 
per capita defined as total value 
of assets minus debts 
-Assets include: land, 
buildings, livestock, farm 
implements, stocks of 
agricultural products, inputs, 
household items and consumer 
durables, and financial assets 
 -Maximum likelihood estimations 
-Uses Hausman’s procedure 
(Hausman, 1978) to test the 
assumption that wealth is an 
exogenous variable and cannot 
reject exogeneity of net wealth at 
the 5% level in any of the 
regressions 
-Wealthier respondents had lower 
discount rates in all experiments, 
although only statistically significant in 
3 experiments 
-Size of wealth effect is substantial, 
implying an increase of Rs 10,000 net 
wealth per capita results in as much as a 
22 percentage point reduction in the 
discount rate 
Holden, Shiferaw, 
and Wik (1998) 
 
-Indonesia(41 
participants) 
-Zambia (86 
participants) 
-Ethiopia (120 
participants) 
 
-Labor force per capita 
-Savings last year per capita 
(Indonesia) 
-Number of oxen (Ethiopia) 
-Former land ownership in 
Indonesia before transferred to 
Sumatra (past wealth) 
 
-Total income per capita 
-Net cash liquidity per capita 
(income minus expenditure) 
-OLS -Indonesia: current liquidity had a 
significant positive correlation with the 
discount rate; income per capita had a 
negative (but insignificant) relationship 
with the discount rate; savings last year 
had a significant positive correlation 
with the discount rate 
-Zambia: Total income and labor force 
per capita had no significant correlation 
with discount rates; cash liquidity 
significant positive relationship  
-Ethiopia: Oxen wealth had a 
significant correlation with discount 
rate; total income per consumer unit 
had a significant negative relationship 
with discount rate 
Nielsen (2001) -Toliara province of 
Madagascar 
-70 households 
across 6 villages 
-Increase in cattle holdings; 
reduction in cattle holding 
-Income -Estimated mean of discount rate 
by sub-groups 
 
-Ordered probit model 
-Respondents with increases in cattle 
stock demonstrate significantly lower 
discount rates 
 
 
Kirby et al. (2002) -Beni, Bolivia 
-154 Tsimane’ 
Amerindians from 53 
households across  2 
villages along the 
River Maniqui in the 
tropical rainforest  
-Log of the value of physical 
assets 
 
-Log of cash received during 
previous month 
-OLS 
-Discount rates were regressed on 
each explanatory variable, both 
separately and in multivariate 
analyses that included together the 
explanatory variable, gender and 
age 
-Focus on simple regressions 
-Found an inverse relationship between  
discount rates and income, but no 
relationship with wealth 
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Source Location and Sample Size Wealth Definition Income Definition Empirical Methods Findings 
Anderson et al. 
(2004) 
-Vietnam 
-Two villages in the 
region of Hanoi city, 
one considered a 
rural commune 
(Thach Ban) and the 
other considered a 
urban commune 
(Quynh Mai) 
 -Household monthly income -Correlation analysis 
-Categorical comparison  
-No relationship between income and 
discount rates 
Gunatilake, 
Wickramasinghe, 
and 
Abeygunawardena 
(2007) 
-Sinharaja Man and 
Biosphere Reserve in 
Sri Lanka 
-180 participants  
 -Total income -OLS -Individual rate of time preference 
declines when total income increases 
Yesuf and 
Bluffstone (2008) 
Ethiopia -Use wealth indicators such as 
value of capital stock, number 
of oxen and land size 
-Use cash liquidity (difference 
between all sources of cash 
revenue and cash expenditure) 
-Interval regression model (due to 
right- censored, left-censored and 
interval discount rates) 
-Farm households with relatively better 
stock of capital, bigger farm sizes, and 
a larger number of oxen are likely to 
have relatively low discount rate 
-Insignificant effect of cash liquidity 
Bauer and Chytilová 
(2008) 
Mukono district, 
southern Uganda 
 
 -Use profession as a proxy of 
income 
-Self-employed farmers and 
non-farm workers (drivers, 
shopkeepers vs. employed 
individuals (teachers, 
employees of public bodies or 
NGOS) and students 
-Examines average discount rates 
across profession groups 
-OLS, clustering at village level 
 
-Individuals facing less income 
pressures discount less when looking at 
average discount rates across profession 
groups 
-From OLS, some evidence that 
employed females discount more, 
however no other significant impact of 
profession on time preference 
Bauer, Chytilová, 
and Morduch (2010) 
Karnataka in 
southern India 
 
-Wealth index calculated by 
principal component analyses 
from questions on type of 
house, electricity connection, 
land ownership and dummies 
for possession of 14 types of 
household equipment 
 OLS, clustering at village level Wealth is not correlated with the 
discount rate 
Table continued on the next page. 
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Source Location and Sample Size Wealth Definition Income Definition Empirical Methods Findings 
Tanaka, Camerer, 
and Nguyen (2010) 
- Vietnam 
-180 participants 
across 4 villages in 
the south and 4 in the 
north 
 -Total income 
-Relative income within the 
village 
-Village mean income 
-Non-linear estimations of the 
logistic function, allowing the 
discount rate and present bias 
parameter to depend on 
demographic variables 
-Use instrumental variables 
(rainfall and head of household 
cannot work) because results of 
Davidson-MacKinnon test suggest 
OLS is an inconsistent estimator 
 
-Mean village income is related to time 
preferences 
-Mean village income is correlated with 
lower discount rates (people living in 
wealthy villages are more patient) 
-Household income is correlated with 
patience 
-People are present biased regardless of 
their income levels and economic 
environments 
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MANUSCRIPT 3 
Forest Tenure Reform and Household Wealth: Insights from China 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of forest tenure reform on household wealth in 
Fujian Province, China, where a large-scale reform of property rights began in 2003. 
We use a balanced panel survey data set that contains data for three years: 2000 
(before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform) in a fixed effect model to 
identify the impact of the reform on wealth. We find weak evidence that the forest 
tenure reforms had a positive effect on household wealth. Specifically, increased 
tenure security in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita by 42% 
between 2000 and 2008. To further examine the source of increased wealth, we also 
examine the effect of the reform on household forest use. Results suggest that forest 
certification increased bamboo revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a forest 
certificate) increased non-timber forest product revenue, although these results are 
statistically weak. Overall this paper provides weak evidence that forest tenure reform 
garners potential for improving poor rural households’ livelihoods in China.  
3.2 Introduction 
 
Many people living in or near forests in developing countries are poor (Sunderlin 
et al. 2007). For example, in China, Zhou and Veeck (1999) observed that many 
 170 
 
counties with abundant forest also were categorized as being severely poor. In India, 
approximately 275 million people live in or near forests and depend on them for their 
income. These people are disproportionally ‘tribal’ ethnic minorities, who are among 
the poorest and most vulnerable people in India (Mehta & Shah 2003; World Bank 
2006). Similar observations have also been made in Cambodia (Dasgupta et al 2005), 
Vietnam (Muller et al. 2006) and Brazil (Sunderlin et al. 2007). Overall there are 
hundreds of millions of people who depend on forests for their livelihood (Byron & 
Arnold 1999; Calibre Consultants and Statistical Services Centre 2000).1 
The correlation between people living in poverty and their dependence on forest 
resources, combined with the continued deforestation in the world, has stimulated a 
call from international institutions, NGOs, and community organizations, for pro-poor 
forestry policies in the last decade (Wunder 2001; FAO 2003; Sunderlin et al. 2005; 
Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). Amongst the various pro-poor forestry polices that have 
been recommended, one that has received notable attention and gained momentum in 
implementation is forest tenure reform. Property rights to ownership and use of forest 
resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced, leaving households with 
insecure ownership and use rights to forest resources. This insecurity undermines 
sound forest management, for without secure rights forest holders have few incentives 
to invest in managing and protecting their forest resources. These realizations have 
stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward strengthening property rights for 
forest resources by transferring property rights from the state to communities and 
individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and use forest resources (Edmonds 
2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth and White 2004).  
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In this paper, we assess the impact of forest tenure reforms on household wealth in 
Fujian, China, where an extensive forest tenure reform, aimed at transferring the 
responsibility of forest planting and management from the collective (by townships 
and villages) to households began in 2003. China implemented the reform with the 
objectives of increasing forest coverage, increasing farmers’ enthusiasm for forest 
management and investment, and improving farmers’ livelihoods (Liu and Lixia 
2009). China’s collectively owned forests total approximately 100 million hectares 
and are home to more than 400 million people, which arguably makes these reforms 
the largest one undertaken in modern times both in terms of forest area and people 
affected (Xu et al. 2010). By 2006, about 70% of collective forests had been allocated 
to households (Xu et al. 2010). Recent guidelines issued by the CPC Central 
Committee and State Council suggest that China is going to continue further with the 
privatization of forest land (Shen et al. 2009). As such, it is important that we examine 
the effect of China’s forest tenure reform on rural households, many of whom despite 
China’s recent rapid economic growth remain in poverty. Lessons learned will be of 
significant value to China and to other developing countries as they too design policy 
to address the interrelated problems of deforestation, insecure forest tenure, and 
poverty in their countries. 
To assess the tenure reform’s progress towards meeting its objective of improving 
farmers’ livelihoods, we use a panel survey data set collected among 103 households 
in 2006 and 2009, which contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and qualitative 
data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform). To 
identify the effect of the reform on wealth, we use a fixed effects model. 
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Results provide statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reforms have had 
a positive effect on household wealth in our study area. Specifically, increased tenure 
security in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita. This positive 
forest certification effect on wealth was larger in magnitude when the forest certificate 
was on a plot that a household had already been managing than when the forest 
certificate accompanied a new plot that a household received as a result of the reform. 
To gain insight into the mechanism through which tenure reform leads to increased 
wealth, we also examine the effect of the tenure reform on households’ forest use. 
Specifically, we examine changes in household revenue per capita from the sale of 
non-timber forest product (NTFP) and total revenue from the sale of bamboo, as 
households were relatively more engaged in these two forest income generating 
activities than in the sale of timber. The results suggest that forest certification had a 
positive effect on total bamboo revenue, while it did not have a significant effect on 
NTFP revenue. Obtaining a new plot (without a forest certificate) resulted in an 
increase in NTFP revenue per capita, while it did not have a significant effect on 
bamboo revenue.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of the forest 
tenure reform history in China, with an emphasis on the recent tenure reforms in 
Fujian, China. The next section explains the data collection procedures, gives a 
description of the data and reports a preliminary examination of the impact of the 
forest tenure reform on households’ livelihoods using descriptive statistics. Then the 
empirical framework is outlined, followed by the results and a concluding section. 
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3.3 China’s Forest Tenure Reform 
 
This paper examines the impact of tenure reforms on wealth in the context of 
China, specifically in Fujian Province. China’s forest area accounts for 4.5 percent of 
the world’s total. China has two main categories of forest landownership. 
Approximately 42 percent of forest land in China is owned by the state and the rest is 
owned by the collective (Liu and Lixia 2009). Since the early 1950s, forest tenure and 
management policies of China’s collective forests have undergone fundamental 
changes. Collectivization of non-state owned forests began in 1956, and remained 
dominant until the reforms of the 1980s (Xu and Jiang 2009). Under collectivization, 
administrative villages, usually comprised of a number of natural villages or clusters 
of families, functioned as the legal owners of collective forests, and households had 
little active participation in management. For households there were no links between 
or among their rights to forests, their responsibility for forest establishment and 
management, and their benefits from forests (Dachang 2001). 
The first major wave of reforms in China’s collective forests began in 1981, and 
was aimed at transferring the responsibility of forest planting and management from 
the collective to households (Miao and West 2004). By 1986, nearly 70% of the 
collectively owned forest land had been transferred to rural household management 
(Xu and Jiang 2009). In 1987, however, due to unsustainable logging the government 
reverted a large portion of forest land under household management back to collective 
management (Hyde et al. 2003).  
By 1986, while 70% of the collectively owned forest land in China had been 
transferred to rural household management, in Fujian only 32% of the collective forest 
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land had been distributed for household management (CFYB 1987). This low 
percentage of forest land under household management was due to the fact that Fujian 
had not fully participated in the first round of the tenure reforms in the 1980s. Instead, 
the provincial government in Fujian had implemented a shareholding system to keep 
forests under collective management while distributing “paper shares” of collective 
forests based on family population. In Fujian, forest land was not actually physically 
distributed, rather only dividends from the forest were distributed to households. 
At first, Fujian’s shareholding system was highly regarded by forest administrators 
for its ability to maintain forests under collective management but fifteen years after 
establishment of the system, two issues became increasingly evident (Xu and Jiang 
2009). First, forestry’s contribution to rural incomes was negligible in spite of the fact 
that forest land occupies more than 60% of the total provincial land area and 80% of 
rural land area (Qin 2008). Second, enforcing forest conservation had become 
increasingly difficult for local forest authorities due to lack of cooperation from 
farmers. For example, the severity of forest fire incidents grew over the course of the 
1990s, and there is anecdotal evidence that many of the fires were caused by farmers 
(Xu and Jiang 2009).  
Under these circumstances, in 2003 the second wave of reforms was officially 
approved by the provincial government in Fujian province.2 In this second wave of 
reforms, Fujian, the largest but once resistant collective forest province, adopted forest 
tenure reforms aimed at individualization of forest land. The decisions regarding forest 
land reallocation during this reform required a 2/3 majority vote by the village 
representative committees or by village assemblies. Redistribution of plots was 
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accompanied by legal contracts and forest certificates with extended contract periods 
of 30 to 70 years, whereas previously contract periods had only been 5 to 15 years 
(Liu and Lixia 2009). Furthermore, adoption of the Rural Land Contract Law allowed 
for the expansion of rights under the new forest certificates to include those of land 
transfer, inheritance and mortgaging (Xu and Jiang 2009). 
In mid-2003, the central government announced the “Resolution of Development 
of Forestry.” This forest policy aimed to reduce the growing rural-urban economic 
disparities in China and to increase domestic forest production by distributing stronger 
forest use and management rights to households (Xu et al. 2010). Since 2003, fourteen 
other provinces have initiated reforms aimed at both delegating collective-owned 
forest land to direct household management and strengthening property rights with 
forest certificates for both households already managing forest plots individually and 
for new forest plots distributed to households.  
About 70% of collective forests had been allocated to households by 2006 (Xu et 
al. 2010). Recent guidelines issued by the CPC Central Committee and State Council 
suggest that China is going to further privatize forest land (Shen et al. 2009). As such, 
it is important that to examine the effect of China’s forest tenure reform on rural 
households, many of whom despite China’s recent rapid economic growth remain in 
poverty. Xu and Jiang (2009) report that household net income as a whole has 
increased from 2000 (before the reform) to 2006 (after the reform) based on a 
household survey of 3,180 households across 8 provinces, where the reform had been 
implemented in China. Furthermore, in provinces that had a shift in rights towards 
households (Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Liaoning, Shandong and Yunnan 
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Province), Xu and Jiang (2009) report that there was an increase in the share of 
household income generated from forestry, and where rights were shifted back 
towards the collective (Anhui), the share of household income from forestry 
diminished. In Fujian, the site of our study, forestry’s share in household income 
increased 3.71% between 2000 and 2006 in Fujian (Xu, White, and Lee 2010). While 
this suggests that forestry income has become more important to households as a result 
of the reform, further analysis is needed to identify a causal effect between the forest 
tenure reform and changes in household income. From these statistics, we are unable 
to determine if the changes in forest income are a result of households receiving forest 
certificates for plots they were already managing, new plots with forest certificates or 
new plots without forest certificates. In this study, we aim to disentangle the causality 
between the forest tenure reform (stronger rights from forest certificates and increased 
forest area from new plots distributed during the reform) and changes in household 
wealth, as well as changes in revenue from the sale of NTFP and bamboo. 
3.4 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The household panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and 
qualitative data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming City and Datian 
County, and 10 villages in Fujian Province for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 
2005 and 2008 (after the reform). Survey data for the years 2000 and 2005 were 
collected in 2006 by a research team from Peking University, Gothenburg University 
and Forest Trends. The 2006 survey team conducted interviews in three townships, 
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600 
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households. In 2009, two of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts 
were made to conduct a follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties 
that had been included in the previous survey.  
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households included in the 
previous survey were located. The 104 located households were asked to complete the 
survey. All households completed the survey. Each household was paid 15 yuan 
compensation for completing the survey.3  
We construct a balanced panel data set by using only those households that were 
included in both survey years, so that we have pre- and post- reform data for every 
household in the analysis. Ten households, that had no forest land area, as well as no 
forest income, in any of the survey years are excluded from the analysis. Seven 
households for which there was missing data that was essential to this analysis are also 
discarded. This results in a sample size of 87 households.  
In 2000, average household size in the sample was 4.9 people (table 3.1). Only two 
of the 87 households had a female head of household. On average the head of 
household was 46.43 years old and had 5.09 years of education. The typical household 
managed 0.59 hectares of forest land per capita and had a crop production area (area 
of production multiplied by the number of times harvested) of 0.08 hectares per capita.  
 
Changes in forest tenure 
Prior to the recent forest tenure reform, 96.6% of the households in our balanced 
panel data set had already been managing forest plots. We will refer to each of these 
plots as pre-FTR plots. The reform impacted household forest plot structure in a 
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variety of ways. First, a household may have gotten a forest certificate for a pre-FTR 
plot (23% of households by 2008). Second, a new forest plot (new plot) may have 
been distributed to the household (24% of households by 2008). Third, the household 
may have been distributed a new plot, along with a forest certificate for the new plot 
(7% of households by 2008). Lastly, in some cases households may have experienced 
one or more of these changes to their forest plot tenure structure (51% of households 
by 2008). To summarize, households’ forest plots can be categorized into four 
categories: 1) pre-FTR plots without a forest certificate; 2) pre-FTR plots with a forest 
certificate; 3) new plots without a forest certificate; and 4) new plots with a forest 
certificate. In each year, a given household’s total forest area will be distributed 
amongst one or more of these four categories. 
Figure 3.1 depicts changes the forest plot tenure structure of households in our 
sample. In 2000, the total forest land area managed by the households in our sample 
was 216.1 hectares. By 2008, the total forest land area managed by the households in 
our sample had risen only slightly to 219.3 hectares, of which 66.7 hectares was 
managed by a household with a forest certificate for that forest land and 42.4 hectares 
that had been distributed to households as a new forest plot area during the reform.  
Wealth 
Our primary interest is to assess the impact of the forest tenure reform on 
household wealth. To measure household wealth we use net worth per capita, which is 
equal to total assets minus total liabilities. Household assets include: the value of 
consumer durables, productive assets, and livestock; savings held in bank accounts;  
loans provided to others; and other investments and deposits. Liabilities include loans 
 179 
 
for both productive and non-productive purposes. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 
are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, 
China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Between 2000 (before the  reform) and 
2008 (after the reform), net worth per capita more than doubled, increasing from 1,360 
to 3,349 yuan (table 3.2). 
As a preview to more rigorous estimates of the effect of the forest tenure reform on 
wealth, we examine the mean net worth per capita for three discrete measures of 
household forest tenure reform status: 1.) whether or not a household received a forest 
certificate for at least one plot, 2.) whether or not a household received at least one 
new plot, and 3.) whether or not a household experienced at least one of these two 
events. Interestingly, we see that those households that got a forest certificate for at 
least one plot between 2000 and 2008 had a lower average net worth per capita in 
2000 and experienced a proportionally larger increase in net worth per capita than 
those households that did not get a forest certificate (figure 3.2, panel a). On average, 
those households that received a forest certificate for at least one plot experienced a 
233% increase in net worth per capita, whereas those that did not receive a forest 
certificate for any plots experienced only a 128% increase. A similar pattern holds 
when we examine the other two discrete measures of household forest tenure reform 
status (figure 3.2, panel b and c). While these differences are noticeable, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the means (in any year) nor in the change in the 
means (between 2000 and 2008) when households are grouped by these discrete 
measures of household forest tenure status. The mean comparison suggests that the 
forest tenure reform has not had an effect on the growth in net worth per capita.  
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Forest Use 
As an extension to the analysis of the affect of the forest tenure reform on 
household wealth, we also examine the affect of the reform on household forest use. 
Households use their forest resources as both an income source (sale of bamboo, 
timber and non-timber forest products (NTFP)) and to meet their personal needs for 
forest products (table 3.3). On average 25% of households engaged in the harvesting 
and sale of bamboo each year. Between 2000 (pre-reform) and 2008 (post-reform), the 
mean bamboo revenue increased by 141.8 yuan per capita (table 3.3). The percentage 
of households selling NTFP (e.g., bamboo shoots, tea, nuts, mushrooms, products for 
medicinal use, etc.) increased from 23% in 2000 to 71% in 2008 and the mean NTFP 
revenue increased by 627.9 yuan per capita. Similarly, there has been an increase in 
revenue from timber. However, only a very small percentage of households (0-3%) 
reported revenue from timber in any of the survey years.  
Households also harvest forest products for their own use. The primary forest 
product harvested for own use is firewood (51% of households in 2000), followed by 
bamboo (29%) and timber (3%).4 Interestingly, there was an increase in the percentage 
of households that collected firewood but there was a decrease in the average 
kilograms per capita collected by each household between 2000 and 2008. Also, there 
was a decrease in the percentage of households harvesting bamboo for own use from 
29% in 2000 to 14% in 2008. 
Next, we examine changes in revenue from the sale of bamboo and NTFP. These 
two revenue sources are worth examining because a larger proportion of households 
derive income from these two activities relative to the sale of timber. Furthermore, 
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while most information on forest activities in the data set is limited to the years 2000, 
2005 and 2008, data for bamboo revenue are available for each year from 2000 to 
2008. The nine years of observations for bamboo revenue will allow us to exploit the 
variation in the length of time between planting and harvesting. Bamboo can be 
harvested yearly or biennially. However, bamboo culms attain their maximum quality 
(in terms of strength and flexibility) and economic value after about seven years 
(Coggins 2000).  
We examine the mean NTFP revenue per capita and the total bamboo revenue for 
the same three discrete measures of household forest tenure reform status, as we 
examined for wealth above. Interestingly, when we examine the change in bamboo 
revenue per capita based on whether or not the household received at least one forest 
certificate, those households that got a forest certificate for at least one plot between 
2000 and 2008 experienced a 209% increase in their NTFP revenue, while those that 
did not experienced a much higher increase of 426% in their NTFP revenue (figure 
3.3, panel a). A similar pattern holds when we examine the other two discrete 
measures of forest tenure reform household status (figure 3.3, panel b and c). 
Figure 3.4 displays the trend in mean total bamboo revenue by each of the three 
discrete measures of household forest tenure reform status. Interestingly, we see that 
the trends for each forest tenure reform category are more divergent from each other 
after 2003 (the official start year of the reform). Specifically, after 2003 those that get 
a forest certificate for at least one plot tend to have a higher average total bamboo 
revenue than those that do not get a forest certificate (figure 3.4, panel a). However, 
those that got at least one new plot have a lower average total bamboo revenue in each 
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year between 2005 and 2008 than those that did not get a new plot (figure 3.4, panel 
b). When we examine the trend for those that got at least one new plot or one forest 
certificate, we see that those households that did also have a lower average total 
bamboo revenue in each year between 2005 and 2008 than those that did not (figure 
3.4, panel c).  
While these differences in both NTFP and bamboo revenue are noticeable, there is 
no statistically significant difference in the change (from 2000 and 2008) in the means 
between households grouped according to these discrete measures of household forest 
tenure status. This suggests that the forest tenure reform has had no effect on 
household revenue from NTFP and bamboo. 
Measuring household forest tenure reform status 
Although our descriptive analysis suggests that the forest tenure reform has not 
had an impact on wealth, NTFP revenue per capita, or total bamboo revenue, it may be 
that the discrete measures used to capture household forest tenure status do not fully 
capture the magnitude of changes in a household’s forest plot tenure structure. For 
instance, with a discrete measure of whether or not a household received a new plot, a 
household that received a new plot with an area of 5 hectares would be categorized in 
the same way as a household that received a new plot with an area of 0.01 hectares. 
However, it is likely that acquiring a new plot with an area of 5 hectares would have a 
greater impact on a household’s wealth and forest product revenue than a plot with an 
area of only 0.01 hectares. Therefore, in our empirical analysis each plot in each year 
is identified as belonging to one of the following four categories: 1) pre-FTR plots 
without a forest certificate; 2) pre-FTR plots with a forest certificate; 3) new plots 
 183 
 
without a forest certificate; and 4) new plots with a forest certificate. In each year, a 
given household’s total forest area will be distributed amongst one or more of these 
four categories (table 3.4).  
3.5 Empirical Strategy 
 
Our main objective is to identify how the forest tenure reform affected household 
wealth. In order to do so, we must address the concern that changes in household 
wealth could be due to factors other than the changes in household forest plot tenure 
structure. For example, changes in household wealth between 2000 and 2008 could be 
due to unobservable time-invariant variables (e.g., household’s entrepreneurial drive 
or location factors that affect forest productivity) or unobservable variables that 
change over time (e.g., increased forest productivity due to favorable weather 
conditions). Furthermore, changes in a household’s wealth that had an increase in plot 
area with a forest certificate and/or a new plot relative to those that did not could be 
due to initial differences in observed (e.g., education of the head of household) and 
unobserved characteristics (e.g., entrepreneurial ability) between the two. Without 
controlling for this we risk incorrectly attributing differences in wealth between those 
households that experienced a change in their forest plot tenure structure to those that 
did not experience a change in its forest plot tenure structure, when in fact they are due 
to initial differences between the two groups. 
To address these concerns, we use three years of balanced household panel data in 
a fixed effect model, which allows us to control for time-invariant observable and 
unobservable variables. The limitation of approach is that it does not allow us to 
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control for time-variant unobservable variables or for possible self-selection of 
households into acquiring a forest certificate or a new plot during the reform.   
As an extension to the analysis, we also examine the effect of the reform on 
households’ bamboo and NTFP revenue. To do so, we must again address the concern 
that changes could be due to factors other than the changes in household forest plot 
tenure structure, and additionally we must address possible selection bias (i.e., factors 
that are inherently different about those households that engage in NTFP or bamboo 
sales and those that do not). For example, on average only 26% of households engaged 
in the sale of bamboo. Therefore, our dependent variable (bamboo revenue) is 
censored (i.e. a positive outcome is not observed for many households) and ordinary 
least squares estimation will produce biased parameter estimates. To address this 
issue, we use Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure for panel data that uses the 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio to take into account selection bias (Wooldridge 1995). In the first 
stage, we use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a household engaging in 
sales of each forest product. The estimated parameters are then used to calculate an 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio for each forest product and year. We then include the Inverse 
Mill’s Ratio as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects estimations to capture the 
selection effect.  
Empirical Model 
The base estimate (model 1) of the forest tenure reform effect is obtained from the 
ordinary least squares estimation: 
  net worthit = β0 + β1(preFTRplot_FCit) + β2(newplot_FCit)  
           + β3(newplot_noFCit) + β4(year2005t) + β5(year2008t) 
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            + β6(FCi)+ β7(newploti) + eit                        (1) 
where net worthit  is the net worth per capita (yuan) of household i in year t. 
preFTRplot_FCit  is the total area per capita of household i’s pre-FTR plots that have a 
forest certificate in year t. newplot_FCit is the total area per capita of household i’s 
new plots that have a forest certificate in year t. newplot_noFCit is the total area per 
capita of household i’s new plots that do not have a forest certificate in year t. The 
coefficients on preFTRplot_FCit, newplot_FCit, and newplot_noFCit are the estimated 
forest tenure reform effects, which provide a measure of the conditional average 
difference in household wealth for changes in households’ per capita  area of plots 
with a forest certificate, new plots with a forest certificate and new plots without a 
forest certificate, respectively. The coefficients on year2005t  and year2008t  control 
for any systematic differences for years 2005 and 2008, respectively. FCi is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if household i had a forest certificate for any plot in any 
year. The coefficient on FCi controls for characteristics that may differ between 
households that received a forest certificate for at least one plot during the recent 
tenure reform and those that did not. newploti is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
of household i had a new plot in any year. The coefficient on newploti controls for 
characteristics that may be different between those households that received a new 
plot during the recent tenure reform and those that did not. 
In addition to the base model (1), we estimate the model controlling for the value 
of the dependent variable, household net worth per capita, in the base year, 2000 
(model 2). And in model (3) we add other base year demographic controls, including: 
household size; head of household’s education level and age; and the number of 
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household members who work, as well as household total area of pre-FTR plots 
without forest certificates and total area of crop production (area of production 
multiplied by the number of harvests) in each year.5 In models (4), (5) and (6), we add 
township, village and household fixed effects, respectively. 
As an extension to the analysis of the effect of the forest tenure reform on 
household wealth, we also estimate the effect of the reform on household NTFP and 
bamboo revenue. To estimate the effect of the forest tenure reform on household 
NTFP and bamboo revenue, we use Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure for 
panel data, which uses the Inverse Mill’s Ratio to take into account selection bias 
(Wooldridge 1995). In the first stage, we use a probit model to estimate the likelihood 
of a household engaging in sales of each forest product.6 As explanatory variables in 
the probit model, we include the number of households that sold each forest product in 
each year in the village and households’ total forest area per capita. We use the 
number of households that sold each forest product in each year in the village as the 
exclusion restriction (i.e., the variable that is included in the first stage probit model 
but omitted from the second stage outcome estimation). This variable is likely to 
impact the decision of a household to sell (or not sell) a forest product but is unlikely 
to impact the household’s decision of what quantity to sell. The estimated parameters 
from the probit are used to calculate an Inverse Mill’s Ratio (i.e., the error from the 
Probit equation explaining selection) for each forest product and year. We then include 
the Inverse Mill’s Ratio as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects estimations to 
capture the selection effect.  
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To estimate the effect of the forest tenure reform on bamboo revenue, we also 
include a dummy variable for each year from 2001 to 2008 to control for systematic 
differences in each year because we have bamboo revenue data for all year from 2000 
to 2008. Lastly, in models (3) thru (5) above for the effect of the forest tenure reform 
on wealth and NTFP revenue we control for the total area of crop production in each 
year. However, we do not have the total area of crop production data for each year 
from 2000 to 2008, and so instead here we control for the total area of crop production 
in the base year (2000). 
3.6 Empirical Results 
 
Overall we find statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has 
increased household wealth (table 3.5).7 Specifically, forest certification of a plot that 
a household had already been managing prior to the reform had the most consistent 
and largest positive effect on household net worth per capita. In all models the 
coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit  is positive (table 3.5, row 1). In models (4) and (5) 
that included township and village fixed effects, respectively, the coefficients on 
preFTRplot_FCit  are statistically significant at the 10% level, while in the remaining 
models, (1) to (3) and (6), they are statistically significant at the 15% level. The 
coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit  in model (6), which includes household fixed effects, 
suggests that for a one hectare per capita of pre-FTR land area that receives a forest 
certificate the effect is an increase in net worth per capita of 5,650 yuan. Households 
on average received forest certificates for 0.14 hectares of their forest land, his implies 
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that stronger property rights in the form of a forest certificate have increased 
household wealth on average by 42% (i.e., on average 5.2% per year). 
Receiving a new plot with a forest certificate also had a positive effect, however 
the evidence is weaker. In all models the coefficients on newplot_FCit is positive 
(table 3.5, row 2) but has a lower magnitude (328 to 820 yuan) than the coefficients on 
preFTRplot_FCit (2923 to 5650 yuan). In models (3) thru (5) the coefficients on 
newplot_FCit are statistically significant at the 10% level or above, while the 
remaining models are insignificant. This suggests that there is also a positive effect on 
wealth when households receive a new plot with a forest certificate, however, the 
effect is not as large as the effect of forest certification of pre-FTR plots. 
Finally, although the coefficient on newplot_noFCit was positive in each model, 
receiving a new plot without a forest certificate did not have a statistically significant 
effect on household net worth per capita (table 3.5, row 3). 
Impact on non-timber forest product sales 
The results suggest that forest certification of a forest plot had no effect on 
household NTFP revenue per capita, as the coefficients on preFTRplot_FCit  or 
newplot_FCit in each model (except for the coefficient on newplot_FCit  in model 1) 
are not statistically significant (table 3.6, rows 1 and 2).8 However, receiving a new 
plot without a forest certificate as a result of the reform had a positive effect on 
households’ bamboo revenue per capita (table 3.6, row 3). The coefficient in each 
model on newplot_noFCit  is positive, and it is significant at least at the 10% level in 
models (1) and (5) and at least at the 20% level in models (4) and (6). The coefficient 
on newplot_noFCit in model (6), which includes household fixed effects, suggests that 
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for a one hectare area per capita increase in forest land (without a forest certificate) the 
effect is an increase in household NTFP revenue per capita of 1,474 yuan. 
Impact on bamboo sales 
The results suggest that forest certification of a plot that a household had already 
been managing prior to the reform has a positive effect on total bamboo revenue, 
while receiving a new plot with a forest certificate has a negative effect on total 
bamboo revenue (table 3.7). However, the evidence in both cases is statistically weak. 
In all models the coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit  is positive, however it is only 
statistically significant in model (3) and (6) at the 5% and 20% level (table 3.7, row 1). 
And in all models the coefficient on newplot_FCit  is negative but it is only 
statistically significant in model (3) at the 5% level (table 3.7, row 2). There is no 
evidence of an effect of receiving a new plot without a forest certificate on bamboo 
sales (tables 3.7, row 3). 
Additionally, the coefficients on each year dummy from 2005 to 2008 capture an 
interesting effect, as they are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
models. This suggests that there is something different about those years with regards 
to bamboo sales revenue. This may be a result of the enthusiasm of farmers, forest 
farms and forestry authorities that have been engaging in the expansion of both fruit 
and nut trees and bamboo plantations over the last two decades, as they are considered 
more profitable than conventional timber plantations and have a less burdensome more 
transparent taxation system (Perez et al. 2004). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
 Over the last decade there has been a call from international institutions, 
NGO’s, and community organizations, for pro-poor forestry policies (Wunder 2001; 
FAO 2003; Sunderlin et al. 2005; Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). Amongst the various pro-
poor forestry policies that have been recommended one that has received notable 
attention and gained momentum in implementation is forest tenure reform (Edmonds 
2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth and White 2004). The hope is that when communities and 
individuals receive stronger rights to ownership and use of forest resources, those 
rights will give them an incentive to invest in managing and protecting those 
resources, and in doing so will also allow poor, rural households to improve their 
livelihoods. 
In this paper, we examined the impact of forest tenure reform on household wealth 
in Fujian Province, where a large-scale reform of forest land tenure began in 2003. 
Empirically, we used a balanced household panel data set among 87 households. We 
examined the effect of the reform on net worth per capita as a measure of wealth. Then 
as an extension we also examined the effect of the reform on total bamboo sales. 
Changes in household forest tenure structure were captured by three variables: the 
total area of pre-FTR plots with a forest certificate; the total area of new plots with a 
forest certificate, and the total area of new plots without a forest certificate. To 
identify the effect of the reform on net worth per capita, NTFP revenue per capita, and 
total bamboo revenue, we used a fixed effects model. Additionally, to identify the 
effect of the reform on total bamboo sales, we used a two-step Heckman selection 
approach for panel data to take into account the effect of selection into engaging in the 
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sale of NTFP or bamboo. 
Results suggest that more secure tenure, resulting from the distribution of forest 
certificates, increased household wealth, although the evidence is statistically weak. 
This positive forest certification effect was stronger on plots that households had been 
managing prior to the recent reform than it was on new plots households received 
during the reform. After identifying a positive effect of the forest tenure reform on 
wealth, we examined its effect on households’ revenue from the sale of forest 
products. Households were relatively more engaged in the sale of NTFP and bamboo 
than in the sale of timber. Therefore, we examined changes in household revenue per 
capita from the sale of NTFP and in total revenue from the sale of bamboo. The results 
suggest that forest certification of a plot that a household had already been managing 
prior to the reform had a positive effect on total bamboo revenue but no significant 
effect on NTFP revenue. Conversely, receiving a new plot without a forest certificate  
had no significant effect on bamboo revenue, while it had a positive effect on NTFP 
revenue. 
While the reason behind the differing effects of receiving a forest certificate or a 
new plot is a question for future analysis, a potential hypothesis is that the differing 
effects may be due to differences in forest stock quantity, quality or type on new plots 
relative to plots that households had already been managing. Testing this hypothesis 
would require an analysis at the plot level; however, we do not have bamboo revenue 
data at the plot level to support such an extension of this analysis. 
This paper provides statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has 
had a positive effect on household wealth in our study area. While the sample is very 
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small, relative to the number of households affected by the forest tenure reform in 
China and China is a large diverse country, this paper does suggest that the forest 
tenure reform garners potential for improving poor rural households’ livelihoods. In 
particular, since only 30% of all forest plots had forest certificates, expanding such 
certification could potentially increase household wealth. It is likely that with forest 
plot certification, tenure security will be enhanced. And increased tenure security will 
stimulate households’ investment in their forest plots, improving their livelihoods. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 It is difficult to be specific about the number of people dependent on forests because 
it depends on the definition of dependent. See Byron and Arnold (1999) and Calibre 
Consultants and Statistical Services Centre (2000) for summaries of existing estimates 
in the literature. 
2
 While the Fujian provincial government formally approved the reform in 2003, 
precedents had already been established in 1998 in Hongtian Village, Yongan County 
of Fujian Province when a rural village suffering from severe deforestation due to 
ineffective collective management, decided to reform forest tenure. Another village, in 
2002 individualized user rights to villagers (those that accepted the forest user rights 
were required to pay a land rental fee to the villages) and sold some of the forest to 
people outside the village to help eliminate village debt (Xu and Jiang 2009). 
3
 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
4
 Households also collected NTFP for their own use but due to the diversity of 
products and units, we have not summarized them here. 
5
 In the year 2000, household total area of pre-FTR plots is equal to the household 
total forest plot area. In year 2005 and 2008, a household’s total area of pre-FTR plots 
changes depending on if it received a forest certificate for a pre-FTR plot or if it 
received a new plot with or without a forest certificate. 
6
 Results from the probit models are presented in appendix table 3.1 and 3.2. 
7
 Table 3.5 summarizes results for the variables of interest. Appendix table 3.3 show 
results with coefficients for all household level control variables. 
8
 Table 3.6 summarizes results for the variables of interest. Appendix table 3.4 shows 
results with coefficients for all household level control variables. 
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Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics for the year 2000 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Net worth per capita (yuan) 1,359.56 6,300.70 -5,000.00 5,0680.98 
Household size 4.90 1.58 2 9 
Number in household who work 2.79 1.26 1 6 
Head of household age (years) 46.43 12.19 26 80 
Head of household education level (years) 5.09 3.12 0 11 
Total forest area (ha/capita) 0.59 1.28 0 6.88 
Total crop production area (ha/capita) 0.08 0.06 0 0.29 
Note: n=87 households. 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Table 3.2  Descriptive statistics for wealth by year 
Year Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Net worth per capita (yuan) 2000 1360 6301 -5000 50681 
2005 1574 6625 -6640 54997 
2008 3349 11142 -9744 69728 
∆ between 2000 and 2008 +1989 1989 -47186 64853 
Note:  n=87 households. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using 
the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 
1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009 
Source:  Authors’ data.. 
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Table 3.3  Forest use and change in use between 2000 (pre-reform) and 2008 (post-
reform) 
  
Unit 
Percent engaging 
in activity 
Mean (based on those 
engaging in activity) 
Mean of 
changes  
between 2000 
and 2008   2000 2008 2000 2008 
Revenue from sale of: 
Bamboo  yuan/capita 26% 24% 207.25 814.30 141.76 
(166.28) (1028.65) (562.25) 
Timber yuan/capita 0% 3% N/A 13835.05 477.07 
N/A (23269.90) (4346.62) 
Non-timber forest products  yuan/capita 23% 71% 2483.22 3654.00 627.90 
(6801.84) (9767.74) (4366.50) 
Net income from sale of: 
Bamboo  yuan/capita 26% 24% 176.94 757.31 136.02 
(182.67) (897.50) (494.24) 
Timber yuan/capita 0% 3% N/A 11823.70 407.72 
N/A (19786.18) (3702.27) 
Harvested for own use: 
Bamboo  sticks/capita 29% 14% 3.34 7.90 0.132 
(2.79) (16.36) (6.65) 
Timber  m3/capita 3% 2% 0.95 0.58 -0.012 
(0.60) (0.12) (0.22) 
Firewood  kilogram/capita 51% 77% 687.14 400.26 -39.28 
        (1395.56) (494.24) (1031.20) 
Notes: n=87 households. Values for the year 2008 where the unit is yuan/capita are adjusted for inflation using the 
rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Mean of changes 
between 2000 and 2008 are calculated by subtracting the 2000 value from the 2010 value for each of the 87 
households and then taking the mean. Net income is calculated by subtracting total harvesting costs from total 
revenue. Harvesting costs include hired labor, rental of machines, felling design, transportation, taxes, and fees but 
do not include family labor. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Table 3.4  Changes in household forest tenure plot structure      
 Forest plot category 
Percent of 
households 
with plot area 
in category 
Mean area 
(ha/capita) 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
  2000 
Pre-FTR plot without a FC 96.6% 0.574 1.259 0 6.883 
Pre-FTR plot with a FC 0 0 0 0 0 
New plot without a FC 0 0 0 0 0 
New plot with a FC 0 0 0 0 0 
All forest plots 96.6% 0.574 1.259 0 6.883 
  2005 
Pre-FTR plot 75% 0.475 1.192 0 6.883 
Pre-FTR plot with a FC 22% 0.122 0.546 0 4.487 
New plot 21% 0.099 0.420 0 3.033 
New plot with a FC 5% 0.068 0.557 0 5.167 
All forest plots 100% 0.763 1.444 0 6.883 
  2008 
Pre-FTR plot 68% 0.340 0.898 0 6.883 
Pre-FTR plot with a FC 23% 0.145 0.552 0 4.487 
New plot 24% 0.115 0.445 0 3.033 
New plot with a FC 7% 0.033 0.230 0 2.067 
All forest plots 94% 0.633 1.142 0 6.883 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR.   
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Table 3.5  Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth 
Dependent Variable:  Net worth (yuan/capita) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 3,002.62 2,923.49 3,144.39 3,339.07 3,343.94 5,650.99 
(1.62) (1.57) (1.61) (1.69)* (1.68)* (1.55) 
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita) 302.01 257.41 587.26 820.12 648.10 328.09 
(1.04) (0.96) (1.67)* (2.04)** (1.71)* (0.56) 
Total area of new plots without a FC  (ha/capita) 6,519.32 5,610.59 5,254.51 5,087.67 5,037.21 4,975.39 
(1.28) (1.09) (1.01) (0.95) (0.94) (0.84) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -814.87 -712.47 -765.766 -759.16 -777.72 -563.33 
(0.71) (1.01) (1.08) (1.02) (1.04) (0.68) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 792.95 910.524 955.10 984.85 965.34 1,433.06 
(0.68) (0.86) (0.96) (0.99) (0.98) (1.42) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year -1,026.73 -658.96 -629.23 -306.57 133.63  
(1.12) (0.83) (0.76) (0.43) (0.18)  
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 
-1,139.13 -700.91 -784.28 -1,310.43 -1,427.50  
 (1.58) (1.20) (1.33) (1.61) (1.13)  
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.60  
(3.08)*** (2.92)*** (2.77)*** (2.77)***  
Constant 2,039.65 894.28 4,051.212 4,915.49 4,093.74  
(2.18)** (2.25)** (1.79)* (1.77)* (1.80)*  
N 261 261 261 261 261 261 
R2 0.10 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.52 
Household characteristics: No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects: No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect type: - - - Township Village  Household 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price 
index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Household characteristics control variables in models (3) to (5) include the following variables for the year 
2000: household size, head of households’ education level and age, and the number of household members who work, as well as the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and 
the total area of crop production in each year. Model (6) includes only the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and the total area of crop production in each year as control 
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data.
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Table 3.6  Effects of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest product revenue 
Dependent Variable:  Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 2,046.42 2,274.99 1,228.47 1,350.06 1,319.21 10,270.98 
(0.87) (0.95) (0.57) (0.62) (0.58) (0.60) 
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita) -4,092.46 -2,857.37 -2,042.04 -2,221.45 -2,597.95 -69,184.37 
(1.93)* (1.27) (1.01) (1.02) (1.11) (0.69) 
Total area of new plots without a FC  (ha/capita) 7,414.64 1,200.47 1,567.79 1,890.45 3,087.09 1,474.69 
(2.90)*** (1.29) (1.24) (1.59) (1.92)* (1.44) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -2,352.53 335.02 28.71 -784.48 -1,002.07 -536.48 
(1.27) (0.32) (0.02) (0.49) (0.67) (0.46) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 -1,736.00 1,014.04 689.68 776.43 607.73 1,555.88 
(0.91) (0.94) (0.50) (0.58) (0.53) (0.90) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year 1,189.62 613.45 932.95 2,400.96 2,879.08  
(0.66) (0.36) (0.55) (1.11) (1.24)  
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 
-130.08 -932.15 -648.20 488.36 604.35  
 (0.09) (0.68) (0.48) (0.48) (0.61)  
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.76  
(9.69)*** (6.78)*** (6.36)*** (3.96)***  
Inverse Mill’s ratio -2,652.86 -1,858.43 -2,242.50 90.25 -103.90 -575.27 
(1.45) (1.22) (1.18) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20) 
Constant 4843.68 2079.22 2369.69 -4262.89 -4623.87  
(2.17)** (1.34) (0.36) (0.83) (1.22)  
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 
R2 0.19 0.36 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.74 
Household characteristics: No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects: No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect type: - - - Township Village  Household 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price 
index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Household characteristics control variables in models (3) to (5) include the following variables for the year 
2000: household size, head of household’s education level and age, and the number of household members who work, as well as the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and 
the total area of crop production in each year. Model (6) includes only the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and the total area of crop production in each year as control 
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data.
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Table 3.7  Effects of the forest tenure reforms on total bamboo revenue  
Dependent variable: Total bamboo revenue (yuan) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 296.81 289.15 459.50 286.13 257.90 3823.95 
(1.09) (1.07) (2.03)** (1.16) (1.01) (1.43) 
Total area of new plots with a FC (ha/capita) -5434.02 -5360.35 -8609.17 -4708.40 -3659.83 -42893.60 
(1.21) (1.23) (2.25)** (1.05) (0.81) (0.80) 
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita) -45.18 -33.34 -149.83 -230.93 -217.62 15.02 
(0.23) (0.17) (0.79) (1.26) (1.18) (0.10) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year 42.53 20.85 -288.34 -353.66 -490.75 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.71) (0.73) (1.01) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 
-221.69 -171.80 -135.43 657.44 814.93 
 (0.54) (0.40) (0.35) (1.40) (1.82)* 
Total bamboo revenue in 2000 
 0.24 0.47 0.266 0.31 
 
 (1.20) (2.30)** (0.83) (0.96) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC  (ha/capita)   190.06 148.57 120.54 
  (4.05)*** (3.01)*** (2.19)** 
Dummy =1 if the year is 2001 487.46 533.55 209.71 230.29 113.19 -35.31 
 
(1.26) (1.39) (0.58) (0.63) (0.31) (0.08) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2002 271.98 297.38 240.61 223.96 174.16 40.43 
(1.36) (1.63) (0.92) (0.81) (0.59) (0.09) 
Dummy =1 if the year is 2003 1024.07 1097.13 791.73 851.71 740.19 116.17 
(2.22)** (2.42)** (1.87)* (2.04)** (1.72)* -0.260 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2004 1380.29 1405.01 1510.18 1520.47 1538.32 1490.95 
(1.06) (1.08) (1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (1.16) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 1303.33 1402.60 1262.39 1480.79 1492.19 1356.95 
(3.71)*** (4.12)*** (3.98)*** (4.36)*** (4.17)*** (3.20)*** 
Dummy =1 if the year is 2006 1967.08 2071.97 2113.13 2284.96 2218.46 2192.33 
(3.55)*** (3.83)*** (3.89)*** (4.20)*** (4.21)*** (4.35)*** 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2007 1739.41 1854.96 1831.88 2085.29 2008.44 2174.54 
 (3.58)*** (3.78)*** (3.97)*** (4.30)*** (4.23)*** (3.94)*** 
Table continued on the next page. 
  
 
204
 
Table 3.7 [Continued] Effects of the forest tenure reforms on total bamboo revenue 
   
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 2411.15 2495.18 2665.31 2874.32 2861.10 2941.85 
(5.18)*** (5.54)*** (7.52)*** (7.41)*** (6.91)*** (5.68)*** 
Inverse Mills Ratio -855.64 -826.32 -732.90 -475.30 -83.24 241.15 
(2.59)** (2.49)** (2.31)** (1.18) (0.16) (0.57) 
Constant 1584.61 1351.46 3157.85 2633.68 1675.37 
(5.03)*** (3.44)*** (3.83)*** (2.76)*** (1.63) 
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R2 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.55 
Fixed effects: No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects type: - - - Township Village Household 
Note:  Model (4) and (5) add township and village fixed effects, respectively, to model (2). Model (6) adds household fixed effects to model (2) and does not include the household 
characteristic controls from the base year (2000), the dummy indicating if a household had at least one new plot in any year, nor the dummy indicating if a household had at least 
one plot with a forest certificate in any year. All models also control for the inverse mills ratio for each year from 2000 to 2008. Values for the years 2001 to 2008 are adjusted for 
inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Forest certificate abbreviated to FC.  Forest tenure reform abbreviated 
to FTR. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Figure 3.1  Change in forest tenure plot structure 
 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Figure 3.2  Mean net worth per capita by household forest tenure reform status 
 
Panel A.  Mean net worth per capita by whether or not a household got a forest certificate  
 
Panel B. Mean net worth per capita by whether or not a household got a new plot
 
Panel C. Mean net worth per capita by household forest tenure reform participation status
 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation 
using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).   
1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Figure 3.3  Mean non-timber forest product revenue per capita by household forest tenure 
reform status 
 
Panel A. Mean NTFP revenue per capita by whether or not a household got a forest certificate  
 
 
Panel B. Mean NTFP revenue per capita by whether or not a household got a new plot 
 
Panel C. Mean NTFP revenue per capita by household forest tenure reform participation status 
 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Non-timber forest product abbreviated to NTFP. Values for the years 
2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009). 
Source:  Authors’ data.
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Figure 3.4  Mean total bamboo revenue by household forest tenure reform status 
 
Panel A. Mean total bamboo revenue by whether or not a household gets a forest certificate 
for at least one forest plot during the forest tenure reform 
 
Panel B. Mean total bamboo revenue by whether or not a household gets at least one new plot 
during the forest tenure reform 
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Panel C. Mean total bamboo revenue by household participation status in the forest tenure 
reform  
 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Values for the years 2001 to 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the 
rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan 
(August 1, 2009). 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Appendix Table 3.1  Probit regression results for participation in non-timber forest 
product sales 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
total non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita) > 0 
  2000 2005 2008 
Number of households in the village that sold NTFPs 0.497 0.3145 0.3459 
(3.89)*** (4.36)*** (4.61)*** 
Total forest area (hectares/capita) -0.388 0.174 0.219 
(1.10) (1.46) (0.96) 
Constant -1.641 -1.08 -1.303 
(4.64)*** (3.19)*** (3.22)*** 
N 87 87 87 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.26 0.32 
Note:  Non-timber forest products abbreviated as NTFPs Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 
10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 3.2  Probit regression results for participation in bamboo revenue 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bamboo revenue > 0 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of households in the village that sold bamboo 0.422 0.459 0.424 0.440 0.484 0.377 0.360 0.344 0.383 
(4.89)*** (4.86)*** (3.94)*** (5.13)*** (4.44)*** (5.61)*** (4.58)*** (4.74)*** (4.67)*** 
Total forest area (hectares/capita) -0.068 -0.054 0.001 -0.027 -0.037 -0.015 -0.067 -0.066 -0.038 
(0.65) (0.61) (0.02) (0.41) (0.42) (0.35) (0.73) (1.15) (0.57) 
Constant -1.631 -1.879 -1.670 -1.896 -1.851 -1.552 -1.514 -1.343 -1.601 
(4.96)*** (5.08)*** (5.14)*** (5.08)*** (4.84)*** (4.95)*** (5.17)*** (5.14)*** (4.99)*** 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.38 0.19 0.41 0.31 0.37 0.292 0.28 0.29 
Log Likelihood -34.103 -28.424 -37.907 -28.608 -30.644 -36.462 -32.350 -37.57 -34.32 
Note:  Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 3.3  Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth 
Dependent variable: Net worth (yuan/capita) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 3,002.60 2,923.49 3,144.39 
(1.62) (1.57) (1.61) 
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita) 302.01 257.41 587.26 
(1.04) (0.96) (1.67)* 
Total area of new plots without a FC  (ha/capita) 6,519.32 5,610.59 5,254.51 
(1.28) (1.09) (1.01) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -814.87 -712.47 -765.77 
(0.71) (1.01) (1.08) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 792.95 910.52 955.10 
(0.68) (0.86) (0.96) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year -1,026.73 -658.96 -629.23 
(1.12) (0.83) (0.76) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 
-1,139.13 -700.91 -784.28 
 (1.58) (1.20) (1.33) 
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.66 0.61 
(3.08)*** (2.92)*** 
Household size in 2000 -863.08 
(2.05)** 
Head of household age in 2000 (years) -12.65 
(0.36) 
Head of household education level in 2000 (years) 34.10 
(0.28) 
Number of household members who work in 2000 371.19 
(1.09) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita) 406.85 
(0.98) 
Total area of crop production (ha/capita) 3733.63 
(0.59) 
Constant 2,039.65 894.28 4,051.21 
(2.18)** (2.25)** (1.79)* 
N 261 261 261 
R2 0.10 0.35 0.37 
Fixed effects: No No No 
Fixed effect type: - - - 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2009). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% 
level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
  
               Table continued on the next page. 
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Appendix Table 3.3 [Continued].  Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth 
Dependent variable: Net worth (yuan/capita) 
Model: (4) (5) (6) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with FC (ha/capita) 3,339.07 3,343.94 5,650.99 
(1.69)* (1.68)* (1.55) 
Total area of new plots with FC (ha/capita) 820.12 649.00 328.09 
(2.04)** (1.71)* (0.56) 
Total area of new plots without FC (ha/capita) 5,087.67 5,037.21 4,975.39 
(0.95) (0.94) (0.84) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -759.16 -777.72 -563.33 
(1.02) (1.04) (0.68) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 984.85 965.34 1,433.06 
(0.99) (0.98) (1.42) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year -306.57 133.63 
(0.43) (0.18) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year -1,310.43 -1,427.50 
 (1.61) (1.13) 
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.58 0.60 
(2.77)*** (2.77)*** 
Household size in 2000 -812.15 -738.81 
(1.74)* (1.68)* 
Head of household age in 2000 (years) -8.35 3.95 
-0.23 -0.11 
Head of household education level in 2000 (years) 86.84 126.98 
-0.64 -0.71 
Number of household who work in 2000 239.06 88.49 
-0.65 -0.29 
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita) 566.25 511.81 3396.87 
-1.28 -1.07 -1.06 
Total area of crop production (ha/capita) 3082.39 4454.53 -4140.63 
-0.45 -0.56 -0.38 
Constant 4,915.49 4,093.74 
(1.77)* (1.80)* 
N 261 261 261 
R2 0.38 0.38 0.52 
Fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects type: Township Village  Household 
Note:  Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2009). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% 
level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 3.4.  Effect of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest product revenue 
Dependent variable: Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 2,046.42 2,274.99 1,228.47 
 
(0.87) (0.95) (0.57) 
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita) -4,092.46 -2,857.37 -2,042.04 
 
(1.93)* (1.27) (1.01) 
Total area of new plots without a FC  (ha/capita) 7,414.64 1,200.47 1,567.79 
 
(2.90)*** (1.29) (1.24) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -2,352.53 335.02 28.71 
 
(1.27) (0.32) (0.02) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 -1,736.00 1,014.04 689.68 
 
(0.91) (0.94) (0.50) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year 1,189.62 613.45 932.95 
 
(0.66) (0.36) (0.55) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 
-130.08 -932.15 -648.20 
 (0.09) (0.68) (0.48) 
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.961 0.91 
 
(9.69)*** (6.78)*** 
Household size in 2000 290.31 
 
(0.75) 
Head of household age in 2000 (years) -9.59 
 
(0.17) 
Head of household education level in 2000 (years) 160.22 
 
(0.48) 
Number of household who work in 2000 -727.70 
 
(1.05) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita) -81.13 
 
(0.16) 
Total area of crop production (ha/capita) 4200.56 
 
(0.65) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -2,652.864 -1,858.427 -2,242.50 
 
(1.45) (1.22) (1.18) 
Constant 4843.682 2079.217 2369.69 
 
(2.17)** (1.34) (0.36) 
N 129 129 129 
R2 0.19 0.36 0.38 
Fixed effects: No No No 
Fixed effects type: - - - 
Notes:  All models control for the inverse mills ratio for each year from 2000, 2005 and 2008. Forest certificate 
abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for 
inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant 
at the 1% level. 
Source:  Authors’ data. 
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Appendix Table 3.4 [Continued]. Effect of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest 
product revenue 
Dependent variable: Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita) 
Model: (4) (5) (6) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita) 1,350.06 1,319.21 10,270.98 
(0.62) (0.58) (0.60) 
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita) -2,221.45 -2,597.95 -69,184.3 
(1.02) (1.11) (0.69) 
Total area of new plots without a FC  (ha/capita) 1,890.45 3,087.09 1,474.69 
(1.59) (1.92)* (1.44) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005 -784.48 -1,002.07 -536.48 
(0.49) (0.67) (0.46) 
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008 776.43 607.73 1,555.88 
(0.58) (0.53) (0.90) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year 2,400.96 2,879.08 
(1.11) (1.24) 
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year 488.36 604.35 
 (0.48) (0.61) 
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita) 0.87 0.76 
(6.36)*** (3.96)*** 
Household size in 2000 495.85 535.57 
(1.28) (1.20) 
Head of household age in 2000 (years) 67.98 74.38 
(1.14) (1.32) 
Head of household education level in 2000 (years) 442.68 449.80 
(1.25) (1.38) 
Number of household who work in 2000 -983.92 -1029.86 
(1.29) (1.34) 
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita) 491.29 436.64 14991.32 
(0.95) (0.82) (1.68)* 
Total area of crop production (ha/capita) 6141.02 7163.93 -13608.05 
(0.87) (1.02) (1.16) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 90.25 -103.90 -575.27 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.20) 
Constant -4262.89 -4623.87 
(0.83) (1.22) 
N 129 129 129 
R2 0.43 0.44 0.74 
Fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects type: Township Village Household 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The underlying motivation for this dissertation research was to examine if property 
rights matter for forest management. Economic theory predicts that improved tenure 
security in the form of strengthened property rights will give households an incentive 
to invest in their forest resources, which will stimulate income, ultimately increasing 
households’ wealth. However, in the past tenure reforms have not always led to these 
intended effects. While researchers have empirically examined the impacts of tenure 
reforms, they have not examined potential heterogeneity in responses due to 
differences in households’ risk and time preferences. Furthermore, these reforms are 
often implemented in areas where the poverty rate is high. Those living in poverty are 
assumed to have both high discount rates and high levels of risk aversion, which make 
them less likely to make investments. Such characteristics may also hinder the 
intended effects of forest tenure reforms.  
In this dissertation, I examined these issues in the context of rural Fujian, China, 
where a large-scale reform of forest property rights began in 2003 in areas where the 
poverty rate is still high. To explore these issues, I used panel household survey data 
and risk and time preference data collected using field experiments with real monetary 
rewards in empirical models that aimed to alleviate potential biases due to self-
selection into receiving a forest certificate for a plot. The four main hypotheses 
examined included: H1) Forest property right reforms affect how individuals manage 
their forest resources; H2) Time and risk preferences affect forest management and 
therefore also augment individual forest management responses to forest property 
rights reforms; H3) Time and risk preferences differ across individuals and are 
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correlated with wealth; and H4) Household wealth increases as a result of the forest 
tenure reforms.  
In manuscript 1, I tested H1 and H2. In the base difference-in-differences 
estimation that does not allow for heterogeneity in time and risk preferences, I found 
that on average there was no significant forest certification effect on forest 
management. This suggests that on average that reform is not working as intended. 
However, it should be noted that this insignificant effect may be due to the possibility 
that households are still in a transition phase. Since forest management requires long 
term investments and our data is at most 5 years post-reform, it may be that not 
enough time has passed since households received their forest certificates to discern 
the reforms intended effects of increased investment in forest resources. In the future, 
researchers should collect additional post-reform data to see if the reform has its 
intended effects over a loner period of time. 
Interestingly, when I allowed for heterogeneity in forest certification effect due to 
households’ time and risk preferences, I found that the average overall forest 
certification effect had been masking a variety of responses that were occurring but 
which varied depending on households’ time and risk preferences. As expected we 
found that in response to receiving a forest certificate households that were more risk 
averse used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying inputs than those that 
were risk neutral or risk seeking. This supports the hypothesis that households believe 
that the forest certificate gives them greater assurance that if they invest or delay 
harvest then they will be able to get their returns in the future. More generally, we 
found that those households that were risk averse, used less labor for applying inputs, 
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spent less on forest inputs, and used more labor for harvesting. This suggests that in 
areas where many households are risk averse, policymakers may want to couple forest 
tenure reforms with other programs and policy instruments to reduce households’ risks 
(e.g., pest, disease, forest fire). Such coupling may stimulate investment in forest 
resources generally and also in response to forest tenure reforms. Future research 
should examine how households perceive the risks specifically associated with forest 
investment and what the levels of actual risks are in order to inform policymakers. 
Such information would aid policymakers in identifying which risks need to me dealt 
with and to design programs or instruments (e.g., programs to reduce threat of pests 
and fire; insurance programs; encourage the formation of voluntary cooperatives 
within village as a risk-sharing mechanism) that specifically help to mitigate those 
risks. 
In Manuscript 1, I also found that more loss averse households used more labor for 
harvesting in response to receiving a forest certificate. This suggests that loss aversion 
affects harvesting responses to receiving a forest certificate based on the manifestation 
of loss aversion in an endowment effect of the forest certificate. Receiving a forest 
certificate may have an endowment effect in that once a household receives a forest 
certificate for a plot, it becomes more painful for the household to experience a loss of 
forest stock from that plot than from other forest plots without forest certificates, and 
therefore loss averse households would harvest more in response to getting a forest 
certificate for a plot. This suggests that future research should examine households’ 
demand for insurance that hedges against the risk of loss of forest stock from plots 
with forest certificates. 
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Lastly, in response to receiving a forest certificate those with higher discount rates 
used less labor for applying input and spent less on forest inputs than those with lower 
discount rates. And in Manuscript 2, I found statistically weak evidence that the poorer 
a household was the higher their discount rate (i.e. more impatient) was. Combined, 
these findings suggests that forest tenure reforms should be coupled with programs to 
reduce poverty and to allow for and encourage borrowing. As poverty is alleviated, 
households’ discount rates may fall, making them more likely to be able to invest, 
whether from their own accumulated savings or by borrowing. While a component of 
China’s forest tenure reform has been the establishment of a loan program that allows 
households to obtain a loan using their forest certificated plot as collateral, in 2008 
only 1 of the 104 surveyed households had used their forest certificate as collateral for 
a loan. Further research should investigate why households are not taking advantage of 
this credit opportunity. 
This research used risk and time preference field experiments designed in a 
generic context. The case can be made that preferences measured in a generic context 
may not translate well to preferences in forest management decisions. I did find that 
these preferences had some effects on forest management and responses to receiving a 
forest certificate. While this suggests that these generic risk and time preferences are 
relevant for forest management decision, it would be valuable in future research to 
design and implement risk and time preference field experiments that are 
contextualized in a forest decision-making problem in order to examine if context 
matters. 
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In manuscript 3, I found statistically weak evidence that improved tenure security 
in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita by 42% between 2000 
and 2008. Furthermore, I found that there was also statistically weak evidence that 
forest certification increased bamboo revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a 
forest certificate) increased non-timber forest product revenue. This suggests that even 
in this early post-reform time period, the forest tenure reform in China appears to be 
improving households’ wealth. Given the long-term time horizon of forest investment, 
it may be that wealth will increase more over the longer term. In the future, 
researchers should collect additional post-reform data to see if the reform has a more 
significant impact on households’ wealth over a longer period of time. 
The overall goal of this research was to understand how heterogeneity in time and 
risk preferences affected responses to forest tenure reforms. I have found that these 
preferences matter for forest management and responses to forest tenure reforms. This 
suggests that policymakers who are going forward with a tenure reform should 
consider the particular context of the reform and consider coupling the reform with 
appropriate programs and instruments to alleviate poverty and to help households’ to 
deal with risks and make long-term investments to further stimulate the intended 
effects of the reform—increased investment in forest resources and improved 
livelihoods.  
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Appendix A. Risk Preference Task Instructions 
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Appendix B.  Risk Preference Task Record Sheets 
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Appendix C. Time Preference Task Instructions 
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Appendix D.  Time Preference Task Record Sheets 
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Appendix E. Earnings Record Sheet 
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